I am aware that the objects proposed might be obtained from Secunder Jah with less difficulty, previously to the death of the Nizam, and that it would on that account be desirable that a negociation should be opened immediately with Secunder Jah. But many objections occur to deter me from such a step. The attempt (if it should transpire either by accident or design) would probably lead to mischievous consequences; I am, therefore, of opinion that no such attempt should be hazarded until the Nizam shall be at the point of death. It is manifest that our power of settling the succession in the manner described, and of obtaining the advantages which I have enumerated, will depend in an eminent degree, if not absolutely, on the local position of the subsidiary force at the time of his Highness's death. It is, therefore, of the last importance that the force should not only be kept together, but stationed as near as possible to the residence of the Nizam; and I accordingly direct you to adopt every practicable means of accomplishing these most desirable and essential objects without delay. I have the honour to be, &c. MORNINGTON. MY LORD, No. XLII. Sir Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington. Camp of his Highness the Supreme Vizier, It is my duty to give your Lordship early information that a disposition on the part of the French army in Egypt to treat for their return to France, by the evacuation of their new "colony," has been at length openly manifested; first, by an official communication to that effect from General Buonaparte to his Highness the Supreme Vizier, in a letter full of the pretended predilection of the French for "Islamism" as a ground for peace, and since in a more reasonable strain from his successor in the command, General Kleber, by letters addressed to his Highness and to me. General Buonaparte made an attempt to renew the intercourse with me, which he had abruptly broken off from a fear of the defection of his army, that defection having been increased rather than diminished by his unqualified abuse of the English commander, to whom alone the army could look for favour in the hour of their distress. The Aid-de-camp sent off to the Tigre appeared to have been commissioned to say that General Buonaparte had ever spoken of me in terms of the utmost respect, although his writings, for political reasons, contained matter calculated to discourage his army from deserting to me at a critical moment of their sufferings in Syria. I could not help cutting the conversation short by saying what I really felt at the time, knowing the man as 1 do, viz., "that I should be very sorry to have his approbation." However, it being evident, from this and other circumstances, that the discontent of the army was kept under only by the terror his severity inspired, I took occasion to acquaint him of his being (together with General Berthier) recalled to command the army in Italy (N. B. not then in existence) this, as I expected, was eagerly caught at. A second flag of truce asked whether I was serious, and a confirmation being sent, he embarked in a few days afterwards for Europe, giving only a few hours notice of his intention to those who were to accompany him, and causing the command to devolve on General Kleber by a sealed packet; it was given out in the army that he was gone to Constantinople to make peace, which affords a proof how much the army wish for some such means of extrication. Having early apprized Lord Nelson of the probability of General Buonaparte's quitting Egypt singly and incognito, I entertain strong hopes that some of his Lordship's cruizers may have fallen in with him, although the Theseus, which I had detached with a squadron for that purpose, has returned unsuccessful. I have been employed assembling a force, and directing an attack on Damietta, which took place on the 1st instant. Like that on Aboukir, it failed of entire success from the same causes, viz. the insubordination, disorder, and obstinate inactivity inherent in a Turkish fleet and army. The attack, however, like that in the Red Sea of Yambo Arabians, has had the good effect of proving to the French army that these irregular hosts can be brought hand to hand with them; and it is likewise evident, that a succession of these sort of engagements must annihilate them to a man, although they may each time remain masters of the field of battle from the effect of European tactics, which, as at Damietta, produces a corps de reserve, or a flanking charge of cavalry, to route the victorious rabble. The French superior officers, with whom I have had frequent intercourse of late by flags of truce seem fully sensible of this, and extremely anxious to quit a theatre whereon they can neither gain honour or secure their profits, and where it is evident to them that they do their country no sort of service since I have communicated the glorious news from India (sent me by Mr. Manesty, extremely apropos). Allow me, my Lord, to take this opportunity of congratulating your Lordship on the signal success which has crowned the well combined measures of Government in India by the able and gallant exertions of Lieutenant-General Harris and his highly distinguished army, at the same time that I offer your Lordship and them this tribute, in the proof of the additional and extensive utility of your joint labours. It is but justice to the French army to say that, though they evidently dread the appearance of the conquerors of the Mysore in Upper Egypt, they are under no sort of apprehension of the Vizier's motley disorderly multitude; but they are sensible that, reduced as they are to 18,000 men, they could not profit by a victory, where they are exposed in the end to be assailed by regular troops both from the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; and I trust a demonstration of the truth of this will be made in support of my assertion to that effect, should the conference I am about to hold with General Desaix and Mr. Poussielgue on board the Tigre close without our settling the terms of evacuation. I have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, my Lord, your Lordship's faithful, humble Servant, W. SIDNEY SMITH. MY LORD, No. XLIII. The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington. Constantinople, Nov. 16th, 1799. [Received at Calcutta, 4th March, 1800.] I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that I arrived here on the 6th instant, in the quality of his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Ottoman Porte. Your Lordship will have known from Mr. Dundas, and from some of the Directors of the East India Company, with whom I conferred confidentially in London, that I am authorized, in considering this post as one that may afford me occasions of interesting communication with Asia; and that my attention was particularly directed by them to that object. may be allowed, on my own part, to say, that no part of the duty connected with this mission is more agreeable to me than the intercourse it establishes with your Lordship; and that my exertions shall be unremitting, in so far as I may be enabled, while here, to contribute to the benefit of the British interests in India, and to the glory and success of your administration there. I I reached Constantinople in a conjuncture, the circumstances of which claim your Lordship's particular notice. The enclosed letters had just been received here from the Grand Vizier, whose head-quarters were then at Damascus ; and the Russian Envoy at this place, and my predecessor, Mr. Smith, had been applied to, to favour the negotiation, thus set on foot, for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. The conferences which had passed, and one which I also had on the subject, do not enable me to furnish you with more than the above papers. For, as Sir Sidney Smith is acting, and with the most brilliant success against that army, and has intercepted the original letters written by the French General, and opened a communication upon them with the * Referring to Buonaparte's address to the Grand Vizier, and the reply of the latter; Kleber's proclamation; the Grand Vizier's reply thereto; and the report of the Capigi Bachi. Vizier; I have referred all proceedings on this negotiation to him, who, no doubt, will comply with every proposal, consistent with the dignity and interest of the allies, to procure the deliverance of Egypt. Orders are also sent to the Grand Vizier on this occasion, to act with Sir Sidney Smith: and I have requested Sir Sidney to acquaint your Lordship, by the most expeditious conveyance, of any proceedings that may take place in consequence of the dispositions thus shewn by the French to quit the Turkish provinces. I am sorry I have no authority to say whether the Grand Vizier is justified in the construction he has put upon the letters from Buonaparte and Kleber. But as they are written after the defeat at Acre, after Buonaparte's flight, and after a proclamation has been circulated among the French troops; it is, I perceive, Sir Sidney Smith's opinion, as well as the Vizier's, that this step did proceed from a desire to evacuate Egypt. Our interests in India are so nearly concerned in defeating the attempt of the French to establish themselves in Egypt, that every facility will be afforded on the part of the British influence in this part of the world, to remove the French troops now there, if the terms they propose shall prove at all acceptable. At the same time, it is my duty to point out that, in case the suggestion thus made by the French Generals, has proceeded from the very unfavourable aspect which the affairs of France lately assumed on the continent of Europe, that cause is liable to much variation. The last accounts from Switzerland leave very little hopes of any part of that country being now occupied by the allied troops, or that they will be able to do more than take up winter quarters in the rear of Feldkirk, and the line from whence the Arch Duke commenced his operations this campaign. On the other hand, the Court of Vienna is, I apprehend, acting without sufficient concert with Russia and England, in directing the civil and military agents attending its armies to take possession of all they conquer, in the name of the Emperor of Germany, and not in that of the lawful Sovereigns. So much so, as to have given occasion to some very strong remonstrances, which, if without effect, may possibly force the other allies to refuse further cooperation with the Aus |