Enough has perhaps been said to prove that, in former times, persecution was the sin, not exclusively of mily estate, which from that moment could no longer be sold, or charged with debt or legacy. On the same day, Popish fathers were debarred, by a penalty of £500. from being guardians to their own children. If the child, however young, declared himself a Protestant, he was to be delivered immediately to the custody of some Protestant relation.-No Protestant to marry a Papist.-No Papist to purchase land, or take a lease of land for more than thirty-one years. If the profits of the land so leased by the Catholic amounted to above a certain rate, settled by the act,—farm to belong to the first Protestant who made the discovery. No Papist to be in a line of entail; but the Estate to pass on to the next Protestant heir, as if the Papist were dead. If a Papist dies intestate, and no Protestant heir can be found, property to be equally divided among all the sons; or, if he has none, among all the daughters. By the 16th clause of this bill, no Papist to hold any office civil or military. Not to dwell in Limerick or Galway, except on certain conditions. Not to vote at elections. Not to hold advowsons. In 1709, Papists were prevented from holding an annuity for life. If any son of a Papist chose to turn Protestant, and enrol the certificate of his conversion in the Court of Chancery, that court is empowered to compel his father to state the value of his property upon oath, and to make out of that property a competent allowance to the son, at their own discretion, not only for his present maintenance, but for his future portion after the death of his father. An encrease of jointure to be enjoyed by Papists' wives, upon their conversion.-Papists keeping schools, to be prosecuted as convicts. Popish priests who are converted, to receive £30. per annum. Rewards are given by the same act for the discovery of Popish clergy; £50. for discovering a Popish bishop; £20. for a common Popish clergyman; £10. for a Popish usher! Two justices of the peace can compel any Papist above 18 years of age to disclose every particular which has come to his knowledge respecting Popish priests, celebration of mass, or Papist schools. Imprisonment for a year, if he refuses to answer. Nobody can hold property in trust for a Catholic. Juries, in all trials growing out of these statutes, to be Protestants. No Papist to take more than two apprentices, except in the linen trade. All the Catholic clergy to give in their names and places of abode at the quarter sessions Protestantism or of Popery, but of the age; and that if the robe of the Catholic Church be stained with sessions, and to keep no curates. Catholics not to serve on grand juries. In any trial upon statutes for strengthening the Protestant interest, a Papist juror may be peremptorily challenged. In the next reign, Popish horses were attached, and allowed to be seized for the militia. Papists cannot be either high or petty constables. No Papist to vote at elections. Papists in towns to provide Protestant watchmen ;—and not to vote at vestries. In the reign of George II. Papists were prohibited from being barristers. Barristers and solicitors marrying Papists, considered to be Papists, and subjected to all penalties as such, Persons robbed by privateers, during a war with a Popish prince, to be indemnified by grand jury presentments, and the money to be levied on the Catholics only. No Papist to marry a Protestant any priest celebrating such a marriage to be hanged. During all this time, there was not the slightest rebellion in Ireland. In 1715 and 1745, while Scotland and the North of England were up in arms, not a man stirred in Ireland; nay, some Irish regiments were even sent to the assistance of the Duke of Cumberland; yet the spirit of persecution against the Catholics continued till the 18th of his present Majesty." But it may be asked, Why thus keep up the memory of persecuting laws, which no longer exist? To this I would reply1st. That some, as will be seen hereafter, still continue to disgrace the Statute-book; and secondly, that I wish to awaken the moral feelings of those of my readers who oppose the Catholics, to a sense of the injuries which have been so long inflicted on them, in the hope that compassion for unmerited suffering may at length lead them to grant justice to the sufferer. It is of high importance that such feelings should exist, and that those who are capable of examining the subject should set an example of liberality to those below them. For it must not be forgotten that the nation had so long been accustomed to contemplate the degraded state of the Catholics with feelings of indifference or satisfaction, that when the legislative acts for their relief became known, they were so far from imparting a humane pleasure, that some artful and turbulent individuals availed themselves of the hostile spirit which prevailed, and by raising the blood of martyrs for conscience sake, that of the Reformed one has by no means escaped a similar pollution. Having thus considered two of the principal objections brought against the Catholics, by the supporters of the Petition, I proceed to examine into the character and principles of the Petition itself. Of its inconsistency I have already spoken. The first sentence deserves to be written in letters of gold. The others breathe a spirit of persecution: its harsh features are indeed softened, but it is still persecution. I feel grieved and humiliated that such senti. ments should be brought forward at this day, in a land that boasts, and justly boasts, its pre-eminence among the nations of the earth. But I shall be told that persecution is not intended; and that it is equally disowned both by the words and by the hearts of the petitioners. It is true that the petition does not propose that any man should be restrained from worshipping his Maker with a splendid and pompous ceremonial, nor from acknowledging and adoring the real presence. But a serious question arises here. The private worship of the heart obviously defies human cognizance and human restriction. But can it with truth be said, that the spirit of persecution is manifested only in prohibiting, or interfering with man in the public worship of his Maker? "The spirit of persecution" says a late writer,* "is this, to wish to inflict harm, or to take away good, on account of raising the cry of "No Popery" gradually led on the populace to those acts of tumult and anarchy, which in 1780 menaced the Metropolis with destruction, and endangered the existence even of Government itself. * ASPLAND'S Sermon on Religious Liberty. opinions. If no harm be inflicted, yet if good be taken away or denied, there is real, palpable persecution. A broader or a narrower, a deeper or a more superficial brand of disgrace may be impressed upon conscience but the least opprobrium fastened on a faithful adherence to principle, is a result of the same evil mind that in other times, and under other circumstances, lighted up fires for martyrs. Virtue makes a man jealous of his reputation; when, therefore, the State puts a label on his faith, intimating that he is unworthy of trust, it touches the apple of his eye, it injures him in the most vital part; and in the soreness of his feelings, shall he be still told that the stigma that he bears about is not persecution? Call it by what name you will, the spirit which suggests to one man the design of making another man's condition worse for his conscience is an evil spirit." Toleration may be either complete, or only partial. Intolerance may have its shades and degrees of deformity. The advocates for this softened intolerance contend that they inflict no punishment, they only refuse certain rewards. *" But if any body has earned reward on any other account, and if, on account of his religion, he is refused that reward, the reward being what, in point of justice, he is otherwise entitled to, then, by such refusal, we take it to be very evident that he does suffer injustice. Rewards that are actually and obviously due for services rendered, and not conferred out of mere munificence or generosity, may be fairly considered as the wages of all noble labour; and as truly and fully due for the service, as the wages of a common mechanic. Now, suppose one man to * Edinburgh Review, vol. xvi. p. 422, have have fairly earned wages from another and, upon coming to the judge to enforce payment, the judge should tell him, Sir, you are a Catholic; but the law, which abhors penalties upon religion, gives to Catholics no rewards,'—would, or would not, the injustice be visible? But, because there are other cases with which common observation is less familiar, and through which a careless eye is able to see less clearly, it is far from following, that, in such instances, injustice equally real may not be sustained. If, instead of earning rewards from an individual, one has earned them from the public, can it be injustice that they should be withheld by the individual, and not injustice that they should be withheld by the public? Of all the rewards which the public has to bestow, that of being appointed to serve the public, in any of its most conspicuous stations of service, is, from the consideration and influence which it bestows, the most fascinating, the most esteemed, and hence the most valuable. If it be injustice in the public, as it would be in the individual, to withhold the highest rewards from the man who has deserved them; and if the opposers of the Catholic emancipation cannot shew that it is impossible for a Catholic to earn the highest rewards at the hands of the public, then they are fairly involved in the guilt and disgrace of supporting injustice by sophistry."—It will be seen that this reasoning applies principally to the exclusion of Catholics from eligibility to some superior offices. It will hereafter be seen that their disabilities are much more extensive. I say eligibility to such offices, for the advocates of the Catholics are not contending that they should be presented to such offices, but only that they should be eligible to them. In other words, that they should not be deprived of those rights which > belong |