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the entry of vessels, and no vessel is subject to capture without previous notice or due warning."

Mr. Clayton, Sec. of State, to Mr. Flenniken, May 12, 1849, MS. Inst.
Denmark, XIV. 72.

"A blockade, to be valid under the law of nations, must be efficient; that
is to say, carried on by a force competent to prevent the entrance of
neutrals into the blockaded ports." (Mr. Clayton, Sec. of State, to
Mr. Bowlin, Jan. 24, 1850, 37 MS. Dom. Let. 419.)

Texas having in 1842 given notice of a blockade of Mexican ports, and it
appearing that the blockade was not "real," the British foreign office
on Sept. 21, 1842, declared it to be of no effect.
State Papers (1845-1846), 1261, 1262.)

(34 Br. & For.

"If the blockade [of Mexican ports by France] is effectually maintained
against vessels of other nations, this Government would withhold its
protection from an American vessel taken in the attempt to evade it.”
(Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Bond, Aug. 9, 1862, 58 MS. Dom.
Let. 47.)

As to the duration of the French blockades in Mexico, see Mr. Seward,
Sec. of State, to Mr. Chase, Ch. Justice, Feb. 9, 1867, 75 MS. Dom.
Let. 231.

"Only such blockades as shall be duly proclaimed and maintained by
adequate force, in conformity to the law of nations, will be observed
and respected by the United States." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State.
to Mr. Sullivan, min. to Colombia, No. 4, June 13, 1867, Dip. Cor. 1868,
II. 1011, 1012.)

See, to the same effect, Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Shishkin, Russian
min., June 12, 1877, For. Rel. 1877, 476; Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State.
to Mr. Christiancy, min. to Peru, No. 29, Aug. 8, 1879, For. Rel
1879, 893.

But the person who assumes to enter a port proclaimed to be blockaded
takes the responsibility of his act, if the blockade is in fact effective.
Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Langston, min. to Hayti.
No. 246, Dec. 15, 1883, MS. Inst. Hayti, II. 367.)

A blockade, once regularly proclaimed and established, will not be held to be ineffective by continual entries in the log-book, supported by testimony of officers of the vessel seized, that, the weather being clear, no blockading vessels were to be seen off the port from which the vessel sailed.

The Andromeda, 2 Wall. 481.

October 15, 1888, the authorities at Port au Prince decided upon a blockade of the ports of Cape Haytian, Gonaives, and St. Marc. Next day they notified the American minister, and from that time on refused to clear vessels for those ports. It appeared that an attempt was made to establish a blockade at Cape Haytian, and that during the next twenty days a man-of-war was kept cruising between that port and Fort Liberté, about twenty-four miles to the eastward. During this time the cruiser never remained off Cape Haytian at night, and eight sailing vessels entered the port. From November 23

to December 3 no blockading vessel whatever appeared off Cape Haytian, while from November 2 to December 1, inclusive, twentysix sailing vessels and two steamships entered the port. On December 3 two Haytian men-of-war appeared and proceeded to fire upon the city, but, after remaining in the offing till December 6, they departed. From that time on hardly a semblance of a blockade existed, and as late as December 25 all the public armed vessels of Hayti were at Port au Prince. Soon after the declaration of blockade, an American schooner was seized off Gonaives, but as she had had no notice of its existence she was subsequently released and an indemnity paid. Other ports, in addition to those above mentioned, were also declared to be blockaded, but the circumstances as to enforcement were similar. It appeared, in fact, that for some time there were only two vessels available for blockade duty, and that both of these were on one or more occasions lying in the harbor of Port au Prince. The evidence appeared to be conclusive that the blockade had always been intermittent, and that it was at no time effective or valid in the sense of being maintained by a force sufficient to restrain access to the coast or to make it difficult to obtain ingress or egress or to preclude a reasonable chance of entrance. Under the circumstances, the Haytian Government was notified that no blockade was considered as existing, and that, if a blockade should be again proposed, “ due notice of the commencement thereof must be given, and a reasonable period during which neutral vessels will be permitted to depart with their cargoes must be allowed and will be reckoned from the date of such actual commencement.”

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Thompson, min. to Hayti, No. 156, Feb. 27, 1889, For. Rel. 1889, 494.

See, also, S. Ex. Doc. 69, 50 Cong. 2 sess.

"The question of the legitimacy and effectiveness of a blockade is one of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence presented; and this Department can not undertake to express opinion thereon in anticipation." (Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Kamer & Co., Feb. 19, 1889, 171 MS. Dom. Let. 685.)

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During a revolution in Venezuela, the minister of the United States reported, on Oct. 4, 1892, that the blockade" of Puerto Cabello was "effected by two inefficient Venezuelan steamers" which were "present there at intervals," and which "now threaten to fire upon New York American steamers;" and he asked whether the Daval forces of the United States should respect such a blockade, should the steamers make an attempt to enter." Reply was made, on October 5, that the blockade was rendered "effective by the pres ence of blockading vessels competent to warn and prevent entrance;" that "if blockade be intermitted, commercial vessels should not be prevented from entering," nor should they on the other hand be

"protected in breaking actual blockade;" that instructions in this
sense would be sent to the United States naval forces, and that the
steamers should be advised “that they should not attempt to break
the blockade when it is visible." The aspects of the situation were,
however, essentially changed by an investigation of the complaint
made by the minister of foreign affairs at Caracas, of the action of
the U. S. S. Kearsarge, Sept. 30, 1892, in convoying the steamer
Philadelphia into Puerto Cabello. Although the blockade of the
port was proclaimed August 26, to take effect on Sept. 10 for vessels
from the Antilles, and on Sept. 25 for vessels from the United States,
it was positively ascertained that no blockading force was visible on
Sept. 16, 21, 23, 25, 26, or 27, while no information was obtained of
the presence of any Venezuelan Government vessel either before or
after Sept. 30, when a force was sent there perhaps for the purpose
of intercepting the Philadelphia, but more probably for that of
intercepting another vessel, which was supposed to be laden with
arms and munitions of war. (For. Rel. 1892, 624.) Under the
circumstances, and in view of the fact that not long previously, six
passengers with permits to leave the country were forcibly taken
from the American steamer Caracas by de facto authorities at Puerto
Cabello, Admiral Walker ordered the Kearsarge to convoy the Phila-
delphia into port, in order, as he said, " to protect the American mail
steamer from unlawful and irregular interference from either fac-
tion." It seems that one of the Venezuelan gunboats steamed to-
ward the Philadelphia, but did not speak her, or make any recognized
signal to attract her attention. With reference to this situation the
Department of State, on Oct. 18, 1892, said: "If, as appears from
the facts stated, no serious and continuous visible blockade of that
port [Puerto Cabello] was maintained and a mere pretense of block-
ade kept up by sending a vessel there only on the periodical occasions
when the
steamers were scheduled to touch at that port.
it could not be respected as effective under international law. Block-
ade to be effective must be maintained against all commerce, and aim
to visibly close the port [and] not be directed to interference with
particular ships at intervals."

Mr. Scruggs, min. to Venezuela, to Mr. Foster, Sec. of State, tel., Oct. 4.
1892, For. Rel. 1892, 628; Mr. Foster to Mr. Scruggs, tel., Oct. 5,
1892, id. 629, MS. Inst. Venezuela, IV. 190; Mr. Scruggs to Mr.
Foster, Oct. 7, 1892, For. Rel. 1892, 629-634; Mr. Wharton, Act.
Sec. of State, to Mr. Scruggs, Oct. 18, 1892, id. 635.
For a Venezuelan decree of blockade of the mouth of the Orinoco, Oct. 2,
1871, and a decree of May 4, 1872, abrogating the previous decree,
see S. Mis. Doc. 168, 50 Cong. 1 sess. 71, 81.

"A blockade to be effective and binding must be maintained by a force sufficient to render ingress to or egress from the port dangerous."

"

Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, General Orders, No. 492,
June 20, 1898, For. Rel. 1898, 780.

The French steamer Olinde Rodriguez, belonging to the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, sailed from Havre June 16, 1898, on her regular voyage, under her mail contract with the French Government, for the West Indian ports of St. Thomas, San Juan (Porto Rico), Puerto Plata, Cape Haytian, St. Marc, Port au Prince, Gonaives, and return, calling at the same ports.

A proclamation declaring San Juan to be blockaded was issued by the Government of the United States on June 27, 1898. The Olinde Rodriguez arrived at St. Thomas on July 3, and on July 4 entered the port of San Juan. The U. S. S. Yosemite, which was lying three miles southwestward of the port, on blockade duty, gave chase, but was unable to reach the steamer before she had turned in and come under the protection of the shore batteries. When on the following morning she came out, the commander of the Yosemite, accepting the master's statement that he did not know that the port was blockaded, endorsed on her log an official warning and permitted her to proceed. She duly completed her outward itinerary and had left Puerto Plata on her return voyage when, on July 17, she was captured by the United States steamship New Orleans off San Juan, on the charge of attempting to enter that port. Questions were raised (1) as to the existence of the intent to enter, and (2) as to the existence of a lawful blockade. The court below doubted the validity of the blockade, because it was maintained by only one cruiser. The Supreme Court observed that the test was whether the blockade was " practically effective;" that this, though a mixed question, was one more of fact than of law;" that, by General Orders, No. 492, “ a blockade to be effective and binding must be maintained by a force sufficient to render ingress to or egress from the port dangerous;" that, while it was not practicable to define the degree of danger that should constitute a test, it was enough that the danger was real and apparent; and that the question of effectiveness was not controlled by the number of the blockading force. The position could not, said the court, be maintained, that one modern cruiser, though sufficient in fact, was not sufficient in law; nor could a vessel, actually captured in attempting to enter a blockaded port, after a warning entered on her log by a cruiser off that port only a few days before, dispute the efficiency of the force to which she was subjected. The blockade was therefore held to be effective and binding. On the other hand, the court decided that the intent to break the blockade was not sufficiently established; but, in view of circumstances of suspicion, ordered that restitution should be awarded without damages, and that the costs

and expenses of her custody and preservation, and all costs in the cause except the fees of counsel, should be imposed on the ship.

The Olinde Rodriguez, 174 U. S. 510; cited in The Newfoundland, 176
U. S. 97.

For the case of the Olinde Rodriguez in the court below, see 89 Fed.
Rep. 105; 91 id. 274.

The President, in his proclamation of April 26, 1898, in relation to the
rules of maritime law to be observed by the United States in the
conflict with Spain, adhering to the uniform position of the United
States, declared; "3. Blockades in order to be binding must be
effective." (Proclamations and Decrees during the War with
Spain, 77.)

"In some cases, where a blockading squadron, from the nature of the channels leading to a port, can be eluded with ease, a large number of successful evasions may be insufficient to destroy the legal efficiency of the blockade. Thus during the American civil war, the blockade of Charleston was usually maintained by several ships, of which one lay off the bar between the two principal channels of entrance, while two or three others cruised outside within signaling distance. This amount and disposition of force seem to have been thought by the British Government amply sufficient to create the degree of risk necessary under the English view of international law, although from the peculiar nature of the coast a large number of vessels succeeded in getting out and in during the whole continuance of the blockade."

Hall, Int. Law (5th ed.), 701, citing Bernard, Neut. of Great Britain. chaps. x. and xi.

"To agree to perform a duty effectively is a very different thing from agreeing to perform it absolutely; the latter engagement is a guarantee, the former is an engagement to perform the duty unless casus intervene. A carrier, for instance, does not insure against a sudden frost which a prudent person could not foresee, nor against peculiar and extraordinary storms; nor even against defective performance by employés, when this defectiveness arises from extraordinary interferences not to be prognosticated. And so it is with blockades. A blockade to be effective need not be perfect. It is not necessary that the beleaguered port should be hermetically sealed. It is not enough to make the blockade ineffective that on some particularly stormy night a blockade-runner slid through the blockading squadron. Nor is it enough that through some exceptional and rare negligence of the officers of one of the blockading vessels a blockade-runner was allowed to pass when perfect vigilance could have arrested him. But if the blockade is not in the main effective-if it can be easily eluded-if escaping its toils is due not to casus or some rare and exceptional neg

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