Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace. The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for human · ity. Sharp wars are brief. 30. Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of state, or to consist in defense against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but the law of war imposes many limitations. and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor." Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war between the contracting powers. "It disclaims all extortions and other transactions for individual gain: all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts. "Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so if committed by officers." Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the "ARTICLE XXII. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. "ARTICLE XXIII. Besides the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially prohibited: "(a.) To employ poison or poisoned arms; "(b.) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; "(c.) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; (d.) To declare that no quarter will be given; "(e.) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury; "(f.) To make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, or military ensigns and the enemy's uniform, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva convention: *(g.) To destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 20, 1899, 32 Stat. II. 1817. "148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retalliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism." Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the (2) BOMBARDMENT OF UNDEFENDED TOWNS. § 1120. "ARTICLE XXV. The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited." Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1893, 32 Stat. II. 1818. (3) PILLAGE. § 1121. "ARTICLE XXVIII. The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited." Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, "44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense. "A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior." Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the (4) DENIAL OF QUARTER. § 1122. (0. It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and revenge, to give no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter; but a commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter, in great straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners. 61. Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies already disabled on the ground, or prisoners captured by other troops. 62. All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any portion of the army, receive none. 63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter." 66. Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, under a misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be ordered to suffer death if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps which gives no quarter." Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the As protesting against the theory that all "foreigners" invading Mexico (5) WANTON DESTRUCTION. § 1123. "Every species of reprisal or annoyance which a power at war employs, contrary to liberality or justice, of doubtful propriety in the estimation of the law of nations, departing from that moderation which, in later times, serves to mitigate the severities of war, by furnishing a pretext or provocation to the other side to resort to extremities, serves to embitter the spirit of hostilities, and to extend its ravages. War is then apt to become more sanguinary, more wasting, and every way more destructive. This is a ground of serious reflection to every nation, both as it regards humanity and policy; to this country it presents itself, accompanied with considerations of peculiar force. A vastly exter led seacoast, overspread with defenseless towns, would offer an abundant prey to an incensed and malignant enemy, having the power to command the sea. The usages of modern H. Doc. 551-vol 7-14 war forbid hostilities of this kind; and though they are not always respected, yet, as they are never violated, unless by way of retaliation for a violation of them on the other side, without exciting the reprobation of the impartial part of mankind, sullying the glory and blasting the reputation of the party which disregards them, this consideration has, in general, force sufficient to induce an observance of them." 66 Letters of Camillus, No. 21, 5 Lodge's Hamilton, 104. They [the British] wantonly destroyed the public edifices, having no relation in their structure to operations of war nor used at the time for military annoyance, some of these edifices being also costly monuments of taste and of the arts, and other depositories of the public archives, not only precious to the nation as the memorials of its origin and its early transactions, but interesting to all nations as contributions to the general stock of historical instruction and political science." President Madison's proclamation of Sept. 1, 1814, Richardson's Messages, "The British Government, immediately after being advised of the conflagration, publicly thanked the officers concerned in it; and on being subsequently informed of the death of General Ross, who was killed, the day after the conflagration, in the abortive march to Baltimore, erected a monument in Westminster Abbey to his memory. But before long it was discovered that the burning of Washington was as impolitic as it was in violation of the law of nations. The sentiment of condemnation that then sprung up is exhibited in a speech of Sir James Mackintosh in the House of Commons on April 11, 1815, in an address to the Prince Regent on the treaty of peace. It was argued by him that the culpable delay of the ministry in opening the negotiations of peace could be explained only on the miserable policy of protracting the war for the sake of striking a blow against America. The disgrace of the naval war, of balanced success between the British navy and the new-born marine of America, was to be redeemed by protracted warfare, and by pouring our victorious armies upon the American continent. That opportunity, fatally for us, arose. If the Congress had opened in June, it was impossible that we should have sent out orders for the attack on Washington. We should have been saved from that success, which he considered as a thousand times more disgraceful and disastrous than the worst defeat. . . . It was a success which made our naval power hateful and alarming to all Europe. It was a success which gave the hearts of the American people to every enemy who might rise against England. It was an enterprise which most exasperated a people and least weakened a government of any recorded in the annals of war. For every justifiable purpose of present warfare it was almost impotent. To every wise object of prospective policy it was hostile. It was an attack, not against the strength or the resources of a state, but against the national honour and public affections of a people. After 25 years of the fiercest warfare, in which every great capital of the European continent had been spared, he had almost said, respected by enemies, it was reserved for England to violate all that decent courtesy towards the seats of national dignity, which, in the midst of enmity, manifest the respect of nations for each other, by an expedition deliberately and principally directed against palaces of government, halls of legislation, tribunals of justice, repositories of the muniments of property, and of the records of history-objects among civilized nations exempted from the ravages of war, and secured, as far as possible, even from its accidental operation, because they contribute nothing to the means of hostility, but are consecrated to purposes of peace, and minister to the common and perpetual interest of all human society. It seemed to him an aggravation of this atrocious measure that ministers had attempted to justify the destruction of a distinguished capital as a retaliation for some violences of inferior American officers, unauthorized and disavowed by their Government, against he knew not what village in Upper Canada. To make such retaliation just, there must always be clear proof of the outrage; in general also, sufficient evidence that the adverse government refused to make due reparation for it, and at least some proportion of the punishment to the offence. Here there was very imperfect evidence of the outrage-no proof of refusal to repair-and demonstration of the excessive and monstrous iniquity of what was falsely called retaliation. The value of a capital is not to be estimated by its houses, and warehouses, and shops. It consisted chiefly in what could be neither numbered nor weighed. It was not even by the elegance or grandeur of its monuments, that it was most dear to a generous people. They looked upon it with affection and pride as the seat of legislation, as the sanctuary of public justice, often as linked with the memory of past times, sometimes still more as connected with their fondest and proudest hopes of greatness to come. To put all these respectable feelings of a great people, sanctified by the illustrious name of Washington, on a level with half a dozen wooden sheds in the temporary seat of a provincial government, was an act of intolerable insolence, and implied as much contempt for the feelings of America as for the common sense of mankind.'" Wharton, Int. Law Digest, III. 335, citing 30 Hansard Parl. Debates, 526; |