they would return back again. Upon which report the Queen came into the camp at Tilbury, and mustered the army, riding among them with a leader's staff in her hand, and did, by her presence and speech, animate both captains and soldiers with incredible courage*." At all events, the Queen must have been ignorant, on the 9th of August, of the fate of the Larmada.

Even as late as the 15th of August the English general was uncertain whether the Spaniards would return, as is evident from a letter from the Earl of Leicester to the Earl of Shrewsbury. After mentioning the Queen's visit, Leicester adds, "But God hath fought mightily for her Majesty, and I trust they be too much daunted to follow their pretended enterpriset." From this extract it is plain that Leicester did not believe that the danger was over even on the 15th of August, six days after the Queen's visit to the camp. The English admiral returned to the Downs on the 7th of August, but at that time he was unacquainted with the fate of the Spanish fleett.

But Dr. Lingard has intentionally suppressed another very important fact. It was not known in England that the Duke of Parma could not sail from the ports of the Netherlands; on the contrary, it was expected that he might land with his army; and, at the moment of

* CARLETON'S Thankful Remembrance, 155, 156.

+ ELLIS's Letters. Second series, iii. 141.

+ Letter to Mendoza, 34.

the Queen's visit to the camp, it was supposed that he might effect a landing while the English admiral was chasing the armada. Parma had intended to waft his troops over while the armada was hovering near our shores; and it was natural, in the English, to expect that he would accomplish his purpose during the absence of the fleet. A letter is printed by Mr. Ellis, from Sir Edward Radcliffe to the Earl of Sussex, dated the 10th of August, 1588. It contains the following passage: "Whilst her Majesty was at dinner in my Lord General's tent, there came a post and brought intelligence that the Duke, with all his forces, was embarked for England, and that he would be here with as much speed as possibly he could. The news was presently published throughout the camp, to what end I know not, but no preparation is made for the sending for more men, which maketh us think the news untrue*." The intelligence evidently was not believed, but the circumstance proves, that there was an expectation that the Duke of Parma might embark and land his troops on the soil of England.

These facts must have been known to Dr. Lingard when he published his history. No other conclusion can, therefore, be arrived at, on this subject, than that the doctor has designedly been guilty of misrepresentation. The circumstance is, however, of a similar kind with many others in his history; it stamps the character of his work, and renders it of little authority

ELLIS's Letters. Second series. Vol. iii. 124.

in matters of such a nature. The man who can endeavour to give a false view of an important and interesting event in English history, cannot reasonably be surprised, if no reliance is placed on any of the statements which he may put forth.

The papal historian also mentions the Queen's determination to disband the army, as another proof that all danger was over, when she was at Tilbury, on the 9th of August. Now it is quite certain, that on the 9th of August, the second day after the admiral's return, the Queen's council could have known nothing of the fate of the Spanish fleet. Some time after, indeed, the council heard that the armada was steering its course towards Spain, and that the King of Scotland had issued strict orders that the Spaniards should not be permitted to land; and then the Queen gave an order for discharging a portion of the navy. But even after this order had been issued, a report was in circulation, that the Spanish navy had refreshed itself in the north, and was about to return to join the Duke of Parma. This report occasioned the previous orders to be countermanded, and the whole fleet was retained in readiness for action. In this posture did the English navy remain during eight or ten days, or to the latter end of August; and then, and not till then, the council received certain intelligence of the fate of the armada. Though, therefore, the danger was actually over on the 9th of August, when the Queen delivered her speech to the army at Tilbury, yet the

council did not know it; on the contrary, they expected that the armada would return, and that) Parma would attempt to land his forces*.

It is in this way that such men as Dr. Lingard falsify the truth of history in those points in which the principles of the Church of Rome are involved. The papal historian has, in many points, evinced a disposition to fairness; but on all subjects connected with his own church, he is most partial and uncandid†.

* Letter to Mendoza, 34, 35.

+ It appears to me that Dr. Nares, in his valuable Life of Lord Burleigh, has unintentionally, in a note, given some countenance to Dr. Lingard's statement, that the danger was over when the Queen was at Tilbury. The following is the note: "Queen Elizabeth has had the credit given her of being the occasion of people eating goose for dinner on Michaelmas-day; for having feasted upon a savoury one, on her way to Tilbury, and calling for a half-pint bumper of Burgundy to drink destruction to the Spanish fleet, she had no sooner drank it, than the news of its dispersion arrived. To commemorate, at once, the day, the dinner, and the victory, she ever afterwards, we are told, ate goose on St. Michael's day, in which she was followed by the court."-NARES'S Memoirs of Lord Burleigh, vol. iii. 334. Now it will be seen from what is stated in this chapter, that the statement contained in the note is erroneous; for the Queen's visit occurred long before St. Michael's day. Such a note should not have been inserted by Dr. Nares without pointing out its inaccuracy.

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CHAPTER V.

Armada attempts to return to Spain. The English Admiral quits the Chase. A Storm overtakes the Armada. Disasters. Spanish Reports of Success. Philip's Conduct on hearing of his Loss. Spaniards ridiculed. Spanish Reasons for the Failure. The Pope writes a Letter of Condolence to Philip.

On arriving at the decision mentioned in the preceding chapter, the Spaniards steered their course northward, in order to save their fleet, and reach the coast of Spain without interruption. How their hopes were disap(pointed remains now to be told.

During the previous actions, the English fleet, from some unaccountable cause, was deficient in ammunition, so that the battle could not be sustained with that vigour with which it would have been carried on had the necessary means been furnished by the Queen's government. Had this deficiency been known to the Spaniards, they would undoubtedly have acted (differently in the matter. It was, however, graciously ordered that they should be ignorant of the wants of the English fleet.

In chasing the armada, the English admiral was especially careful to prevent them from putting into Lany of the Scottish ports. When it was perceived that the Spaniards were disposed to quit the coast of Scotland, and to return to Spain with all possible expedition, the English admiral determined to have