the rules of Architecture, because, without their assistance, he very regularly places one stone upon another; habit enables him to do this, and he can assign no reason for his manner of proceeding. The perfection of the mind is not merely to act and think, but to think and act with deliberation and regularity; its actions and thoughts would otherwise want the merit of accuracy, and be the suggestions of chance only. The understanding would be determined in its pursuits by the objects casually presented to the mind, instead of forming its own determination; it would be confined to those particular objects, and remain incapable of applying to other objects with the same discernment and judgment. Whereas, a Philosopher directs his attention not only to the objects that immediately engage it, but to the relation they bear to a vast number of others, and thus enlarges and improves his knowledge to the highest degree. Scrutinizing in this manner the ideas presented to his mind, he perceives, on the one hand, the slightest difference,

and, on the other, the least resemblance that may exist between them. Now this is what properly constitutes a Metaphysician, and distinguishes him from the vulgar. We find in them the same difference as in an uneducated person, who occasionally expresses himself correctly, and a Man of education, who always does so, because he speaks with reflection and according to the rules of Grammar.

Just now, said EUGENIUS, I believed myself becoming unexpectedly a Metaphysician; but as so much reflection and so many rules are required, I again despair of ever being one.

I should have thought, interrupted LEANDER, that you would have been rather stimulated to fresh exertions. If you have entered into the spirit of what I have said, you cannot fail to see that nothing is more worthy a RATIONAL BEING than to make such an accurate analysis of his thoughts as to be able to distinguish and combine them as perfectly as possible.

What you propose, replied EUGENIUS, had a fair appearance; but, when I re

collect the disgust I experienced from the subject, while pursuing my academical studies, I can scarcely expect them to prove less distasteful, at the present moment; even the strange names that encumber them are enough to deter me, Abstractions, Universals, Individuals, Relations; nothing can be more difficultnothing less profitable.

Are you one then, said LEANDER, smiling, to be frightened by words? why, it is worse than to be frightened at your own shadow!

It is not words in themselves that displease me, answered EUGENIUS, but such barbarous words as seem to me without meaning, and in which no one could ever make me discover any meaning.

Would you believe, said LEANDER, that those terms, which you complain of as so barbarous, signify nearly the same things as those you thought so plain, when we last conversed on the subject. shall judge by the term Abstraction, which seems the most difficult, and which is most important to be well understood.

You

Have you never remarked in an object certain faculties, qualities, or circumstances which are really inseparable from it? Thus the Understanding and the Will are really inseparable from the Soul, for an Understanding without a Will, or a Will without an Understanding, would be no longer a Soul-indeed would be Nothing; and yet in our mind and thoughts we can separate these two things which are in themselves inseparable. We can think sometimes of the Will without thinking of the Understanding, or, of the Understanding without thinking of the Will; so, also, Colour is inseparable from the thing coloured; and, it is impossible that there should be really Colour where there is not something coloured, as Wood, Stone, Gold, Silver, or some other thing; and yet in thought we may separate the Colour from the thing coloured, and think of Colour without thinking of what is coloured.

What you say is evident, interrupted EUGENIUS; I understand it without difficulty. But what has this to do with the term Abstraction, which you undertook

to explain to me, and which is commonly said to be the principal object of Metaphysics?

What you find so evident and free from difficulty, answered LEANDER, is just what Philosophers understand by the word Abstraction. This word signifies nothing else than Separation, from the Latin verb, Abstrahere—that is, to separate. Abstraction, then, is the separation which the mind effects by thought, of things in themselves not separate.

I cannot but wonder, said EUGENIUS, that I, and so many good people with me, should hitherto have heard the term Abstraction so frequently repeated without comprehending it, when, it seems, there is no difficulty in it whatever. But I wonder still more, how Metaphysics can be devoted to such a frivolous occupation as the consideration of Abstractions; for where is the use of regarding, as separate, things which are not so? Is it not to see them in a different state from that in which they actually exist, and, conse. quently, to see them in a false light?