finally with the last of the allied enemies in July, 1919, and ratified by all the Powers engaged except the Unites States.1 Who During the year 1914 all civilized countries, both warring nations and neutrals, busied themselves in trying to establish the guilt of having brought on the war. Each of the nations at war produced its government publications, the gray, yellow, orange, red or blue books, to prove its own innocence and the guilt of its enemies, partly to facilitate recruiting and organization of the war at home, partly with the desire to state its case to the neutral world and to justify itself before these judges.2 In America (in spite of the President's request that we both act and think neutrally), we tried earnestly to trace the real causes of the war and to find a ground for our sympathy or resentment. The cause for our deep interest and concern was our great abhorrence of war and our consequent desire to know who was to blame for so great a catastrophe. Further, not only Americans but the more thoughtful among Europeans, even men like H. G. Wells, the famous English novelist, who insisted upon fighting the war to a finish, began to look for a basis for peace. In the New York Times for November 1914,3 Jacob H. Schiff, the late New York financier, began a thoughtful discussion of a future peace, which elicited correspondence from such men as Charles W. Eliot, formerly president of Harvard University, David Starr Jordan of Stanford University, Daniel Jordan of Columbia University, and Lord James Bryce, formerly British ambassador to the United States. In England, George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells were most prominent in peace discussions. These writers generally agreed upon the obstacles to peace. The English writers especially were prepared to urge such points as a League of Nations, universal limitation of armament, security upon the seas, recognition of the principle of nationality and the rights of small nations. In America these notes were sounded feebly, for we were then more concerned in getting our bearings than in determining bases for peace. Early Discussions of Peace. In September the first official suggestions of a peace came from United States governmental sources. As a result of some semiprivate utterances of Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador, in New York, Secretary of State Bryan asked our representative in Germany, Mr. Gerard, to learn from the German government whether 1 The U. S. Senate passed a peace resolution in 1921. 2 England, the Blue Books; Russia, the Orange Books; Belgium, the Gray Books; France, the Yellow Books; Germany, the White Book; Austria Hungary the Red Books. N. Y. Times, History of the War, Vol. 1. pp. 459 ff. the Emperor was desirous of discussing peace. The following reply came from Mr. Gerard, who repeated the German Chancellor's reply from memory: "Germany was appreciative of the American government's interest and offer of services in trying to make peace. Germany did not want war, but had it forced on her. Even if she defeats France she has likewise to defeat both Great Britain and Russia, as all three have made an agreement not to make peace except by common consent. Similarly, England has announced through Premier Asquith, her diplomats and the newspapers that she intends to fight to the limit of her endurance. In view of that determination on the part of Great Britain, the United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Germany and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security." 4 Phases in Peace Discussions 1915-1918. This statement that Germany wanted a lasting peace and securities against future attack was only substantially quoting the statement that Lord Grey had made a short time before, and despite the hopes of diplomatists, nothing further was received from any of the warring Powers, and the matter ended without progress. The peace discussions from early in 1915 to the armistice have in reality four phases: (1) The early part of 1915 is given over to general statements by publicists, semiofficial views and brief statements by allied public officials and, less openly, German official statements. (2) This period was followed by a revision of German peace ideas due to the unexpected stubbornness of the Allies and a general reluctance on both sides to give public utterance to peace sentiments. (3) In turn, this period gave way to a more strenuous attempt of the Central Powers to secure a separate peace with France and Russia. Although the terms of this peace had been prepared by the general appeal of Pope Benedict, it should not be understood that the Pope presented his appeal in any other spirit than that in which Secretary of State Lansing had made his inquiry of Germany at an earlier date. (4) The failure of this attempt to close the war was followed by a stiffening of the sinews of all the belligerent Powers as they settled down to the idea of a war to the end. This period lasted nearly to the end of 1916, when in December the German N. Y. Times Current History, Vol. I, p. 973. 'N. Y. Times Current History IV, 1022 ff. premier, by order of the emperor, presented the now celebrated German suggestion for a peace conference which was at once followed by Wilson's appeal on December 18th to all the belligerents to state their war aims as a preliminary to peace. The failure of this so-called peace drive determined the Germans to play their last card, and the proclamation of the barred zone was handed to our ambassador in Washington on January 31, 1917.6 This note silenced all discussions of peace and thenceforward until our declaration of war against Germany the problems before the public mind in Europe were the problems of war; while before us arose the menace of armed conflict which daily faced us. In the discussion of the events of this fourth period, which lasted for such a long time, it will be well to notice the gradual growth of public sentiment toward a peace that would tend to establish itself rather than merely to end the war, the gradual realization that however guilty Germany was in beginning the war, the peace must aim rather at taking away future causes for beginning wars than at punishing the one held guilty in this war. While it must be kept in mind that peace suggestions have been used to hearten the nation and break the morale of the opponent, it will be more worth while to recognize that neutral Powers especially recognized the solidarity of the world rather than their own selfish interests in the pursuit of peace. During the last part of 1914, Gustaf Stoesteen issued what seemed to be a semi-official statement of Germany's peace Peace Views. views. He stated that Germany did not desire to incorporate peoples not speaking the German tongue; that she did desire the reorganization of the European economic situation so that it would be favorable to Germany. Maximillian Harden, the people's advocate, accepted these views, emphasizing the fear which Germany felt that her economic future was imperilled. German In April 1915, Bernard Dernberg, former German colonial secretary, issued a statement that was read at a meeting of GermanAmericans in Portland, Maine, which constituted the fullest statement of Germany's early aims. He demanded a permanent peace; free open use of the high seas, neutralized by agreement of all the Powers; an open equal economic policy, considering all colonial possessions as independent of their mother state for economic purposes; and the reestablishment of international law, codified and guaranteed The barred zone included the whole English channel and "the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland." Within this zone all enemy merchant ships were to be destroyed after February 18, 1917. The proclamation contained a warning also for neutral ships. See Part VII, Chapter III. 8 for the benefit of neutrals. He said that although Germany had no desire for European territory, she could not give up Belgium unless her other demands were complied with. Lastly, Germany demanded a colonial outlet for her population where it need not be expatriated." By his "permanent peace" Dernberg probably meant only a peace that would make Germany secure, not a safeguard for the world but for Germany against her European enemies. The step from this idea to universal peace was, however, short and easily taken. The second demand was that England should lose her naval supremacy, although this demand was naturally placed on the higher ground of freedom for all peoples guaranteed by all the Powers. The demand for an open economic policy was Germany's reiteration that because she was being strangled by Europe there had been necessity for war Incorporated with this demand was the idea that in economic affairs the colonies should be forced to treat all nations alike even though they gave their allegiance to some one state-an open door in economic affairs in all dependencies. Germany acknowledged the breaking of international law, but insisted that her enemies were equally guilty and so must aid in reestablishing international law for the future. In his fifth point, Dernberg gave up for Germany any aim at European aggression but held to Belgium as compensation for Germany in the surrender of any of her other demands. Lastly, Germany made clear her claim to a national imperial policy by demanding a colonial outlet for her surplus population which had increased more rapidly than her territory had grown. Opposed to this rather elaborate program, the Allies' claims as set forth by Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister Allied Peace and Asquith, the British premier, asked the same kind of Proposals. permanent peace that Germany asked. They wanted also the recognition of small states, freedom for nationalities to work out their own destinies, and the destruction of Prussian militarism. "We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium receives in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domiination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed," declared Asquith, in November 1914.9 The consistency of the Allied peace aims at this N. Y. Times Current History III, 279 ff. Expatriated means to lose one's nationality. An economic policy which would treat all nations alike, under all circum9 Asquith was prime minister of England at this time. stances. Increased time undoubtedly resulted from the early German military successes. In June 1915, a group of learned Germans presented a petition to the chancellor on the ground that Germany was unlikely Demands of to demand strong enough terms. They asked for: the Germany. ruin of France and the improvement of Germany's whole west front, the holding of Belgium, all of occupied Russia, possession of Asia Minor, Egypt and the Persian Gulf, the supplanting of Great Britain by German world trade, and an indemnity to cover war expenses and losses. This petition resulted in at least a changed sentiment on the part of the German government, which by the end of 1915 was content to say "peace depends upon when the enemy wants it but the farther off it is put the harder will be its terms. "10 This hardening of the heart of the German government drew from the German socialists a statement early in 1916. They demanded no conquests, German retention of AlsaceLorraine, each nation to be allowed to decide for itself in regard to militarism. With these demands the Austrian socialists were in accord. Both groups of socialists demanded that peace should be discussed. This demand brought forth an added statement by Bethmann-Hollweg in April 1916, in which he said that Germany was ready to talk peace whenever the enemy was ready. He added that Germany wanted a peace on the basis of facts, a permanent peace, and one that would not leave Belgium an Anglo-French vassal either in a military or in an economic sense." To this England and France replied that Germany strove to make the Allies ask for peace while allowing Germany to decide the basis; that what the Allies wanted was destruction of Prussian militarism, treaty rights and the defeat of German military control of Europe. The Plans of German Socialists. Through the entire year of 1916 both sides viewed peace as impossible without victory for one side, though neither one was able to secure victory. In August 1916, Nauman expressed the first doubt of Germany's ultimate success, and of the possibility of bringing peace without the complete military collapse of either group of Allies.12 In this same month the German National Peace Commission protested in a memorial against Bethmann-Hollweg's extension of territory to include German conquests of Russia and against his demand for guarantees in territory on the west, and at the same time it demanded. the right to discuss peace.13 10 N. Y. Times Current History VI, 642. "N. Y. Times Current History VII, 228. 12 Nauman is the author of Mittel Europa, a German book of propaganda for colonial expansion. 13 N. Y. Times Current History VIII, 1066. |