it be a defense that the trade is not subservient to the enemy's interest, as the condemnation of such licensed vessel and cargo rests upon the broad ground of the illegality of such voyage. See Halleck Int. Law (3d. ed. by Baker), II. 138 et seq. It is not necessary, in order to subject the property to condemnation, that the person granting the license should be duly authorized to grant it, provided the person receiving it takes it with the expectation that it will protect his property from the enemy. The Aurora, 8 Cranch, 203. On August 5, 1812, Admiral Sawyer addressed to the British consul at Boston a letter stating that, it being important to insure a constant supply of flour and other dry provisions to Spain and Portugal and to the West Indies, he (the Admiral) had been instructed to direct the officers under his command not to molest American vessels unarmed and so laden, bona fide bound to Portugese and Spanish ports, whose papers should be accompanied by a certified copy of a letter under the consul's official seal. The consul then addressed a similar communication to the commanders of British ships of war and privateers, accompanied with a certified copy of the Admiral's letter. American vessels thus licensed naturally threw themselves, as soon as possible, into the hands of British cruisers for the purpose of obtaining protection against American capture for sailing under the enemy's license. Such vessels, when captured by American cruisers, were condemned. The Hiram, 8 Cranch, 444; The Hiram, 1 Wheaton, 440. See Upton's Maritime Warfare and Prize (2d ed.), 137. The sailing under the enemy's license constitutes, of itself, an act of illegality, which subjects the property to confiscation, without regard to the object of the voyage or the port of destination. The Ariadne, 2 Wheat. 143. See, also, Patton r. Nicholson, 3 Wheat. 204. A vessel which has been rendered liable to capture as enemy's property by sailing under the license or pass of the enemy, or for trading with the enemy, may still be seized and condemned as prize of war after her return to the United States, by virtue of the general authority of the Government to seize all enemies' property coming into our ports during war. And as a general rule, any person may seize any property forfeited to the use of the Government, either by the municipal law or by the law of prize, for the purpose of enforcing the forfeiture; and it depends upon the Government itself whether it will act upon the seizure. If it proceeds to enforce the forfeiture by legal process, this is a sufficient confirmation of the seizure. The Caledonian, 4 Wheat. 100. The fact of a vessel having been sent into an enemy's port for adjudication, and afterwards permitted to resume her voyage, was held to raise a violent presumption that she had a license; and, the claimant having produced no evidence to repel the presumption, condemnation was pronounced. The Langdon Cheves, 4 Wheat. 103. When a ship is captured in time of war, it is not to be presumed, from the fact that she carries an enemy's license, that she intends proceeding to the port of the enemy. The license may be carried for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. The Matilda, 5 Hughes, C. C. 544. A contract made by a consul of a neutral power with a citizen of a belligerent state, that he will" protect," with his neutral name, from capture by the belligerent, merchandise which such citizen has in the enemy's lines, is against public policy and void. Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall. 542. “A United States consul has no authority by virtue of his official station to grant any license or permit the exemption of a vessel of an enemy from capture and confiscation." The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568; citing The Amodo, Newberry, 400; VII. ENEMY'S PROPERTY. 1. LIABILITY TO SEIZURE. § 1183. The Continental Congress, by a resolution of December 9, 1781, enacted that all ships, with their cargoes, which should be seized by their crews, should be deemed lawful prize to the captors, the object being to tempt the navigators of enemy vessels to bring them into American ports. Subsequently, during the war, a British ship, bound to New York, then in the possession of the British, was compelled by stress of weather to enter a port in North Carolina; and the master, with a view to save his ship from confiscation, made an agreement with the crew to seize the vessel and cargo and have them condemned, with the understanding that the crew were to have their wages, and that the residue of the proceeds were to remain in the master's hands as trustee for the owners. This agreement was signed by the master and crew, and, after the condemnation of the vessel and cargo, was carried into effect. After the war was over, the owners of the vessel and cargo filed a bill in equity in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Georgia against the master, praying for an accounting. The bill was dismissed on demurrer, and a writ of error was then obtained from the Supreme Court. This court held, Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion, that while the scheme to save the ship and cargo, under the semblance of a condemnation, was a stratagem of war, and not in itself an immoral act, it was a fraud upon the resolution of Congress, and therefore could not be enforced by the courts of the United States. Hannay r. Eve (1806), 3 Cranch, 242. The circumstance that a ship is found in the possession of the enemy affords prima facie evidence that it is his property. But if it was originally of a friendly or neutral character, and has not been changed by a sentence of condemnation, or by such possession as nations recognize as firm and effectual, it will be restored absolutely or conditionally, as each case requires. Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch, 244. Some goods, captured by an American privateer and libelled as British property, were claimed by A, an American merchant. The original order for the goods did not appear, but the evidence contained (1) an invoice, (2) a bill of lading, and (3) two letters. The invoice stated that the goods were bought by B, a merchant of Birmingham, by order and for account and risk" of A, and forwarded on March 4, 1811, to the care of certain merchants at Liverpool, and that they were "the property" of C, a banker of Birmingham, to whom the amount of the invoice was to be remitted. The bill of lading, which was in the usual form, stated that the goods were shipped by the Liverpool merchants to be delivered to A, or his assigns, in New York. The letters in question were both addressed to A, and were dated, respectively, at Birmingham, July S and July 9, 1812. The first was from B, and stated that, in consequence of the revocation of the orders in council, he had lost no time in shipping the goods sent to Liverpool so long since, agreeable to your (A's) kind order." The second letter, which was referred to in the first, was from C, who stated that he had extended assistance to B, who had been embarrassed, and that he had therefore obtained from the latter "an assignment of certain quantities of goods" which B “had provided on account of A . . . previous to the 2nd of February, 1811." Marshall, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said that, in the usual course of trade, if the purchasing and shipping merchant were the same, there would rarely be any actual change of property between the purchase and the shipment. But, in the state of the relations between the United States and Great Britain during the existence of the nonimportation acts, the transaction often became divided. Goods were procured under a general order to purchase, but were not to be shipped till a future uncertain event should occur; and if they were, in the meantime, to remain the property of the agent, they would probably be retained at the place of purchase under his immediate control and inspection. Their conveyance to a seaport, there to be stored till their importation into the United States should be allowed, would indicate an actual investment of the property in the person by whose order and for whose use the goods were purchased and stored. The evidence in the present case indicated that the goods when stored in Liverpool were the property of A, subject to that control which B would have as purchaser and intended shipper, who had advanced the purchase money. This control, while affording security to B, could not be wantonly used to the destruction of A's property in the goods, and, in the case of a conveyance to a person having notice of A's rights, should be construed to operate consistently with them, so far as the two rights could consist with each other. The words in the invoice representing the goods as the property of C evidently were introduced merely for the purpose of securing the payment of the purchase money to him. On the whole, the majority of the court was of opinion that the goods were shipped in pursuance of A's orders, and became his property when delivered, for his use, to the master of the vessel, "if not at an earlier period,” i. e., “on being stored in Liverpool, if not at an antecedent time." The goods must, therefore, be restored. The Susan & Mary (1816), 1 Wheaton, 25. A ship and cargo, captured as British, were claimed by a Russian as neutral. It appeared that the ship, documented as Russian, was placed under the control of a British house, which dispatched her to Havana, where she was loaded under the directions of one M., ostensible agent of the Russian owner; and that she then cleared apparently for a Russian port, but with orders to call at a British port, and terminate her voyage there under the orders of the British house. Evidence was lacking to show either the relations between the Russian owner and the British house, or the dependence of M. on the Russian owner for authority, instructions, and resources. All the material papers touching the transaction were concealed in a billet of wood, and their presence was betrayed by one of the crew. They tended to show that the adventure was undertaken by the British house alone; that the cargo was purchased with their funds, and that M. was their agent. As to the ship, nothing was produced to show her neutral character but the formal papers that always accompany fictitious as well as real transactions. There was no charterparty, no original correspondence, no instructions, even, directing the master to obey the orders of the British house. Held, that both ship and cargo should be condemned, the court (Johnson, J., delivering the opinion) saying that in any case a neutral shipowner's lending his name to cover a fraud with regard to the cargo would alone subject the ship to condemnation. The Fortuna (Feb. 26, 1818), 3 Wheaton, 236. The court referred to the case of the St. Nicholas, 1 Wheaton, 417, as similar in circumstances. The American ship Merrimack, a few days before the declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain was known in the latter country, sailed from Liverpool for Baltimore with a cargo of goods shipped by a British subject and consigned to citizens of the United States. She was captured on the voyage by an American privateer, who libelled her cargo as prize. Four claimants appeared, as follows: 1. McKean and Woodland, American merchants, claimed certain articles which were purchased on their orders by merchants in Sheffield. At the moment of shipment the British merchants learned that the partnership between McKean and Woodland had been dissolved, and, having no instructions as to how the goods should be shipped, consigned them to an American merchant residing in the same city as McKean and Woodland, for the latters' use. Held, that the property vested in McKean and Woodland, and consequently was not liable to condemnation as enemy property. There was nothing in the case to throw any suspicion on the fairness of the trans action. 2. Kimmel and Albert, merchants of Baltimore, claimed certain articles. The shippers, who were British merchants, consigned the articles in question to their agent in the United States with instructions not to deliver them in a certain contingency except for cash. On the ground that the property remained in the shippers, the goods were condemned. 3. The facts in this claim were substantially the same as in number 2, and the goods were condemned. 4. W. & J. Wilkins, merchants of Baltimore, claimed certain goods, which were purchased, as were the goods in cases 1, 2, and 3, on orders given long before the war. In the present case, however, the shipper |