eminent Painter in Painting-nay, more, I could even point out the prevalence of Metaphysics among certain Artisans and even among the Peasantry, whom we look upon as so rude and uneducated; for, on whatever regards their immediate interest, they display an admirable sagacity in considering the matter in every possible shape now in this consists the most essential and refined office of Metaphysics.

But, said EUGENIUS, if all men are thus by nature Metaphysicians, each in his own trade, Metaphysics have no distinctive character. Why, then, do their advocates give them such high-sounding names, as Science by pre-eminence; the principle and foundation of the Sciences-in a word, the UNIVERSAL SCIENCE?

If it be true, replied LEANDER, that they enter into every thing, and are, besides, a true science, then it is not demanding too much for them to style them UNIVERSAL SCIENCE. If, moreover, they lead us, as I just now said, to think of every thing with the greatest exactness and precision of which the human mind

and reason are capable, can we be wrong in regarding them as Science by preeminence; the principle and foundation of the Sciences? For what constitutes the most excellent and fundamental part of every science, is an exact and precise knowledge of the object to which it is applied.

But, resumed EUGENIUS, I have not yet fully explained myself. My question is, why, since every one is naturally a Metaphysician in the thing in which he is most conversant, we should regard as a particular science, what is an employment common and natural to all?

Is it not common and natural to all, answered LEANDER, to reason, to speak, to sing, and to walk? and yet there are particular studies for each of these faculties, such as Logic for reasoning justly, Rhetoric for speaking correctly, Music for singing agreeably, and Dancing for walking with grace and firmness. Each of those exercises pre-supposes certain faculties common to all men; but, the purpose of each is to carry them to perfection.

It is possible that a particular individual may have been so favoured by nature as, without the assistance of Logic, or of Rhetoric, or of Music, or of the art of Dancing, to reason, speak, sing, or dance, better than some who have made it their study; but had he pursued the same course as they, he would probably have found himself a still greater proficient in each of those exercises; as the others would have been less so, if they had studied it less. This is just the case of Metaphysics. The power of thinking of things with clearness and precision is common to all men; but some, either through natural talent and an habitual attention to things of an intellectual nature, are able to think of them with more correctness and discrimination than others who are professed Metaphysicians; and yet the notions of the former would have been still more correct if they had applied themselves to the study of Metaphysics. This Science, then, proposes, as its peculiar province, to make an exact analysis of the objects of thought, so as to enable us to judge of every thing presen

ted to the mind with the utmost possible precision.

I think, said EUGENIUS, I have heard very different definitions of Metaphysics from the one you have given. Yours, indeed, is more clear and attractive than the others; but, between ourselves, since opinions vary so much respecting the end and object of Metaphysics, is it not a proof that they are in themselves so obscure that we cannot even understand what they are?

If a science could exist independently of its professors, Metaphysics would take ample vengeance for the insult you have offered them; but it is the misfortune of Metaphysics to be in the hands of those who are incapable of doing them justice and discerning their true character; nevertheless, I will undertake to show you, whenever you please, that all the definitions of Metaphysics are easily reducible to the one I have pointed out, and with which you seem so well satisfied.

I am, indeed, said EUGENIUS; but I fear that I shall not be equally so with

the rest; for if it be the characteristic of Metaphysics to enable us to judge correctly of every thing, how comes it that Metaphysicians so frequent judge amiss? and, if you will allow me to say so, even more than others,—and that on the most common affairs of life?

It is, replied LEANDER, because they either do not apply Metaphysics to them, or they apply them badly. It is not at all surprising that a Philosopher should be unable to comprehend matters to which he had not turned his mind. It is, as if an excellent Dancer should be unable to execute a foreign, or new dance, with which he was unacquainted; but let him only take the trouble of going through the steps and figure, and he will perform it better than any other. So a skilful Metaphysician may understand nothing of the business of finance, or commerce, of diplomacy, or of politics, in which he has never been instructed; yet, if he will devote himself to their consideration, he will soon acquire more precise notions on the subject than those who have made it