had not a more appropriate name than memory was concerned in all organic evolution. This mnemonic theory, as it is termed, has been called in to explain heredity by the assumption that the germ-cells are charged with the memories of past generations (see Professor Dendy's British Association Address, August, 1914). BREAKS IN NATURE-PROCESSES. We are beginning, moreover, to see that Nature does not work continuously, but often by sudden leaps, for which no seeming preparation had been previously made. "Mutations," or sudden leaps, in the organic world are now recognized in cases where a long period of unbroken sameness preceded. In the physical world also we have evidence of the same thing in Planck's Quantum Theory, which, owing to the fact that it explains several physical anomalies, is becoming generally accepted. It calls in question the constancy of Nature's operations. "The constancy of all dynamic operations," says Professor Planck, "has been an unquestioned assumption of all physical theories, which, based on the doctrine of Aristotle, maintains that Natura non facit saltus. But even in this ancient fortress recent investigations of physical science have made an important breach. In this case it is the principles of thermo-dynamies with which-owing to newly observed facts, the sentence just cited has come into collision; and if all the indications are not deceptive, the days of the validity of that saying are numbered. Nature, in fact, seems to work by leaps, and those, too, of a singular character." These leaps, he afterwards explains, are of an explosive and inconstant nature. This principle is on a par with the "mutations" already referred to, and the constancy and uniformity of Nature, which, in the eyes of some, seem to exclude the miraculous, are no longer to be regarded as unquestionable acquisitions of knowledge. The Quantum Theory, moreover, as applied to heat-radiation, is inconsistent with the older mechanics (see Nature, January 22nd, 1914). Other considerations have lately thrown grave doubts on the universality of the Newtonian laws. The principles at work in the connection of the "whirl" of negative electrons with the positive nucleus in the atom are seemingly inexplicable by any known mechanical laws. Dr. Norman Campbell, writing in Nature of January 22nd, 1914, raises the question of the universality of application of It mechanical principles. Dealing with the difficulty of accounting for the motion of electrons within the atom, he says: has recently been proposed to solve this difficulty by denying that the principles of mechanics are true in their application to systems of atomic dimensions. Such a solution may appear heroic rather than practical to those who have not followed the trend of modern physics; those who have, know that it is completely in accordance with the recent development of our ideas. The new conceptions, which were first introduced by Planck's theory of radiation, and have been applied with such striking results to the theory of specific heat and elasticity, are directly contradictory of those of the older mechanics." Again, "Bohr's theory not only rejects the principles of mechanics, which the most conservative are being driven to abandon, but it indicates that fundamental propositions are to take their place." Even the pervasive influence of gravitation has been recently called in question. Professor Eddington (Stellar Movements and the Structure of the Universe, 1914) concludes, from a comparison of the proper motion of the "fixed" stars with their spectra, that the average velocity increases with the age of the star, and he throws out the momentous conjecture that matter in its elementary stage may not be subject to gravitation. It seems clear from this extract that mechanical principles, applied to the constitution of the atom, are not in undisputed control of the universe, and it is only prudent to wait for further light before we adapt, as the Modernists are doing, our theology to the demands of a mechanical system which may have to give place to a wider generalization not conflicting with the possibility of the miraculous in nature. Deprived, as the Modernists think they are, of any support for the supernatural from the science which they wrongly assume to be that of to-day, they take refuge in philosophy. The scholastic philosophy is, to them, no longer in harmony with modern thought. We need a new Aquinas, they think, to give us a satisfactory presentation of the Christian religion in a theological terminology of a truly philosophical character. The Modernists found such a philosophy in that of Emmanuel Kant and his followers. The distinction drawn by Kant between "Nature in itself "—which he regarded as unknowable -and the phenomena presented in consciousness, gave the Modernist all that he wanted to build up a religion from inward spiritual experience without reference to external records. Renan was, perhaps, the first to apply the Kantian philosophy to religion in its historical aspect. "Religion," he says, "is false from the objective point of view, that is to say, in itself, and in regard to that which it commands to be believed; but it is eternally true from the subjective point of view, that is to say, from the need we have of it and of the religious sentiment with which it corresponds." Spiritual experience, and not historical events, are to the Modernist the perennial source of all religion. The external element, like "Nature in itself," is presented to consciousness only as symbols of reality. Symbolism occupies, no doubt, a large field in religion. When we speak of God as "Light," as "Truth," as "Love," etc., we are using symbols to express truths beyond the reach of our faculties, but it does not follow that all revelation of matters not within the sphere of experience are merely symbols. The Bishop of Oxford, Dr. Gore, in an admirable article in the Constructive Quarterly for March, 1914, limits the use of symbolism to the expression of truths which deal with "what lies outside our possible or actual human experience," or concern the transcendent God, or regions of existence which lie in the beyond" (p. 68). We are now urged," he goes on to say, "by our Modernist friends to extend the application of this principle so as to recognize that the phrases 'He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary,' and He rose again the third day from the dead,' are symbolical phrases." This Dr. Gore denies. It cannot, with any show of reason, be denied," he goes on to say, "that the point of Christianity was that these things and the like miracles had actually happened; and that provision had been made that they should be proclaimed by competent witnesses The insistence upon actual occurrence and competent witness in the New Testament is unmistakable” (p. 64). “With regard to the Bible language about angels and devils, it is one thing to recognize the language about the devil'going about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour,' or about the unclean spirit' going through dry places, etc., or about the Angels of little children beholding the face of God in heaven, as symbolical language; but it is quite another thing to dismiss from our minds the whole idea of good La réligion est fausse au point de vue de l'objet, c'est à dire en ellemême, et quant à ce qu'elle ordonne à croire ; mais elle est eternellement vraie au point de vue du sujet, c'est à dire du besoin que nous en avons et du sentiment réligieux auquel elle correspond."-Patrice. and bad spirits, and their relation to us and influence upon us The Modernist view of symbolism rests, as we have seen, on the Kantian outlook. It may be well in this connection to consider how that outlook is regarded by the most recent scientific investigators. Professor Planck, in the Berlin Address (Oct., 1913), already referred to, presents the latest scientific view with regard to the Kantian outlook as contrasted with that of thirty-six years ago. "Five and thirty years ago," he said, "Hermann von Helmholtz stated in this same place that our perceptions can never give us a picture, but at most merely a symbol, of the external world. For we are altogether lacking in a standard which would serve to show any kind of resemblance between the character peculiar to the external impression and the character peculiar to the consciousness to which it gives rise. ness. "All conceptions which we may form of the external world are, in the last analysis, reflections merely of our own consciousIs there any rational sense at all in setting up opposite our self-consciousness a Nature in itself' independent of the latter? Are not rather all the so-called 'laws of Nature' merely at bottom more or less serviceable rules by which we sum up, as accurately and conveniently as we can, the flow of events in our consciousness? If this were the case," says Professor Planck, then not only the ordinary judgments of men, but even exact investigation of Nature would at all times be in a fundamental error. For it is impossible to deny that the entire development of physical science up to the present aims, as a matter of fact, at as wide and deep a separation' as possible of the processes of external Nature from those that take place in the world of human consciousness. "The escape from this entangling difficulty very soon presents itself if we follow for only a step farther the thought-process involved. Let us assume for the moment that a physical picture of the world has been found which satisfies all the claims which may be made upon it, and thus is capable of exhibiting perfectly accurately all the empirically discovered laws of Nature. In that case the assertion that the picture referred to resembles only after a fashion 'actual' Nature can in no wise be proved. "But this subject has also a reverse side, which is generally much too little accentuated. Equally true is it that the still far bolder assertion, namely, that the supposed world-picture represents absolutely truly 'actual' Nature in every point, without exception, is not in any manner to be refuted. For in order even to enter on a proof to the contrary it would be necessary to be able to say something with certainty about 'actual' Nature-but this confessedly is altogether out of the question. Here, as we see, a monstrous void lies before us into which no science may ever penetrate, and the filling up of this void is not the business of the Pure Reason, but of the Practical-the business of a sane view of the world. Little as such a view of the world may be susceptible of scientific proof, we may safely rely upon it that it will stand fast against every storm, so long as it remains in agreement with itself and with the facts of experience. But let us not delude ourselves with the idea that it is possible, even in the most exact of all sciences of Nature, to make any progress entirely without a concept of the world, that is, altogether without unprovable hypotheses. Even in Physics the statement is valid, one cannot be saved without Faith-at least, faith in a certain reality outside ourselves." The German philosophy subsequent to the Kantian proceeds. on the assumption that no dualistic concept is necessary to explain consciousness. Consciousness needs no Nature in itself" as an exciting cause of its activity, everything is in the sphere of consciousness. A world outside consciousness is, to some of the successors of Kant, unthinkable. It is to this philosophy that Canon Streeter appeals in his Preface to Foundations, and Mr. W. H. Moberly contributes to this work an article on "God and the Absolute," in which he endeavours to sketch out, on the basis, presumably, of Hegelianism, a philosophy in which the religious difficulties. of the day may be met. He does not seem satisfied with his own conclusions, and adds at the end with commendable frankness his misgivings. "We have raised," he says, "a very ambitious problem, and our suggestions towards its solution are, at the best, fragmentary and unsatisfying. The reader can hardly avoid feeling this, for the writer himself feels it strongly." The philosophy which is to form a basis for Modernist theology is, therefore, yet to seek, and if the view cited above as to a world limited to subjective experience is any guide to the trend of scientific thought, the great fabric of Monism, built up with much labour by |