have brought against the Prince of Modern Philosophers; how unceremoniously you treat Descartes and his followers!

Yes, interrupted LEANDER; I would treat them as a Philosopher should; that is, without mercy as they themselves have treated Aristotle and the Ancients. But this is not our present business.What I have been saying, is not of a nature to be set in its full light in a moment. Besides, we have been talking long while and I must hasten to keep an engagement I have made. It is sufficient for the present to have made it clear to you, that what may sometimes appear minute and trifling in a Metaphysical truth, is frequently of the greatest importance in its consequences.

These consequences are so strange, said EUGENIUS, that I entreat you not to insist on my admitting them so hastily, nor till I have had leisure to think of them more attentively. Much as I confide in your understanding, I still require time to fix these things in my mind, and habituate myself to them.

I applaud your caution, replied LEANDER; it is not right to admit any thing as true, till we have ourselves examined the truth of it. It will afford me great pleasure, if you would no longer regard as frivolous the subtilties of Metaphysics, provided I shew the certainty of the consequences I have spoken of.

EUGENIUS assured LEANDER of his readiness to pursue the course he might point out, and to give all possible attention to what he might say; and then, after some mutual civilities, they parted.

F

ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS.

DIALOGUE IV.

IN their next interview, EUGENIUS began the conversation by informing LEANDER that he was now perfectly sensible of the importance of never taking an Abstraction for an independent reality, and of always confining himself to the most rigid and precise truth. But, added he, with respect to truth, I have myself experienced the inconvenience, or abuse of Abstractions, in my endeavours to form to myself a clear notion of what is truth. Allow me then, for my satisfaction, to put again that old and celebrated question, What is Truth? for it appears to me that

no sufficient answer has been yet given to it.

The Philosophers have done so, said LEANDER; for they define Truth to be an agreement of our thoughts with their objects.

This definition had escaped my memory, said EUGENIUS; but I must confess, notwithstanding you have reminded me of it, I am still dissatisfied; for, if truth be an agreement of my thoughts, it is then a particular or circumstance of my thoughts, it is dependent on them, it does not exist of itself, it cannot be eternal; now all this appears to contradict the finest saying of Philosophers of very high authority, respecting the nature of Truth. May there not be Abstractions taken for realities in what they have advanced on this subject?

Your suspicion, replied LEANder, is quite as well founded as their authority. Certain it is, that Truth being no other thing than a particular circumstance, or quality of our consciousness, and of our thoughts, is so dependent on them, that were there no thoughts, nor consciousness