CHAPTER XIV.

MILITARY HISTORY OF THE TAE PINGS, AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF NANKING, UP TO THE PRESENT TIME.

ON or about the 12th May, 1853, an army of Tae pings, detached from Nanking, effected a landing on the northern bank of the Great River, where they defeated, and captured the baggage of a body of Tartars, who had been brought down from Northern Manchooria, and on whom the Emperor had placed great reliance. On the 15th May, they defeated another body of Tartars at Lew ho. On the evening of the 28th May, they took the departmental city, Fung yang, from whence they advanced by way of Po chow and Kwei tih to Kae fung, the capital of Honan; where they appeared on the 19th June. On the 22nd they made an unsuccessful attempt to take Kae fung by storm. They then crossed the Yellow River and marched to the departmental city of Hwae king, about 100 miles to the west of Kae fung. They spent about two months in an unsuccessful siege of Hwae king, they themselves being, during the second month, subjected to the attacks of the Imperial forces in the field, which had assembled to prevent their further advance. The Tae ping camps commanded the Tan river which, flowing eastward, becomes further on the Wei, under which name it joins the Grand Canal at Lin tsing, on the northern side of the highest level of the Canal waters. It constitutes, therefore, the head of a continuous water communication down-stream to Teen tsin, the port of Peking. This water communication is not to be compared, in point of magnitude, with that formed by the Seang and the Great River, by which the rebels had

descended about a year before from Kwang se to Nanking but it is sufficiently large for the transport of the munitions. of war in the smaller river craft of China; and there can be little doubt that the prolonged efforts of the Tae pings to take Hwae king, in itself but a second-rate city, proceeded from a desire to establish there a basis of operations, and to facilitate an advance from thence, by the easy route of the Wei river and the Grand Canal, on Peking. There are two other circumstances which make Hwae king an important strategical point: the Sin river, which flows by it in the south, is an affluent of the Yellow River and opens a communication with the East; and it lies on the great route which goes west through the province of Shan se to Peking. But this latter route is entirely a land road and crosses a mountain ridge.

The fact, therefore, that the Tae pings, when they raised the siege of Hwae king on the 1st September marched westwards by it into Shan se, shows that the Imperial forces were strong enough to prevent their descent by the Wei river. The westward movement was, however, so little guarded against by the Imperialists that the Tae pings took the district city of Yuen keuh on the 4th September, and on the 12th September the departmental city of Ping yang; after taking the district cities of Fung and Keuh wuh on the way. From thence they proceeded, first in an easterly, then in a north-easterly direction by way of the district cities of Hung tung, Tun lew, Lo ching, Le ching, She heen, and Woo gan-all of which they entered-to the Lin ming pass, in the ridge between the provinces of Ho nan and Chih le. They then defeated a Manchoo force, and debouched into Chih le on the 29th September. On the 30th September they entered the district city of Sha ho; on the 1st of October, that of Jin heen; and on the 2nd those of Lung ping and Pih heang. On the 4th October they took the departmental city of Chaou chow; and on the 6th the district city of Lwan ching. On the same day they

took the district city of Kaou ching, situated on the southern bank of the Hoo to. On the 8th they left that city, crossed the Hoo to by a floating bridge, which they themselves constructed, and took the district city of Tsin chow. On the 9th October they took the departmental city of Shin chow, where they remained for fourteen days, till the 22nd, when they proceeded to the district cities of Heen and Keaou ho, entering the latter on the 25th of October. From thence they proceeded by the Grand Canal to the district city of Tsing hae and to Tuh lew, an unwalled town of some little commercial importance a few miles to the north of it. Both of these places, which they occupied about the 28th October, are situated on the Grand Canal about twenty miles to the south of Teen tsin and about one hundred miles from Peking. One of their advanced parties appeared before Teen tsin on the 30th October, but was repulsed with some loss; and the whole army was immediately afterwards, i. e. in the first days of November, 1853, blockaded in its position at Tsing hae and Tuh lew, by the forces that had been following it from Hwae king, as well as by those detached from Peking. These latter were composed chiefly of a portion of the Manchoo garrison of that city, aided by 4,500 Mongols, veritable nomads, who had been brought in from beyond the Great Wall. The want of cavalry, to cope with these born horsemen, was doubtless one of the causes why the Tae pings were unable to approach nearer to Peking. The Imperial Gazettes and a letter despatched to me from Peking at that period showed that the Court and Capital were greatly alarmed; but the danger was averted, and they have not since been so seriously menaced.

The march of this Tae ping army from Nanking to Tsing hae is one of the most remarkable of which history gives record. The whole of the above particulars are, I must observe, taken from the "Peking Gazette," the Imperialist organ; the statements in which must be interpreted as we, if without our own accounts, would interpret those about the

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Allies in the Russian journals published for the Russian people. Now the distance which the army marched in its advance from Nanking to Tsing hae is not less than thirteen to fourteen hundred miles, and the very day that it left the northern bank of the Great River opposite Nanking, all communication with its friends at the latter place was cut off; with the exception of such correspondence as could be maintained by disguised messengers. It was immediately followed by a force of the Imperialists, detached from their armies of observation near Nanking and Chin keang; apart from which the local troops always closed in its rear as it advanced. The spectacle of this army, so isolated, making its way perseveringly northwards, in spite of constantly accumulating difficulties in the shape of inclement weather and more numerous as well as more efficient foes, swerving first to the west then to the east, but never turning southward during a period of six months, this spectacle speaks powerfully for the strength of the Tae ping organization. is pretty well established that none of the five subordinate Tae ping Princes, still less the "Heavenly Prince" himself, accompanied it; for the Imperialist accounts of battles fought on the route, while they make frequent mention of "false Ministers," ,""false Army Superintendents" and "false Generals," as they term the Tae ping officers bearing such titles, never speak of any "false Prince " being with them. On the other hand, when the Tae ping army was engaged in its two months' siege of Hwae king, and was in its turn there attacked by Imperialist armies in the field, the fact of the "false Minister, Lin fung tseang" having "himself" headed 5,000 men in order to stimulate them in an attack, is mentioned by the Gazette in such manner as leads to the inference that this man was the known Commander-in-chief. It was, therefore, some of their third and fourth rate men whom the Tae ping leaders could entrust with the execution of this bold and perilous attempt on the very stronghold of the Manchoo power. How faithfully the commanders strove to carry out

their instructions, the reader will have perceived from the above narrative. The Gazettes gave details of a defeatpictured as almost ruinous-inflicted on the Tae pings as they were approaching Kaou ching on the 6th October. That some severe losses were really sustained by them about that time, is rendered probable by the circumstance of their side march to Shin chow, and their stay in that place of fourteen days' duration. When they eventually stopped at Tsing hae and Tuh lew, it could only have been from inability to force their way further; for these places do not constitute a station of strategical importance, while Teen tsin, only twenty miles further on, lies in a commanding situation and is a very large and populous city.

No indication is given in the Gazettes of the numbers of the Tae pings at the time of their occupation of Tsing hae ; except that "seven or eight thousand" are spoken of as having made a sally from it on the 1st November. Whatever their strength, they resolved to maintain themselves there, while awaiting relief from their friends at Nanking.

On receipt of the intelligence of the stoppage of their army at Tsing hae, the Tae ping leaders did immediately make preparations for despatching a second army to its aid. About the same time that the first army started for the North, another was despatched up the Great River to the Po yang lake. This left a force in occupation of Gan king, the provincial capital of Gan hwuy; which subsequently became a basis for operations, directed northward against the central portion of that province. The district city of Tung ching was first taken, then on the 29th November, 1853, that of Shoo ching, and on the 14th January, 1854, the departmental city of Loo chow; where the Governor of the province had stationed himself, and was then slain. Previous to this, the Tae pings had (on the 26th December) withdrawn their garrison from the large city of Yang chow, situated on the Grand Canal a little to the north of Kwa chow. The Imperialist Commanders told me at the time that this had doubtless