Science by requesting you not to condemn it; or, at least, to suspend your judgment till you know what it really is; the interest of the Science and your own are both at stake; the science would be greatly injured if deprived of the countenance of a man of your understanding, and you would act a part little worthy of you, in passing sentence without examining the cause.

But, said EUGENIUS, may I not, as the Courts of Law sometimes do, refuse to take cognizance of the cause, and so dismiss it without prejudice to either party? And in thus acting I should be guilty of no injustice, for there may be preliminary objections of so much weight against an opinion, as to render any examination of it unnecessary.

All then that we shall require, resumed LEANDER, is for you to establish the justice of your objections.

I understand you, interrupted EUGENIUS; and in order to satisfy you of the reasonableness of my opinion, I have only to say that all the subjects which I

have seen handled by the most famous Metaphysians have, like unsubstantial phantoms, melted into air. Witness the celebrated controversy on occasional causes between M. Arnaud and P. Malebranche, who soared so much above vulgar apprehension, that no one could understand them; and, probably, they did not understand themselves.

That is, interrupted LEANDER, you make Metaphysics responsible for the faults of Metaphysicians. This reminds me of a saying of Rochefoucault: "The world is full of devotees, who disgust one with devotion; and of friends, who disgust one with friendship; and yet neither friendship nor devotion is to blame."So, in the present instance, is it the fault of Metaphysics, if some have carried them to too great a length, or misapplied them? The best things are the most liable to be abused; reason itself is sometimes employed to uphold, by the vicious exercise of its powers, the most unreasonable opinions; and Metaphysics may be served in a like manner, and yet be not

the less entitled to our regard; for, in my view of the case, Metaphysics are reason carried to the highest perfection.

If that were so, said EUGENIUS, it would go far to remove my prejudices. I have all along adhered to them, believing them to be well founded. But I am ready to relinquish them, if you can convince me that they are groundless. I would even entreat you to do so now, were I not fearful of such a dry subject being unsuitable to a conversation which, by the very name of Metaphysics, must have already wearied the company.Here those who were present interrupted EUGENIUS, assuring him that they would listen with pleasure to the continuation of his discussion with LEANDER, for what they had hitherto heard had nothing of that repulsive character, which seemed inseparable from Metaphysics; and they had even some curiosity to see how matters, usually accounted so crabbed and frivolous, could be made the subject of an amusing and rational conversation. - I gladly accept the kind permission of the

company, said EUGENIUS, and would ask LEANDER to inform me, how he understands Metaphysics to be the perfection of reason? Is it possible that we could have hitherto prized reason so highly, and yet be so careless about Metaphysics?

We sometimes prize a thing without being aware of it, said LEANDER, smiling; and, besides, a person may possess talents of which he is unconscious; like the Man in the Comedy, who had been talking prose all his life without ever once suspecting it. The comparison may appear somewhat ludicrous, but it is nevertheless just; and, whoever knows how to think with all the precision and exactness of which human reason is capable, is really and truly a Metaphysician, whether he be aware of it or not.

Is it possible, asked EUGENIUS, that all the world should have regarded as a most abstruse part of knowledge what, according to you, is so plain and practical, and level to the capacity of all the world?

Metaphysics, said LEANDER, are level to the capacity of all the world, because they

are not what all the world supposes them to be. No one can think with clearness and precision on every subject; but on certain points, all exercise their thoughts ike able Metaphysicians. This arises from the knowledge and experience they have of the subject with which they are become familiar. Thus an Attorney would probably have very confused and incorrect notions on every thing relating to literature; and yet he employs Metaphysics with wonderful address in the practice of the courts, and the conduct of a law-suit. His ideas on that subject are most distinct and precise.

If you metamorphose an Attorney into a Metaphysician, said EUGENIUS, I suppose you will soon do the like by the Merchant and Financier; and with better reason, by the Diplomatist and the Statesman.

Even so, interrupted LEANDER; I will engage to do it by every man who is accurately versed in any part of knowledge whatever it may be; such, for instance, as the skilful Musician in Music, the