to such of the subaltern officers and cadets, who were captured in the Kent, as may apply for advances to that amount. These advances will be deducted from their future pay and batta. No. XCVIII. WELLESLEY. SIR, The Marquess Wellesley to his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier. I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of the advices which I received on the 15th instant from the Resident at Bussorah. The result of the late events in Europe has probably been an immediate peace between France and Austria. It is not, however, equally probable that peace will speedily be concluded between Great Britain and France. If the war on the continent has ceased, and if hostilities should have continued between Great Britain and France, it is reasonable to suppose, that the enemy has prepared to make, with the least practicable delay, a vigorous effort to relieve the French army in Egypt, and that this effort may either be accompanied or speedily followed by an attack upon our possessions in India. The renewed spirit and enterprizing genius of Buonaparte will naturally lead him to commence his operations with a view to either or both these objects at the earliest practicable period of time. Experience warrants an expectation that he will not lose a moment in availing himself of the actual advantages of his situation; and it is certain, that any naval armament which he might be enabled to despatch from France in the past months of July, August, and September, 1800, might reach the Red Sea, or the western coast of India, during the approaching season. On the other hand, the probability increases every hour of a demand from his Majesty's Ministers upon the British Government in India, and upon your Excellency, to co-operate with a force, to be employed in the Mediterranean, for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A considerable British force has been collected at Minorca, originally, perhaps, with a view to an attempt on the southern coasts of France. That design, however, (if it was ever entertained,) has probably been relinquished in consequence of the late events on the continent of Europe. In the event of a separate peace between Austria and France, and of the continuance of hostilities between Great Britain and France, it is not improbable that the troops assembled at Minorca may be employed in concert with the Turkish army, against the French in Egypt. In such an event, an expedition from India might prove essentially useful by creating a diversion on the side of Upper Egypt; and the tenor of my private despatches from the Earl of Elgin tends to confirm the probability, that the unfavourable alteration which has taken place in the state of the war with France will induce his Majesty's Ministers to require an expedition from India to Egypt in the only manner in which such an operation could be undertaken with any prospect of advantage; namely, by combining it with a powerful attack from the side of the Mediterranean. It may be expected that any such requisition from his Majesty's Ministers may reach me in the first week in November, and that they will expect the fleets and armies of India to be ready to act against Egypt during the approaching season. The preceding statement will have explained to your Excellency my reasons for apprehending that the naval and military strength of India is likely to be required, either for the purposes of defensive or offensive operations on the western side of the Peninsula between the ensuing months of December and March; and your Excellency's judgment and experience in the interests of the British empire in India will form a correct estimate of the magnitude of the danger which we may be called upon to repel, and of the urgent necessity of placing our force in such a condition, and in such a station, as shall enable us to act with promptitude and effect whenever the expected exigency shall arise. After the fullest consideration of these circumstances, I am decidedly of opinion, that the British Government of India would not be justified in undertaking or prosecuting any expedition, the necessary effect of which must be to remove the strength of your Excellency's squadron to any considerable distance to the eastward for any long period of time. The same objection applies, in a certain degree, to the de tachment of any part of our military force in the present conjuncture for the purposes of any foreign conquest unconnected with an increase of our means of defence against the probable point of danger. This objection applies most powerfully to any detachment of our European force; the whole disposable amount of which throughout India does not at this time amount to ten thousand men. If the expedition to Batavia should be prosecuted, even under the most favourable circumstances, your Excellency, with the strength of your squadron, could scarcely reach the western side of India sooner than the commencement of the month of February or the close of the month of January, 1801, and the troops employed in concert with his Majesty's ships would necessarily be detained at Batavia for a much longer period of time. It is, therefore, with considerable reluctance, and under an irresistible conviction of the necessity of preparing to meet the emergencies which I have described, that I find myself compelled to suspend a second time the final execution of his Majesty's commands respecting Batavia; and to request your Excellency's assistance in carrying into effect a system of operations adapted to the new and alarming crisis of affairs. Your Excellency will not fail to observe the extreme difficulty of my situation: without any official or private information from his Majesty's Ministers, I am left to conjecture their intentions respecting Egypt from such imperfect advices as have been transmitted to me by the Earl of Elgin, and from my own view of the general state of political events. On the other hand, the declared anxiety of his Majesty's Ministers to obtain possession of Batavia, and the forward state of the expedition prepared for that purpose strongly inclined me to persevere in an undertaking which promised such advantage, and which had been so auspiciously commenced; but the pursuit of any foreign conquest, however easy or advantageous, must always yield to the necessity of self-defence. The further suspension of the measures commenced against Batavia will not render the prosecution of that expedition less practicable at a future period, while the absence of our fleet and of any part of our disposable European force in any of the probable cases which I have supposed might be fatal to our existence in India. I must, therefore, request your Ex2 D VOL. II. cellency to consider the expedition to Batavia to be postponed to a more favourable opportunity. Having decided this important point, it becomes my duty to submit to your Excellency's consideration a general view of the plan which appears to me most eligible for the purpose of enabling us to act offensively or defensively as the case may require, to frustrate any attempt of the French, either for the relief of their army in Egypt, or for the disturbance of our possessions in India, and to answer the expected demand of his Majesty's Ministers for our co-operation in Egypt during the approaching season. With a view to meet all these cases as they may arise, it appears to me desirable to concentre the strength of your Excellency's squadron, together with the largest disposable force of Europeans, which my limited means will enable me to spare, at some point from which they may be ready to issue with promptitude and facility either to the western coasts of the peninsula of India or to the Red Sea, or to any other quarter which the enemy may menace during the north-eastern monsoon. The general security of our possessions in India will be further promoted if the station chosen for your Excellency's fleet and for the proposed military force, should be central in its relation to the whole British empire in India, and should be a point at all times valuable and important to our interests, and necessary to be maintained against any assault of the enemy. After much attention to the subject, Trincomalé appears to me, under every aspect of the question, to be the most eligible station for the immediate rendezvous of the strength of your Excellency's squadron and of the force which I propose to assemble. It appears further necessary that the military force to be assembled should be provided with transports and camp equipage, and should be ready to move, under the convoy of your Excellency's squadron, wherever the service might require its presence. The force which I propose to collect at Trincomalé will consist of about 2,000* Europeans from his Majesty's infantry; to these I shall add a corps of native volunteer infantry from Bengal, and a suitable proportion of field ordnance. I have reason to expect that I shall be enabled to assemble * 10th regiment, 19th do. 80th do. infantry. this force at Trincomalé on or before the middle of the month of December; and it is my intention that it should be commanded by Colonel Wellesley, and that Colonel Champagné should be the second in command. Colonel Wellesley has already received my orders to proceed to Trincomalé. My earnest request to your Excellency is, that you will proceed to Trincomalé without delay, where Colonel Wellesley will, I trust, be prepared to meet you, to concert with you such plans of operation as may appear best suited to the purposes of the armament, and to aid you by every exertion within his power. Your Excellency will either abandon the blockade of Batavia, or provide means for continuing it, according to your view of all the circumstances of our situation, and of the various objects stated in this despatch, and in that which accompanies it under the same date. I expect that the troops and stores to be sent from hence will be ready to proceed to sea by the middle of November; and it is my intention to apprize Captain Malcolm, of his Majesty's ship Suffolk, of the change which circumstances have compelled me to make in my measures, and to request him to convoy the transports with the troops to Trincomalé instead of Prince of Wales' Island. I request that your Excellency will give the necessary orders for the return of the two companies of his Majesty's 12th regiment (embarked on board of Captain Ball's squadron) to Madras by the earliest opportunity. Although my opinion is, that a part of the European force to be employed in concert with your Excellency's squadron, will be most conveniently conveyed to the point of actual service on board his Majesty's ships, I have judged it to be expedient to engage transports sufficient for the conveyance of the whole European and native force to be assembled at Trincomalé, together with their necessary provisions and supplies. Your Excellency and Colonel Wellesley will determine on the spot what proportion of the European troops can be conveniently accommodated on board his Majesty's ships. I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's information a copy of a letter which I despatched to Rear-Admiral Blankett on the 16th instant, in consequence of the recent |