excellent gentleman's 15 measure 16 spoils and undermines these functions. For, in his measure, as we all know, it is proposed 17 that if a sentence of imprisonment has been pronounced, or should in future be pronounced, on any public debtor, he may be discharged from confinement on producing 18 sureties that he will undoubtedly pay 19 the sum in full 19 in nine months. How, then, are we to find our ways and means? In what manner will our army be sent out? How shall we collect 20 our revenue if every debtor is to produce sureties according to this man's law, instead of doing his duty? We shall have, by Jove, to tell the Greeks "We have got Timocrates' law; wait, therefore, for nine months; we will then march;" for this will be our fate. But if it should be necessary to fight in your own behalf, do you really 21 believe that the enemy will wait for the evasions 22 and dishonest tricks 23 of unprincipled men among us? or that if the state enacts laws embarrassing 24 its own functions and opposed to its own interests, it will be capable of achieving any of the measures required? No! 25 it is enough,26 Athenians, if, while prosperity reigns at home, and no law of this kind exists, we can vanquish our enemies, and keep up with the sharp demands 27 and emergencies 28 of war, and never fall 29 into the rear. Assure yourselves, therefore, Athenians, that even now all the rest is sheer profession1 and pretence, and that Philip is really planning and contriving3 that, while you remain at home, and the state loses all influence abroad, he may carry out all the projects he desires with the greatest tranquillity. In proof of this, contemplate the scene which is passing before your eyes. He is now spending his time in Thrace, attended by a large force, and is sending for strong reinforcements, as persons on the spot allege, from Macedonia and Thessaly. If, therefore, after waiting for the Etesian winds, he should appear before Byzantium and besiege it, do you in the first place imagine that the Byzantines will continue as infatuated as they now are, and will condescend neither to invoke our aid nor to defend themselves? I do not believe they will: on 10 the contrary, I believe that, if there are any whom they distrust even more than ourselves, they would admit11 them in preference to surrendering the city to him, in case12 he should not reduce them beforehand. So that,13 if we are not able to send a squadron thither from hence, and if there is no resource1 at hand upon the spot, nothing can save them from ruin. "True,"15 you will say, "for the men are ill-starred wretches, and their infatuation knows no bounds." I quite agree; 16 yet still they must be saved: for it concerns our country. Moreover, we cannot be certain even of this, that he will not attack the Chersonese: but if 17 17 as we surely may - we are to judge from the letter which he sent us, he intends to retaliate 18 on the inhabitants of the Chersonese. 6 2 Πράττεται. 3 Κατασκευάζεται. 4"Оπws, with fut. ind. W. Gr. Gr. § 176, obs. 3; BUTTм. Gr. Gr. § 139, E. ἀνοίας τῆς αὐτῆς. Cf. οὐχ οἷός 12" Αν περ. 13 Οὐκοῦν. 9 τ' ἐστίν, ἔχων ἃ κατέστραπται, μένειν ἐπὶ 14 Βοήθεια. = Πάνυ ye. fut. XLVI. I am anxious, therefore, that you should candidly1 examine into the present state of public affairs, and should consider what we are ourselves now doing, and how we are administering them. We are neither willing to pay war taxes,2 nor do we venture to serve in person in the army, nor are we capable of refraining from the public treasure, nor do we pay Diopeithes his stipulated reward,3 nor praise the efforts he has made to provide for himself. No! we slander him, and debate by what means, and what, he is likely to do, and so forth: nor, while such is our position, are we willing to transact our own affairs; but while in our speeches we commend those who utter sentiments worthy of the state, in our actions we second their opponents. You have been in the habit of asking, from time to time, of every public speaker,What, then, are we to do?' I beg to ask of you, 'What am I to propose?' for if you will neither pay war taxes, nor march in person, nor abstain from the national funds, nor grant Diopeithes his stipulated pay, nor leave untouched whatever he may provide for himself, nor undertake to administer your own affairs, I have nothing to propose. For if you still grant such unbridled license to persons sure 10 and calumniate, as" to listen even to impeachments directed by anticipation against the plans they impute to him, what can any man possibly 12 propose? 8 anxious to cen 1 Μετὰ παῤῥησίας. 2 * Εἰσφέρειν. 3 Σύνταξις, an euphemism for 4 Αλλά. * Βασκαίνω. 6 · Συναγωνίζεσθαι. 1 Ο πατ μισθός. pióv oi πapióvтes=the public orators: the origin of the term is explained by Eschines, 76, 18. παριὼν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα. λειν. with opt. 8 'Eâv. 10 Αἰτιᾶσθαι. 11"QOTE, with indic. JELF, § 863. 9 ''Elé12" Av, 1 XLVII. Considering, then, that the struggle is for the most important stakes, it becomes us thus to resolve, and to detest and chastise the traitors who have sold themselves to him; for it is not possible to master our enemies outside of the city, until you have punished those enemies within our walls who are in his pay; but we shall always stumble3 over these men, like vessels striking on jutting rocks,* and thus be behindhand5 with the former. For what reason do you imagine that he now insults us—for to me he seems to be doing nothing less-and while he cajoles others with fair treatment, is already menacing you? Thus it was by lavish presents that he secretly inveigled the Thessalians into their present state of vassalage; nor can any man detail in how many instances he deluded the ill-fated Olynthians in former times, by the cession of Potidæa, and in many other ways. The Thebans he is even now decoying by delivering Boeotia into their hands, and rescuing them from a protracted and exasperated 10 war; so that these several states, after reaping11 some petty 12 advantage, have, in some cases, already suffered a lot familiar to all; and in others, are destined to suffer whatever may turn out to be their fate. I say nothing of the possessions that have been torn from you; but in the very conclusion of the peace, how many cheats were imposed upon you! of how much were you robbed! Why in the world, then, does 4 5 1'Qs, with gen. abs. JELF, § 701. 2 IIpiv av, with conjunctive, because there is a negative in the preceding clause. W. Gr. Gr. § 177, obs. 2. Προσπταίειν, with dative. · Πρόβολον. Ὑστερίζειν, with genitive. • 'Exeivos, opp. to ouros, which is='the latter.' Vid. LIDD. and SCOTT, Lex. middle. 3 6 • Οἷον. ¡ Mèv-dé. • Υπάγεσθαι, 12 Πλεονεξία. he act 13 as I have described 14 towards others, but differently towards yourselves? Because your's is the only city wherein it is perfectly safe 15 to plead the cause of a public enemy. 13 Προσφέρεσθαι, with dative. Η Εκείνως. 15 * Αδεια δίδοται. XLVIII. 7 8 Then, whoever1 happens to come forward, says, ' Why,2 you do not choose to propose a measure,3 or to run any risk, but are a timorous and effeminate man.' Now I am not, and trust I never may be, reckless, profligate, or shameless; yet I count myself vastly more courageous than your neck-or-nothing politicians. For whoever, Athenians, overlooking what will conduce to his country's good, condemns, confiscates, lavishes in presents, accuses, is not acting from courage, but is emboldened to play a safe game at politics by holding in his parasitical' speeches a guarantee 10 for his own security; while whoever in advocating the wisest course, is frequently opposed to your inclinations, and says nothing to court 12 favour, but always counsels the soundest measures, and prefers that 13 style of administration wherein fortune is more powerful than arithmetic, yet holds himself responsible 15 to you on either side, he is a man of courage: yes,' 16 a man of this kind is indeed a useful citizen; not they who have ruined their country's best interests for daily favour, whom I am so far 17 from envying or regarding as citizens worthy of the state, that were 18 anyone to ask me, 'Tell 14 |