Athenians, in his capacity of Proxenus of the state. Transitions, also, take place to oligarchy, to democracy, and to a republic,18 in consequence of some magistracy, 19 or portion of the state, having gained distinction or aggrandisement. For instance, the Areopagus, after gaining renown in the Persian war, was held to govern with too tight a rein; while, on the other hand, the populace who had served afloat,20 having been the instrument 21 of the victory at Salamis, strengthened the democracy by means of the ascendancy acquired through their maritime power. In Argos, also, the notables, having distinguished themselves at the battle of Mantinea against the Lacedæmonians, attempted to put down the commonalty; and in Syracuse the commons, having been the instrument of the triumph gained in the war against Athens, changed the constitution from a republic to a democracy. 18 Πολιτεία. 19 Αρχείον. 20 ̔Ο ναυτικὸς ὄχλος. 21 Αἴτιος. LXIII. because a In aristocracies revolutions sometimes occur, few only have access to political honours - which has been stated to be a disturbing cause1 in oligarchies alsofor aristocracy is, in one sense, an oligarchy; since in both the rulers are few in number; not, however, for the same reason, though2 some men fancy aristocracy oligarchical merely on this account. Especially must this be the result, whenever the mass is equal in merit to the haughty nobles, as in the case of the class called Partheniæ in Lacedæmon-for they were of the same stock-whom the Spartans dispatched as colonists to Tarentum, on detecting their intrigue. Or, whenever men of great influence, and 1 Κινείν. 2 'Erei—ye, which in this passage is nearly equivalent to quanquam. 'EжBovλevew, partic. 3 4 inferior to none in merit, are insulted by men of still higher dignity, as in the instance of Lysander at the hands of the kings. Or, whenever a man of spirit is excluded from office, as in the case of Cinadon, who, in the days of Agesilaus,5 concerted the plot against the Spartans. Further, whenever some are very poor, and others very rich; and this happens especially in time of war. Indeed, it actually happened in Lacedæmon, in the Messenian war, as is clear from the poem by Tyrtæus, called Eunomia; for some who were pinched by the war, demanded a redistribution of the soil. Again, if any man becomes powerful, and is capable of becoming even more powerful, he instigates a revolution to gain a throne, just as Pausanias, who commanded during the Persian war, and Hanno at Carthage, appear to have done. But the dissolution of aristocracies, and of republics, is chiefly owing to deviations from right," in the very frame of the constitution. Its source is the disproportionate blending of democracy and of oligarchy in a republic, and of the same elements combined with merit in an aristocracy, but especially the two former; I mean democracy and oligarchy; for republics, and many of the constitutions styled aristocracies, attempt to blend them. • Επίθεσις. 9 Τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασις. 4 Εντιμότεροι. * I read Αγησιλέω. accus. 8 Ἵνα μοναρχῇ. LXIV. 7 Ὑπὸ, with As we have said, monarchy stands upon the same ground as aristocracy. For it depends on worth,2 either on personal or family excellence, or public services, or these combined with power. All who have achieved public services, or are capable of benefiting states or tribes, have 1 Τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· α military metaphor. · Εὐεργεσία. 4 Κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν. JELF, § 664 2 'Αξία. usually enjoyed this honour; some for preventing a nation's being enslaved, by deeds of arms, as in the case of Codrus; others for restoring a people to freedom, as in that of Cyrus; others for colonizing or acquiring a territory, as in the instances of the kings of Lacedæmon, of Macedon, and Molossus. A monarch's function is that of a guardian, shielding the owners of property in his dominions from all injustice, and the commonalty from all outrage. Tyranny, on the other hand, has no regard for the public interest, save with a view to its own advantage. Pleasure is the tyrant's, honour the monarch's aim. Consistently3 with this, when successes are achieved, the money goes to the tyrant, the honour to the monarch. The monarch's guard is national, the tyrant's foreign. That tyranny, then, involves evils, both those of democracy and oligarchy, is clear; those of oligarchy, inasmuch as its end is wealth -for by this means alone can its vigilance and its luxury be maintained—and it has a thorough distrust of the people, in consequence whereof tyrants resort to the wellknown practice of disarming them; it is also common to oligarchy and to tyranny to illtreat the populace, to banish them from the capital, and to break them up by dispersion.10 With democracy it shares its feuds with the notables; its covert or open compassing of their destruction, or their exile as political" rivals and obstacles to absolutism; 12 for it is from these sources that intrigues flow; one party being anxious for the integrity of its rule, the other for its rescue from slavery. To this effect was the advice conveyed by Periander to Thrasybulus, when he cut off the tall stalks of wheat, implying 13 the policy of 5 Kríčew, 1 aor. partic. * Οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας τὰς limits οὐσίας. 1 Σκοπός. 8 Διὸ καί. * Η παραίρεσις τῶν ὅπλων. Οn this sense of the article, see JELF, § 444, e. 10 Διοικίζειν. 11 'Αντί12 Πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμπόδιος. τεχνος. 13 'Os déov. JELF, §701. cutting off, from time to time, the more ambitious of the citizens. LXV. 1 8 6 9 There being four varieties of democracy, the first in order is the best: it is also the most ancient of all. I mean by ‘first,' what comes first in the order of arrangement; for the agricultural2 democracy is the best; indeed, it is possible to create a democracy wherever the people subsists by agriculture or pasture.3 For as the commons are not affluent, they are busy; and this prevents5 their holding many assemblies; and as they do not possess the requisites of subsistence, their time is spent in active pursuits, and they do not hanker after the property of others; on the contrary, industrious toil is pleasanter to them than political or official life, wherever large fees are not derivable from office. For the mass is more desirous of gain than of honour. And this is a proof: they used to endure the old despotisms, and at this day they endure oligarchies, so long as no one interferes either with their industry or their property; for some of them speedily acquire wealth, and others competence.10 Moreover, their capacity to elect and to call officials to account,11 satisfies their ambition, if they have any; since, in some democracies, the people are content with deliberative functions,12 without any share in the elections to office, which are conducted by deputies, chosen successively from the whole body,13 as at Mantinea: and this we must regard as a form 14 of democracy, like that which formerly subsisted in Mantinea. On this account it is the policy 15 of the democracy 5 Ὥστε. JELF, 1 Τάξις. $863. • Λήμμα. 2 Γεωργικός. 14 13 Κατὰ μέρος. 1 Σχήμα. 3 Νομή. 7'Αλλά. 4*Ασχολος. 8 Τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. 11 Εὐθύνειν. 12 Τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. 15 Συμφέρον. we have described above, and it has been the general usage, that the elective and judicial functions, and the scrutiny of magistrates, be open to all, while the most important offices are filled by election, and that by a property standard 16-the higher the office, the higher the standard -or else in no case by the standard of property, but by that of capacity.17 Such a constitution is certain to work well (for the executive will always be filled by the best men, the commonalty assenting and feeling no jealousy of distinction), 18 and this system is certain to content men of distinction and repute; for they will not be governed by their inferiors, and will govern justly, because others have the power of calling them to account. For to depend on public opinion, 19 and not to be able to do whatever one pleases, is advantageous, since the liberty of acting at discretion keeps no check on the evil inherent in every man. The result, therefore, must be that which is most serviceable in all constitutions-administration by men of distinction and irreproachable character,20 without any disparagement 21 to the commons. 16 ̓Απὸ τιμημάτων. 17 Οἱ δυνάμενοι. νακρέμασθαι. 20 Αναμάρτητοι ὄντες. LXVI. 18 Οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς. 19 Επα That this, then, is the best of the various forms of democracy, and that it is so because it gives a certain character to the people, is clear; and in order to give an agricultural character to the people, some of the laws enacted of old, in most states, are very serviceable-laws forbidding the possession of land beyond a certain amount,' either altogether,2 or within3 a certain distance of the Acropolis and the capital city. Indeed, in ancient times, 1 Μέτρον. 2 Ολως. 3 Από [= ἄποθεν] τινος τόπου πρὸς. 4 Tò |