You are already apprized that my principal object is to effect a reform of the Nabob Vizier's army; and it would be a happy circumstance if any steps towards that most desirable end could be made during the present season before the alarm of Zemaun Shah's return to the frontier of Hindostan can be renewed. I have, therefore, thought it advisable to relax my injunction to you, not to take any step towards the accomplishment of the proposed military arrangements before you shall have received further instructions from me: I leave it to your discretion to act in this matter as you shall deem most expedient.

I entirely approve your suggestion of the advantages to be derived from availing ourselves of any instances of mutiny, treachery, or criminal neglect in any branches of the Vizier's army to reduce such divisions of the army as shall be convicted of these crimes.

The extreme unpopularity of the Nabob Vizier has been an object of serious regret to me: I understand that it arises principally from his excessive parsimony and his ungracious conduct towards the principal personages of his Court. It will be a matter of considerable delicacy to attempt to correct these defects; however, I request that you will direct your constant attention to them; and if any favourable opportunity should occur, that you will apprize the Nabob, in an amicable manner, of the concern with which I have learnt, that he does not pursue a course likely to conciliate the affection of his subjects; and you will signify to him, that the deep interest which I take in the stability, ease, and honour of his Government, renders me particularly anxious to hear that his Excellency has found means of removing the unfavourable impressions which have been conceived of his disposition.

At the same time you will express to his Excellency, in the strongest terms, my cordial approbation of the regularity which has marked his payment of the military subsidy ever since my arrival in Bengal. It is scarcely necessary to point out to you the importance of taking every step to encourage and improve the Nabob's disposition to the punctual discharge of his pecuniary engagements to the Company, forming, as they now do, the source of so considerable a branch of our revenue.

You are already informed of my views in the event of the

death of Almas Ali Khan, they are entirely conformable to your own ideas upon that subject. I request that you will apply to Mr. Lumsden for a copy of a private letter which I addressed to him a short time previous to my departure from Calcutta.* It contains a general outline of my sentiments with regard to the state of Oude.

I wish to call your particular attention to an evil which I consider to be of the first magnitude. I mean the number of real or pretended emissaries of Zemaun Shah who have spread themselves over the provinces of Oude and Benares for the last two or three years, exciting general alarm, and weakening the respect due to the British Government by inculcating exaggerated reports of the force of the Shah.

The imperious tone which the Shah has adopted in his communication with the Nabob Vizier and with the British Government must be abated. Our tacit admission of his presumptuous claims of sovereignty upon our provinces and their dependencies serves only to inflame his pride and ambition, and to degrade us in the eyes of our own subjects. From the papers discovered in the palace at Seringapatam, after the conquest of that place, it appears evident that Tippoo Sultaun had formed a connection with Zemaun Shah. Under all these circumstances, I desire that you will establish, in concert with Mr. Vanderheyden, a most vigilant control over any emissaries who may arrive from the Shah; and that you will, without hesitation, either send them beyond the frontier of Oude, or imprison them, as the case may require. I wish you to understand and to declare that I shall hereafter consider every person as a traitor who shall assert the royal authority of Zemaun Shah over any part of the dominions, either of the Nabob Vizier, or of the Company.

Your attention will necessarily be alive to the intrigues of Ambajee and of the French; with respect to the latter, my principle is very simple: wherever I find a Frenchman in India, within my power, I will send him back to Europe, and I desire that you will adopt this principle as the general rule of your conduct, from which you are never to depart, excepting in cases of a very special nature, which you will always report to me for my determination.

* See Vol. I. p. 386.

I am naturally anxious to visit Oude, but as I see no prospect of being able to return to Bengal before the month of September, it will be impossible for me to move from Calcutta before the month of December; indeed, after so long an absence from Calcutta, I should be desirous of remaining there until the commencement of the rains in the ensuing year, 1800, unless you see any necessity for my visiting Oude at an earlier period. On this question I wish for your unreserved opinion, by which my motions shall be regulated.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, most sincerely,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXI.

Chief Justice Sir John Anstruther to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

June 25th, 1799.

I had your very kind letter some days ago, and yesterday brought me Tippoo's private correspondence with the French Government, you were so good as to send me. It affords convincing proofs of the good sense and judgment which dictated the commencement of the war, and of the danger which would have attended any delay, or any less exertion of vigour and activity than actually took place.

I am much flattered with the favourable place you gave me in your esteem, and sincerely assure you that I feel nearly as much satisfaction upon private as upon public grounds at the wonderful success of the war, but knowing what I do I cannot help wondering at the slight grounds upon which the fate of empires depend. The slightest delay in your passage, the slightest accident to the ship, an accidental sickness at the Cape, nay, had you yielded to the desires of many of your friends, and come to India without the Government being in you the instant of your arrival, all your exertions would have been in vain, and our empire in India might have been tottering at this day, instead of being fixed upon foundations I trust the most stable.

I am extremely happy to hear your determination upon the question of Seringa patam, which I have not disclosed to a

soul. Its central position, its local strength, joined to the river, being in a great measure a frontier almost all the way across the peninsula, and the facility with which an army may move from it to any point of attack, point it out as a material station for our army, and indeed, a line drawn by Colar Bangalore to Periapatam, affords a shorter line of defence to the Carnatic than we had before, and seems to point out that and Mangalore as a desirable acquisition for us. Gooty and Gurrumcoonda naturally are the places from whence the Nizam will secure his share of the conquest, and in the present circumstances an addition to his power is rather desirable than dangerous, adds to our strength, and not to our alarm, an additional effect of the wise measures of your Government. Were I in your place I should be more puzzled with Bednore than any other part of the country. It is distant from us. The Mahrattas will claim it. They deserve little, and in their present state, although not very formidable, yet might become so; and it is a rich province. I dare say your determination will be the best and the wisest.

The correspondence you sent me I think, in some degree, proves what I have long suspected, that the principles upon which the treaty of Seringapatam was founded were but fallacious, and more suited to defend the treaty in an English House of Commons than to assist its operations in this country. To Tippoo the triple alliance appeared the effect of weakness rather than ability, and moderation was by him, and I suspect by our allies too, supposed the effect of our inability. Besides the remote good arising from the balance of power wisely held to any Indian mind cannot come in competition with any immediate advantage whatever. Our successes have been too rapid for any Indian to give us credit for our moderation, and their false and fickle conduct will, I am afraid, prevent us from practising it long. I have no doubt but had the Frenchman's advice in the last letter in the collection*

This was conveyed in a letter from M. Dubuc to Tippoo Sultaun, dated 16th of December, 1798, urging Tippoo to make overtures to the Mahrattas for their cooperation against the English, and entreating Tippoo so to stimulate the Mahrattas that they might take aların and attack the East India Company's territories. See p. 134 of Mr. Edmonstone's translation of the discovered documents.

been taken with vigour, that you would not have had the Mahrattas so quiet, and possibly their delay may be in some degree owing to its having been attempted to be carried into execution. Adieu! may every good attend you, and every success follow your measures.

Yours, ever sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. XXII.

Captain (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, 29th June, 1799.

I should hardly have ventured to trouble your Lordship with a letter on the subject of my appointment as a joint Secretary to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore had not their instructions, directing me to communicate with you on the civil administration of Canara, opened the way for me to make my acknowledgments to your Lordship for having twice pointed me out as a person that might be usefully employed. As it is probable that your Lordship may hear that I hesitated for some time in accepting this appointment to Canara, I shall, without reserve, explain the motives by which I was guided on this occasion. I felt a reluctance to quit the coast, where I had served near twenty years. After having been the greatest part of the last nine years in tents, I dreaded that my constitution would not support the fatigue of leading the same kind of life for two or three years longer in investigating the revenues of a new country. I thought it possible that I might be ordered to take charge of a part of Coimbatore, and as I know perfectly, from my long residence. in the neighbourhood of that province, that it yielded more than double the estimate of Tippoo Sultaun; I flattered myself with the hope of gaining some credit by augmenting the public revenue. On the contrary, I saw that, by going to Canara, I should only disappoint the expectations which your Lordship might have formed; for I never had any doubts of