2nd. There is Something in other men and myself, that I call soul, mind, thought; and, thought is not that which is called body, or matter, nor any thing material, or corporeal. 3rd. That which is known by the feeling, or the experience of all men, ought to be received as true; and, we cannot dissent from it, without doing violence to Common Sense.

I cannot imagine it possible for any one rationally to dissent from the first of these propositions, interrupted EUGENIUS; but, is it equally clear, that that which we call soul is not at all that which we call body or matter? May we not conceive mind to be the result of the imperceptible particles of matter, the secret springs of which we do not see; in the same manner as we do not see those by which the magnet attracts iron; and yet they really exist. Besides, is it not a fact, that some of the Fathers of the Church have maintained Spirits and Angels to be corporeal?

Those who have maintained Spirits and Angels to be corporeal, replied Leander,

believed, perhaps, that these Spirits were invested with a very subtile body; but, they never believed that these Spirits or Angels were nothing but subtile bodies, or composed solely of corporeal parts. Every one conceives Understanding and Will, to be something different from the particles of matter, however minute they may be, or, whatever figure or motion we may imagine them to possess, so that with all our efforts we can never persuade ourselves that a grain of sand, or a drop of water, or any thing material can ever become what we call an emotion of our will, or a thought of our understanding. Hence it must be evident, to every one who would deal fairly, that what we mean by mind, is not at all that which we mean by body, and that the one is not the other, whatever, in other respects, may be their particular constitution and intimate nature; of which in fact, we know nothing.

And yet, replied EUGENIUS, I have known some difficulties started, as to what you have been saying. It is true they

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appeared to me obscure; still I should wish to see them clearly answered.

And how, let me ask you, said LEANDER, are you to find a clear and evident answer to confused and obscure objections? Before we can give an intelligible answer, we must first understand the question; and, if we have not a distinct perception of the difficulty, how is it possible to furnish that distinct solution of it which is demanded? This is the expedient resorted to by those system-mongers, who have been desirous of getting the votaries of free thinking on their side, by rendering it impossible for mankind clearly to refute them. They have succeeded; but how? by laying down principles so dark, that not all the natural light of the understanding can dispel the obscurity. Hereupon they boast that no one can refute them. I believe it; for, to refute them with the clearness they require, their principles should be such, as to admit of being explored and elucidated by the light of reason; whereas, in such a chaos of extravagant ideas, reason itself is lost

and confounded; it must, therefore, content itself with proposing its own natural apprehensions, of which all men partake, as sufficient ground for disregarding what is not in accordance with them, and can have originated only in the vagaries of some sickly brain, like that of Spinosa.

Such brains, said EUGENIUS, smiling, will still go on reasoning.

Yes, replied LEANDER, much like a drum; the emptier they are, the more they reason, and the less reason we find in them. But to speak seriously, added Leander, we must not pretend to give an answer to every thing; reason has its limits, imagination has none; but, however little one may enter into the views I have opened to you, it is impossible, I think, to dissent from some First Truths, which may be stated in the following manner :—

1st. There exists Something, out of me, and, I am not the only Being existing in the world.

2nd. There is such a difference between that which I call mind or soul, and that which I call body or matter, that I cannot

seriously confound the one with the other, nor in sincerity believe, that the properties of the one, which are figure and motion, can in any way agree with the properties of the other, which are emotion and thought.

3rd. That which is affirmed by the experience and testimony of all Men is incontestably true.

4th. There is in Man something which is called reason, and is opposed to absurdity; something which is called prudence, and is opposed to imprudence; something which is called liberty, and is opposed to necessity of acting.

5th. That which combines a great number of different parts to produce an effect, which returns regularly, cannot be the effect of chance, but is the effect of what we call intelligence.

6th. A fact, attested by a great number of sensible people, who declare themselves to have been witnesses of it, cannot be reasonably doubted.

But, interrupted EUGENIUS, if any should contest the point with me and deny