will they cease to be, as I before said, the principle of all the Sciences, and UNIVERSAL SCIENCE.

While LEANDER was thus speaking, a shower of rain came on, which interrupted their walk and conversation. It was, however, very soon resumed in the manner following.

ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS.

DIALOGUE III.

In your last conversation, said EUGENIUS, you impressed me with a high idea of Metaphysics, when you pointed out their extensive application. But may it not be feared that the subject is too vast for the mind to grasp? According to you, a Treatise of Metaphysics must embrace every Science and every branch of knowledge imaginable; in this case, however concisely it may be written, it would be so voluminous as to fill an entire library.

I see the force of your objection, replied LEANDER; a Treatise would be interminable, were it to attempt to explain in detail every thing to which Metaphysics

may be applied. And so would a Treatise on Eloquence or on Architecture, if it were to lay down particular rules for every individual work, constructed by the help of Eloquence or of Architecture; but in order to circumscribe a Treatise of Metaphysics within due bounds, how do we proceed? we dwell at first upon those objects of thought, which are most essential and may serve to conduct us to all the rest; such, for instance, are the conceptions of the Mind itself. Besides, as nothing is more important than to establish the truth and evidence of our knowledge, a Treatise of Metaphysics should make that its first and principal business. It should, moreover, aim at laying down the most precise notions of all that most generally engages our thoughts, when we contemplate the natures and properties of all Beings, and especially of Spiritual Beings, the most excellent of all; hence some have represented Metaphysics as the Science of Beings, or of Being in general. Thus, Metaphysics having taught us to make an exact analysis of our know

ledge and of the mind, which is its seat, as well as of the properties of those Beings which mostly attract its notice, enable us, also, to employ the same method on any particular subject, worth knowing with exactness. They accustom us, by such an exercise of our faculties, to think and judge, not as the vulgar, whose knowledge is confused and superficial, but with all the precision and correctness of which the human mind is capable.

Your exposition, said EUGENIUS, promises to be as interesting as the Treatises I have heard spoken of are uninviting; but allow me to observe, you lay no stress on Abstraction; which is, however, as you before told me, the principal object of Metaphysics.

You remind me, said LEANDER, that I have omitted the use of the word Abstraction, but I have not omitted to speak of what is signified by it; for it expresses that operation of the Mind, by which it thinks of one property or circumstance of a thing, without thinking of its other properties or circumstances. Now to

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