What moves me is, not the many disorders & depredations that naturally will ensue, upon the removeall of that regiment, in the northern parts of this countrey; those con sequences are too obvious not to have been thought of; and I dare say (as the strongest equity requires) measures have been devised, & will be pursued, fit to prevent that evill; but my apprehensions are of ane oy' & a much higher nature; and to explain myself you must permit me to go a little out of my depth, and to talk like a politician. If I am mistaken, & my supposalls have no foundation in truth or probability, I shall be very glad of it; and in writeing thus, I shall have done no more harm than to shew my ignorance & my zeal. I suppose, then, that the generous efforts his Majestie is makeing to preserve the libertys of Europe will provoke the invader of those libertys, and may produce a war with the Crown of France; and I suppose in the next place, in case such a war happen, France may espouse the interest of the Pretender, and attempt, if not seriously to sett him on the throne, at least to make a very important diversion, at the expence of risquing a very few battalions. If there is no probability of such a rupture, or no danger that in such an event France may think of playing the game I have mentioned, what follows is useless; and you may throw aside this letter without reading any more of it; but then if there is any liklyhood that France may enterprize what I dread, to me it wou'd seem in common prudence highly necessary not to facilitate that enterprize; but, on the contrary, to do every thing that might render it dificult, or rather impracticable. I take it for granted, that if there is any liklyhood of a rupture, due care is and will be taken of England, by keeping such a body of troops in readiness as must be superior to any force that can be landed there; which will prevent the attempt; as the sending over a small body wou'd be, in effect, sending them to certain destruction; since there cou'd be no hopes of their being joyned by any force in England to support them. But I beg that you may consider, whether the case is the same in Scotland; and if it is not, what is then fittest to be done? The case of Scotland, so far as I understand it, is, that Jacobitism is at a very low pass, compared with what it was 30 years ago; that the Pretender is very much out of men's thoughts; that his antient adherents, who suffered for him, and who find themselves now tollerably at their ease, will consider well before they risque a second time; and that, in all appearance, upon his own bottom he never will be able to cause the least disturbance in this countrey. But tho' this is (I verily believe) the case, yet I will not be so sanguine as to say, that the fire is totally extinguished; that there is none of it lurking under the embers, or even that what lurks may not possibly be blown up into a flame, if France, besides words, which she has always ready, will give some money, and the countenance of force; I say, the countenance of force, because I fear a small one, seconded with money & promises, might spirit up unthinking people, who cannot perfectly judge what force may be suf. ficient to secure the execution of the design. If I am in the right in what I have suggested, put the case, that France, in alliance with the Pretender, shou'd, by his missionaries, back promises with money, and treat for ane insurrection upon their actual landing of troops; and suppose, that, as she has of late been sparing of neither money nor troops, she shou'd fling half a dozen or half a score of battalions into the Highlands, a fond perdue, and that these shou'd be joyned by 3 or 4,000 banditti; what sort of confusion must that make on the island; what diversion to his Majestie's troops, what interruption to his designs! The enterprise, I verily believe, wou'd at last be baffled, and the invaders wou'd be lost to France; but still ane infinite deal of mischeiff wou'd be wrought, at a small expence to that Crown; 3 A and and this is what distinguishes ane attempt in the Highlands of Scotland, from one in any place to the southward. In the last, the invaders wou'd be swallowed up in a moment, if they did not come in numbers more than can well be conveyed at once without discovery; in the first case, a small number wou'd suffice to raise, with those that might be brought to join them, a lasting & a very dangerous confusion. in Having thus stated to you the danger I dread, I must, in the next place, put you mind, that the present system for securing the peace of the Highlands, which is the best I ever heard of, is by regular troops stationed from Inverness to Fort William, alongst the chain of lakes which in a manner divydes the Highlands, to command the obedience of the inhabitants of both sides, and by a body of disciplined Highlanders, wearing the dress & speaking the language of the countrey, to execute such orders as require expedition, and for which neither the dress nor the manner of the other troops are proper. These Highlanders, now regimented, were at first independent companys; and tho' their dress, language, & manners, qualyfied them for secureing the low countrey against depredations, yet that was not the sole use of them; the same qualitys fitted them for every expedition that required secrecy & dispatch; they served for all purposes of hussars, or light horse, in a country where mountains & bogs render cavalry useless; and if properly disposed over the Highlands, nothing that was commonly reported & believed by the Highlanders cou'd be a secret to their commanders, because of their intimacy with the people, and the sameness of the language. Now, Sir, lett me suppose, that France was to attempt ane insurrection in the Highlands, which must be prepared by emissarys sent to cajole, to cabale, to promise, to pay, to concert, &c. and by arms & ammunition imported & dispersed; and lett me suppose this Highland regiment properly disposed, and properly commanded, is it not obvious, that the operations of such emisarys must be discovered, if not transacted with the outmost secrecy; that the Highlanders who suffered themselves to be tampered with by them, must do so under the strongest apprehensions of being taken by the neck by detachments of that regiment, if their treason were heard of; and that, of course, they must be shy of meeting or transacting with the agent of the Pretender, or of caballing, mustering their followers, or receiveing or distributeing arms. Now, on the other hand, lett me suppose the same attempt to be made, and the Highland regiment in Flanders; lett me beg to know, what chance cou'd you have of discovering or preventing the effect of any tampering in the Highlands. Cou'd any officer, or other person trusted by the Government, go through the mountains with ane intention to discover such intrigues with safety? Wou'd the Pretender's emissarys, or the Highlanders who might favour them, be in any apprehension from the regular troops? Cou'd you propose, with any probability of success, to seize arms or attainted persons? Nay, suppose the Government had direct intelligence of the projects carried on, where, and by whom, cou'd they hope to surprise, or lay hold of, any one person? These questions, I dare say, you can easily answer, and, with me, can see, that if France shou'd stumble upon such a design as I have been supposing,remove but that regiment, and there is nothing to hinder the Agents of that Crown to have their full swing, and to tamper with the poor unthinking people of the Highlands, with as great safety as if there were no Government at all in the Island. I will say more; I doubt not but in many places of that country, if the people could be prevailed with to rebel, they might receive arms, & be in some sort disciplined, for many weeks before the Government cou'd have certain notice of it. As, therefore, I think removeing the regiment I speak of, is removing one of the principall obstructions to the mischieff I dread the most, on the supposal of ane open open rupture with France, I have taken the liberty of bringing my thoughts on that subject together, & laying them before you, to the end you may make such use of them, as to you shall seem most proper. If you think of this matter as I do, and find it necessary, you may mention it to the King as a suggestion of mine; he may find fault with my timidity, or want of judgment in things of this nature; but he will remember so much of me as to believe, that the hint I presume to give proceeds from duty to him, & from that only. I wish you may be able to read my wretched hand writeing; but the subject wou'd not permit me to make use of any other. My service to the Major. I am, &c. No. CCCXCI. My Lord Lyon, From the Lord President to the Lord Lyon. THE last post brought me your's of the 24th, complaining of the remissness of our countrymen in making the necessary aplication, for obtaining relief from the masterfull depredations that destroy the neighbourhood of the Highlands. I am heartily sorry to hear it, and unwilling to belive that a man of honour, who was so zealous, and for so good reasons, last harvest, to have this mischief obviated, as the Earle of Murray was, can slacken in his aplication when the evil to be prevented is growing daylie more dangerous. I am hopefull his Lop's deferring is rather the effect of judgment, as thinking it more adviseable to wait till the hurry which attended the first part of the Session was over, than to importune Ministers, overloaded, with what they wou'd be apt to think a trifle, compared with their other much more interfeering af fairs. But then, though much depends on the timeing properly an application, I hope his Lop, and all of you, will consider, that you may sett your time, and that unless your project is prepared and agreed to before shutting up the Committee of Supply, if it must be supported by public money, it cannot take place untill ane other Session. As to what you mention touching the disarming Act, without entering into the question how far it was expedient to have enacted that law at the time, I believe no one will think this a fitt season for repeating it; and I am confident, that to the effect of it is owing, in a great measure, the disorder we now so sensibly feel. Had the host of thieves who now plunder us been thorrowly disarmed, and keeped from the use of arms since the date of the first act, we shou'd have had no complaints at present; or if that act hade never past, and if the Highlanders adjacent to the thieveing countrys hade remained armed as formerly, those robbers durst never have ventured to prey upon them, and must even make their inroads on the lowest countries with much more precaution; but at present, as the bandittie are armed, whilst their neighbours are disarmed, they roam about in troops in broad day-light, without any aprehension from the country which is disarmed, or from the troops who cannot follow so as to come up with them. This, my Lord Lyon, is manifestly the case; and this is what creates the most just of all demands upon the publick; because if the Government have taken away from the people their defence, by disarming them, they that moment become debitors to the people for protection, and ought in justice to afford it, whatever it may cost. But, besides this consideration from justice, there is ane other from policy, that one should think must weigh, especialy at this juncture; 342 and and that is, the danger of permitting a gang of ruffians disaffected, if any in the whole Highlands are so, to his Majesty, to range and lord it over the whole country without any restraint. If any enemy to our happy establishment were now to attempt to seduce the inhabitants of the mountains into treasonable measures, what could prevent their tampering at least? How could any orders from the Government be executed amongst the hills? and who can answer at this day whether there are, or are not, emissaries from beyond seas trying to corrupt the minds of those poor Highlanders who not long agoe were favourable to them? For my owen part, I never think on this subject without concern; and I am satisfied, that if our great men saw this matter in the same light with me, they would not be at rest one moment untill they hade a force in the Highlands of Scotland sufficient to keep those bandittie, and all other low people, in order, sufficient to execute the King's lawfull commands in that country, as sufficient to prevent the easy access of the emissarys of the King's enemys to unthinking people, who do not look upon themselves to be favourites to the Government; at least, doe not feel, so much as they with reason might expect, the fruits of its protection. These preferences, with many more of the same kind, which will naturally occur, cannot faill, when laid before our great men, to rouse their attention, and produce the desired effect. I should gladly, for my own part, contribute every thing in my power towards the design; but, as I am left out of the play, I doubt it would not be thought any part of my province to meddle in such matters, or to give any advice before it is asked. If the application to be made by all of you, which will be concurred with by the Duke of Atholl, who by this time is with you, have the effect to move any of the Ministers to call for my poor opinion, they shall have it readily; in the mean time, I hope no time will be lost in making the application: the further delay of a very few days may render the whole design impracticable. It will cost you, I doubt, some trouble to read this scrawl; but you know I never was a good scribe. Stoney Hill, 31 Dec' 1743. I am yours, &c. No. CCCXCII. My Lord, The Marquis of Tweeddale to the Lord President. st Whitehall, 1" Feb 1743-4. YOUR Lordship's zeal and affection for his Majesty, and your extended interest and acquaintance in the Highlands, make it necessary to give your Lordship the present trouble. We have certain intelligence, that a squadron of 20 ships of war sailed from Brest on the 26th Jan, and were seen last Saturday morning steering Northwards. There are no certain accounts of any troops being on board; but it is said they have 15,000 musq" with them; and as we know that the Pretender's Son left Rome some time ago, and landed at Antibes the 11th of Jan', there is reason to suspect an attempt may be intended to be made on some part of Britain. I have wrote to the Justice Clerk, the Solicitor, & General Guest; since it is necessary that his Majesty's servants should, on this occasion, be duely informed of what particulars are come to our knowledge here. Lord President. I am, with great truth and esteem, Your Lordship's most obedient and most humble Servant, My Lord, No. CCCXCIII. The Lord President to the Marquis of Tweeddale. Edin', 5th Feb. 1744. THIS morning I had your Lordship's of the 1" by express. You judge exceedingly right of my affection to his Majesty's person and government, but too favourably of my abilities to be of service to him in the Highlands. At the same time, whatever is within my abilities he has very good reason to depend on, because it is my inclination as well as it is my duty. I am very hopefull the destination of the French fleet will not be found to be for Scotland. I shall be greatly deceived if ane attempt of that nature meet with any encouragement from the Highlanders. Their turn, a very few months ago, I am very confident, was very adversary to views of this nature; and tho' for some time I have been out of the way of conversing with them, or having their sentiments, yet I cannot suffer myself to believe that they can have been so far debauched as to give encouragement to any invader that did not bring alongst with him force sufficient to make the party equal. Besides, the season of the year does not leave it possible for a debarkation made amongst them to make any progress, or for them to subsist in bodies amongst the mountains; and a small number of foreign regular troops landed in the low country, though in their neighbourhood, must fall a sacrifice before they in all human probability could be reinforced. However, as your Lop has thought the intelligence worth communicating, I have wrote to a friend of mine in the neighbourhood of the Highlands to examine; a person whom I confide in, and who I am sure will let me know what he has observed; and if I learn any thing by this inquiry, I shall do myself the honour to let your Lop know it by Mr Solicitor Gen', who gives himself the trouble to dispatch my letter to the North Country by express. May I beg (as you see this letter is wrote in haste) to put your Lop in mind of a letter which I wrote above twelve months ago to Gen' Clayton, and which he sent to your Lop, about the Highland Regiments; and to ask you whether you are not now convinced that the reflections therein made were just, and whether the King's service does not absolutely require (to say nothing of the doubtful subjects) that a force of that kind should remain established in the Highlands? Your Lordship, I know, will forgive the imperfection of this scrawl, and believe me to be, with perfect esteem, My Lord, your's, The Marquis of Tweeddale. My Lord, No. CCCXCIV. The Marquis of Tweeddale to the Lord President. D. F. Whitehall, 15 Feb 1743-4. I HAD the favour of your Lordship's of the 5th, which I took the first opportunity of laying before his Majesty; who has commanded me to signify to you, that he is very sensible of your zeal and affection for his person and government ;. and to desire, that you will, from time to time, communicate any intelligence you shall receive that you think for his service. This day the King sent a Message to both Houses of Parliament, of which I send. you a copy, together with the Address thereupon. I am, with great truth and respect, My Lord, |