Modern and Contemporary European Civilization

plan depended a great deal also upon Austria's ability to hold in check the national Slavic development to the south; hence, her seizure of Bosnia-Herzogovina may be viewed as due to her desire to check the aspirations of Servia as a rallying center for Slavic nationality in southern Europe.

A cursory glance at the map will also show that the only commercial port of any significance which Austria held upon the Adriatic, was Trieste, with a population almost wholly Italian. Should Servia reach the Adriatic she might become a serious menace to Austrian commerce, which on the way to its own port passes through a considerable stretch of Slavic territory. This territory, in the event of Servia becoming strong, would naturally drift toward Servia. The like was true of Hungary. Here, Fiume is Slavic, 2 and here again a strong Slavic border lies between the Hungarian population and territory and their only commercial port to the southeast. The growth of a national Slavic state to the south, or the growth of the Slavic national interests within the empire, would spell economic disaster to national Hungary as well as to national Austria.

Purpose of
Seizure of
Bosnia-
Herzogovina.

Austria's seizure of Bosnia-Herzogovina was intended to make impossible the growth of a greater Servia, while she felt. sure that she would be able to thwart the national interests of the Slavs at home. The seizure of the Slavic territories to the south did more than aid in accomplishing Austria's ambition to destroy the hope of a southern Slavic state; it was directly in line with her avowed object of reaching an Aegean port at Salonica. Germany, too, in 1908, had wholly committed herself to her Turkish program. Already at this time the Triple Entente was a reality, and Great Britain and Russia had agreed upon the division of Persia and the final settlement of all their differences. Germany had lost hope of successfully blocking French progress in Morocco and realized that in Asia Minor was her only chance for Empire.

Germany
and her
Turkish Pro-

gram.

Russian

So Russia had been driven more and more back to her hopes in the south. Her practical failure in Persia, her loss of the war with Japan and the resulting check to her ambitions, Hopes. -these had been the causes. When one recalls that in the TurkoItalian war, while the Turk closed the Dardanelles for only a brief time, 200 ship loads of Russian wheat were held up in the Black Sea and mostly rotted, it is not difficult to gauge Russian desire for the control of this outlet. With the interests of England and Italy in The Slavic population is somewhat stronger than the Italian if the city as well as the port are taken into account.

this region and the close alliance of France and Russia, it can be said that in 1908 the situation in the Balkans was at a deadlock so far as the Great Powers were concerned.

The Young

Turk

Régime.

It was at this point that the initiation of affairs passed to the peninsula itself. The Young Turk régime was born. Constitutionalist propaganda had been going on for a long time. The scheme of government, which allowed no freedom on the part of officials, but enforced always the most abject. servility to the Sultan, had driven many proud spirited Young Turks into exile and had organized the Constitutionalist party. The brilliant success of the revolution was due, however, rather to the weakness of the government, than to the strength of the conspirators. Their aims and aspirations were good. They saw Turkey, subject to all the Powers of Europe, buffeted and ill used in order that selfish interests might be satisfied. They saw her losing bit by bit her European possessions, as the Powers were in a mood to agree upon a division; they saw her losing internally in the struggle for nationality, to them the most important struggle left to wage. They wished to create and consolidate the Turkish nationality and to secure what was left of Turkish inheritance. To do this, a constitutional régime they believed to be necessary; had not such a régime secured that end in all the states of western Europe!

The immediate events which precipitated the Young Turk revolution were such as to make almost necessary some action on the part of Turkey. In the latter years of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, 1876-1909, Turkey seemed on the verge of disruption. The national debt became so alarming that France, who held most of the bonds, led the way in forming an international commission to supervise Turkish finances. The massacres of Armenians in Asia Minor grew in intensity so that during 1894-1895 more than a hundred thousand Armenians were murdered by their neighbors. Crete, opposed to Turkish misrule, rebelled and Greece began a war with Turkey to aid her kinsman. Though the war was a failure, the Concert of Powers forced Turkey to establish an autonomous government in Crete which practically destroyed Turkey's control, if not her ownership, of the island. The same misgovernment in Macedonia forced the Powers to interfere in 1903 and a scheme of reform was drawn up to be applied to Macedonia. The reforms were never carried out and Macedonia remained a center of opposition until 1908. All this the Young Turks saw and realized that if anything was to be done it must be done promptly. 'Shrewdly enough the Young Turks avoided all violence until they were absolutely sure the army would support them. Then with swift

แ

ness and certainty they struck the blow, the coup d'état of 1908. On July 23, 1908, the constitution of 1876 was proclaimed at Salonica by the central body of the Young Turk, the so-called committee of Union and Progress, with Major Enver Bey at its head. Two army corps threatened to march on Constantinople if the Sultan should deny the constitution. Terrified, Abdul Hamid hastily issued an imperial decree, officially restoring the constitution of 1876. A few opponents of the revolution were assassinated, the press was emancipated, a liberal statesman, Kiamil Pasha, was appointed Grand Vizier, and Turkey was a constitutional monarchy."3 So much for the revolution. It met practical difficulties at once. So serious did these become that, in 1909, steps were taken toward a counter revolution in behalf of the liberal party, a movement that received the support of the old sultan. In the end, an army went to Constantinople, overthrew Abdul Hamid, and put in his place Mohammed V, his younger brother. A parliamentary government was established and the power of the Young Turk was secure.

With the revolution accomplished, the Young Turk turned to the administration to carry out his ideas of nationalization. First of all, the Turk decided that the triumph of Turkish nationality must be built upon the annihilation rather than the assimilation of other races. This decision seems to have been directly responsible for the Armenian massacres of 1909 by which more than 30,000 of the most helpful and commercially significant part of the population were destroyed. It was, also, this idea that led to the attempt to nationalize Macedonia by the emigration of the Turkish population from BosniaHerzogovina to Macedonia, the shipping of Mohammedans from Asia into Macedonia, followed by riots and massacres which influenced Greece to lay aside her opposition to Bulgaria and to ally herself with the Balkan states.

The Young Turks held also, that the empire must be unified in religion in order to be strong. They, therefore, began an attack upon the orthodox church by demanding that it give up its special privileges and accept the guarantees of the constitution. This position was a natural one, the only difficulty being that the constitution was as yet a theory only and the rulers of the orthodox church were not ready to lay aside material advantages already secured to them for a theoretical freedom of religion and privilege. The Young Turks failed to coerce because of lack of time and because of the stubbornness and the efficient organization of the church. The Greek Catholics were 'Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe II; p. 525.

alienated, however, and their numbers were large enough to make their opposition a serious menace to the new Turkish state.

The Young Turks also completed the alienation of the outlying districts, Arabia and Albania. These districts were found in great disorder. For a long time they had been semi-independent, though unfortunately they had never developed an administration of their own. The revolutionary dream of a national Turkey made no appeal to these provinces so that when the Young Turks attempted to remodel and strengthen the government they aroused only rebellion which grew in intensity until the overthrow of the new régime by the Balkan wars.

Thus the dream of a national Turkey had ended in failure. The Young Turk recognized and was able to take advantage of the selfishness and failure of European diplomacy in near eastern affairs. From the point of view of its supineness he had every chance of success. His ultimate aim was worthy, the founding of a national state. His failure lay not in his ideals, but in his inability to use the right means. He was an idealist with no practical knowledge of politics or administration. This lack of practical knowledge of affairs led him into all sorts of inconsistencies and often far from his real object. We have recounted some of his attempts to recreate the empire from within, but his diplomatic failures were even more fruitful in defeating his object.

The tortuous routes of diplomacy seemed to him too long a way to travel. He was also too familiar with its methods as used by the old Turk who was a past master in the arts of diplomacy. These arts seemed to him, therefore, to be coupled with wrong. The straightforward method seemed to be more in keeping with his high purpose and to enable him to proceed more quickly. Moreover, the Young Turk believed in his aim as he believed in his religion, and, therefore, suspected as enemies all who thwarted him in any way.

He dared not attack Austria for her seizure of Bosnia, but he could refuse to trade with her. He, therefore, declared a boycott on all Austrian goods and adhered to it for a time so strictly as to win Austria's antagonism. He gave the Bulgarians infinite trouble along the Turkish borders because of their declaration of independence. He enforced a boycott on Greece because of her encouragement of the rebellion in Crete, and he gave Italy an opportunity and cause for her seizure of Tripoli. The revolution instead of saving had completed the destruction of Turkey and was the cause of the upsetting of all the plans of the allied groups of the Great Powers in the Near East.

Книги

Modern and Contemporary European Civilization: The Persisting Factors of the ...