JAMES MADISON TO PRESIDENT WASHINGTON. Orange, 24 October, 1793. DEAR SIR, Your letter of the 14th instant did not arrive till Sunday night, and, being not then at home, I did not receive it till last night. I now lose not a moment in complying with its request; though I foresee it cannot reach you before you will have left Mount Vernon, and before you will probably have made up a final determination on some, if not on all the questions proposed. These are, 1. Ought the President to summon Congress at a time and place to be named by him? 2. If the President has no power to change the place, ought he to abstain from all interposition whatever? Or, 3. Ought he to notify the obstacle to a meeting at Philadelphia, state the defect of a regular provision for the exigency, and suggest his purpose of repairing to as a place deemed most eligible for a meeting in the first instance? 4. What is the place liable to fewest objections? From the best investigation I have been able to make in so short a time, the first expedient, though most adequate to the exigency, seems to require an authority that does not exist under the constitution and laws of the United States. The only passage in the constitution, in which such an authority could be sought, is that which says, "The President may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them." But the obvious import of these terms is satisfied by referring them to the time only, at which the extraordinary meeting is summoned. If indeed they included a discretion as to the place, as well as the time, it would be unnecessary to recur to the expedient of altering the time in order to get at an alteration of the place. The President could as well alter the place without interfering with the time, as alter the time without interfering with the place. Besides, the effect of a change as to place would not be in all respects similar to a change as to time. In the latter case, an extraordinary session, running into the period of an ordinary one, would allow the ordinary one to go on under all the circumstances prescribed by law. In the former case this would not happen. The ordinary part of the session would be held out of the place prescribed for it, unless prevented by a positive act for returning to it. The obvious meaning here assigned to the phrase is confirmed by other parts of the constitution. It is well known, that much jealousy has always appeared in every thing connected with the residence of the general government. The solicitude of the constitution to appease this jealousy is particularly marked by the first paragraph of Section 6th, and the third paragraph of Section 7th, of Article I. The light in which these paragraphs must be viewed cannot well be reconciled with a supposition, that it was meant to entrust the executive alone with any power on that subject. Laying aside the constitution and consulting the law, the expedient seems to be no less inadmissible. The act of July, 1790, "establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the government of the United States," cannot be understood to leave any such power in the President. And as the power, if exercised so as to interfere with the provision relating to the temporary seat, might beget an alarm, lest in the hands of a President unfriendly to the permanent seat, it should be turned, on some pretext or other, against that arrangement, prudential reasons unite with legal ones for avoiding the precedent. The second mode of treating the difficulty would seem to be best, if the danger at Germantown were out of the way. A voluntary resort to that place might be relied on; and the members of the legislature, finding themselves together and with the President, might legalize the necessary steps; or, if that should be thought wrong, might deliberate and decide for themselves on the emergency. But as the danger might defeat such an expectation, it results, that, The third expedient is called for by the occasion, and, being sufficient, is all that can be justified by it. The fourth point to be considered is the delicate one of naming the place. In deciding this point it would seem proper to attend first to the risk of the infection. This consideration lies, as you observe, against Trenton and Wilmington. Secondly, to northern and southern jealousies. This applies to New York and Annapolis. Thirdly, to the disposition of Pennsylvania, which is entitled to some regard, as well by her calamity, as by the circumstance of her being in possession of the government. In combining these considerations we are led to look for some place within the State of Pennsylvania, not materially different from Philadelphia in relation to north and south. Lancaster and Reading appear to have occurred. With the former I am but VOL. X. 70 UU little acquainted. The latter I never saw. If the object of the executive should be merely to put Congress in the most neutral situation possible for choosing a place for themselves, as would have been the case at Germantown, Reading seems to have the better pretensions. If the object should be to provide a place, at once marking an impartiality in the executive, and capable of retaining Congress during the session, Lancaster seems to claim a preference. If the measure, which my present view of the subject favors, should be deemed least objectionable, something like the following form might be given to it. "Whereas, a very dangerous and infectious malady, which continues to rage in the city of Philadelphia, renders it indispensable that the approaching session of Congress should be held, as well as the executive department be for the present administered, at some other place; and whereas no regular provision exists for such an emergency, so that, unless some other place be pointed out, at which the members of Congress may assemble in the first instance, great embarrassments may happen; under these peculiar circumstances, I have thought it incumbent on me to notify the obstacle to a meeting of Congress at the ordinary place of their session, and to recommend that the several members assemble at in the State of at which place I shall be ready to meet them." With sentiments of the highest respect and attachment, I remain, dear Sir, your affectionate humble servant. JAMES MADISON. No. XXI. p. 397. LETTER FROM ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO Philadelphia, April, 1794. SIR, I have analyzed the declaration, which you have been pleased to make, upon the copy of the paper of the 1st instant, delivered by me to the committee of inquiry into the state of the treasury department, and find with regret, that the terms used are such as will enable those, who are disposed to construe every thing to my disadvantage, to affirm, "that the declaration of the President has entirely waved the main point, and does not even manifest an opinion, that the representation of the Secretary of the Treasury is well founded." To this it would be added, that the reserve of the President is a proof, that he does not think that representation true; else his justice would have led him to rescue the officer concerned, even from suspicion on the point. That this will be the interpretation put upon your declaration, I have no doubt; and, in justice to myself, I cannot forbear to make this impression known to you, and to bring the declaration under your revision. I am the more certain that this construction will be put upon the fact, from what has heretofore taken place. In the course of the discussion of the last session, an argument of this kind was in private urged against me. "If Mr. Hamilton had really acted by the authority of the President, or in due communication with him, would not the President take same method, either directly to Mr. Madison, or through Mr. Jefferson or Mr. Randolph, to make known to him that this ground of accusation did not exist? His not doing it, which may be inferred from Mr. Madison's urging the point, is a proof that there was no coöperation on his part." In addition to this, I have learnt from an authentic source, that a particular gentleman, supposed to possess good opportunities of information, has intimated in a manner to induce a belief of its having come from you, that it never was your intention, that any of the loans which were made should have had reference to the act making provision for the reduction of the public debt, and that you never knew any thing of the operation while it was going on. Under all that has happened, Sir, I cannot help entertaining, and frankly expressing to you, an apprehension, that false and insidious men, whom you may one day understand, taking advantage of the want of recollection, which is natural where the mind is habitually occupied with a variety of important objects, have found means, by artful suggestions, to infuse doubts and distrusts very injurious to me. My consciousness of what has been the real tenor of my conduct, and my conviction of the fairness and rectitude of your mind, compel me to this conclusion. Upon this, as upon every other occasion, my desire is to encounter directly and without détour whatever embarrassment may stand in my way. If, contrary to what I understood from Mr. Lear during the discussion of the matter in Congress, and what I inferred from the late conversations with you, the affair does not stand well in your mind, I request the opportunity of a full and free conference on the subject, to recapitulate and go over all the circumstances which have occurred, in the hope of recalling to your memory what may have escaped it, and with a wish to abide the result in an explicit form, that is, by a declaration, which shall render the main fact unambiguous, or shall record the doubt. As on the one hand I expect what is due to the situation, so on the other I seek no palliation of delinquency, no cover for any defect of conduct. The situation is indeed an unpleasant one. Having conducted an important piece of public business in a spirit of confidence, dictated by an unqualified reliance on the one hand upon the rectitude, candor, and delicacy of the person under whom I was acting, on the other by a persuasion, that the experience of years had secured to me a reciprocal sentiment (whatever imperfections it may have otherwise discovered), and by the belief, likewise, that, however particular instances might be forgotten, the general course of proceeding in so important an affair could not but be remembered, I did not look for a difficulty like that which now seems to press me. Knowing, too, that there existed in my written communications with the President (not only those which have been specified, but others,) so many direct and indirect indications of what was truly the course pursued, I still less apprehended a difficulty of that nature, when the occasion for explanation should occur. Not seeking to escape responsibility for any improper execution of the laws, if any has happened, I did not imagine, that want of immediate authority from the President to do what they would justify, would be suffered to remain (the appeal being made to him) a topic of objection to my conduct. In the freedom of these remarks, I flatter myself, Sir, that you will perceive nothing but that just sensibility, which a man of honor, who thinks his veracity is exposed to question, ought to feel, and that you will be persuaded I continue yet to retain undiminished all that respect, which a long-established conviction of the existence of an upright and virtuous character ought to inspire. With this sentiment, I have the honor to remain, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant, ALEXANDER HAMILTON. |