These replies were unsatisfactory to Russia. The Socialists moved forward without attempting to carry the Allies with them and declared on June 15, that their real aim was a union of workers against imperialism in all nations who were alike responsible for the war. From this point the new Russian government moved alone on its course and in November presented its plan to all the belligerents. It demanded an armistice of three months to negotiate a peace based on no annexations, no conquests, no indemnities, self-determination, and acceptance by the working classes. The Central Powers alone moved forward with these plans. On December 17, 1917, an armistice was signed for four weeks to be renewed if necessary and breakable by either party on seven days' notice. The Treaty of BrestLitovsk. Peace negotiations were at once entered into and the peace of Brest-Litovsk was drawn up by the Germans and presented to the Russians. This treaty was significant mainly in its refusal of practically all the Russian principles of peace and in its attempt to secure for Germany the Baltic provinces as well as the commercial exploitation of Russia. It was refused by the Russian government. The army was, however, quickly broken up and the German invasion, which began at once, forced Russia to sign finally in order to save herself. From this point Germany sought strenuously to exclude the eastern front from all discussions of peace with the western Allies, in order to make sure of her retention of the Baltic provinces lying east and north of Poland which she continued to occupy with her armies. Thus the year closed by the heartening encouragement of the Central Powers, in spite of the failure of the submarine policy and the Allied successes on the western front. The year had, however, caused a great deal of thinking about peace in all countries; the position of the socialists seemed to demand that war aims and conditions of peace be put upon a clearer basis. Especially was this true when the Allied secret treaties with Russia were published by the new Russian government. These publications made it clear that all the Allied states concerned in these treaties had a great deal to explain. Wilson's gram. On the other hand, America's entrance into the war had been hailed on all sides, not only for the military aid that Peace Pro- she could give but because her entry gave her the clear right to sit in the peace councils to insure a lasting and righteous peace. It was therefore fitting that President Wilson on January 8, 1918, should have set forth the peace program of the Allied Powers in its entirety, in his justly famous Fourteen Peace Points. In presenting this program President Wilson said, "We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle must run through the whole program I have outlined." "It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor and everything that they possess. "The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test." It should be remembered that the United States stood somewhat apart from the Allies. She had made no agreements with any state and she fought by the side of the Allies because of the common enemy and also because she believed in the justness of the Allied cause. Wilson's fourteen points, therefore, were, in a significant sense, the position of the United States only and could become the Allied position only by their acceptance on the part of the other governments. It must be recalled that the United States had been the Allied spokesman on former occasions, hence the world was justified in assuming that the President once again spoke for the Allies. This soon became in fact more than an assumption, for on January 5, Lloyd George expressed a like program of peace to the Trades Union conference, so that it was clear that with respect to the question of the freedom of the seas the British and the American statesmen were in accord. Perhaps the main contribution of President Wilson was that he expressed his principles in very concrete terms. No new ideas were given but each statement made a specific application of sound principles to the question in hand. The points were as follows: open covenants of peace with no private understandings, and public diplomatic methods; freedom of the seas in peace and war; removal of economic barriers; 7 reduction of armaments; adjustment of colonial The European states had early in the war bound themselves by the Treaty of London to make peace only as one Power but the U. S. did not become a party to the Treaty of London. See N. Y. Times, Current History, XIV; 257 ff. 7 By economic barriers was meant fixing tariff walls against particular states and making special tariff treaties with some states but not with all. war claims in the interest of the population as well as in the interest of the government concerned; evacuation of Russia; evacuation and restoration of Belgium; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine; restoration of Italian territories; autonomy for peoples of Austria-Hungary; restoration and indemnification of the Balkan states and Roumania; the relinquishment by Turkey of non-Turkish territories and the international control of the Straits; the independence of Poland; a League of Nations. Here is a definite program of peace, frankly uttered and as com Open Covenants of Peace. prehensive as it seemed possible to make. With respect to the first point it should be remembered that it opposed the whole past history of diplomacy. It is true that in democratic France, England, and the United States had been developed a sense of responsibility which has generally expressed itself by a refusal to accept the ratification of a treaty except by the representatives of the people. This ratification or presentation for ratification is the public announcement of the foreign policy of the government. There had continued a feeling, however, that since the people are ignorant of foreign affairs, their part is but to ratify a policy set for them by the leaders and put in the form of a treaty. This conception Wilson challenged. His statement placed upon the people the duty and responsibility for foreign policies. It is likely that the terrible consequences of the past few years will make the people question more carefully the foreign policies presented by the governments in the future. Freedom of the Seas. In the second point Wilson touched a chord in harmony with the German mind. It is worth while to notice, however, that the Germans were particularly interested in the war blockade and not in peace conditions. They were also particularly concerned with matters relating to Germany and not to the neutral states. Germany was to the American mind a far greater sinner against the freedom of the seas than was England in the early part of the war. In times of peace we have never considered the English navy a menace, and Wilson primarily meant in his "freedom of the seas" the continued freedom of peace times during war periods. There was, of course, a second idea present. The great navy of England had at least furnished Germany an excuse for her naval rivalry, not as a defense measure but as a means of offense. Thus, just as armies were to be reduced on land to strengthen peace so navies should be reduced to the same extent and for the same purpose. This view did not apply so readily in England which has maintained, owing to its position, a navy as a defense in place of an army. England has always compared her navy to continental armies as a defense measure. There is perhaps some point in this contention, since Germany has been wholly immune from British naval attack by her defense measures independently of her navy, although her commerce was at once destroyed. Removal of Economic In his third point, it is clear that President Wilson had in mind, first, the work of reconstructing economic affairs and that of giving confidence to the warring Powers. The Allies had threatened, in a conference held in Paris, to carry on the economic war after the signing of peace, a threat that Germany especially viewed with alarm. In his address Wilson gave notice that he would not sanction the Allied agreement, saying that time had shown the unwisdom of such action. He, however, was not prepared to withdraw altogether the possibility of such a consequence if Germany refused to make peace in the right spirit. Of course Wilson intended to make this principle apply to peace times. That the war was largely the result of false economic conditions was already conceded and understood. Such a condition of affairs must be remedied if peace was to be kept when once made. This problem was naturally left to the international commission charged with the supervision of international economic questions arising out of the war. The League of Nations was expected eventually to establish its findings as a part of the international law of the world and to reach some basis of equity to all peoples. This is one of the most fertile subjects touched upon by Wilson and the most difficult of adjustment. Adjustment Claims. It is but fair to read the fourteen articles in the light of the events which brought them forth. When the address was presented in January, 1918, President Wilson had no intention of raising questions of policy between the Allies. In the fifth article he could have had no intention of bringing in colonial questions not produced by the war. Primarily he had in mind the settlement of of Colonial those enemy territories with which the peace must be concerned. There was to be no seizure of enemy colonies in order to share them among the Allies. Rather, the disposal of such territories should follow the principles laid down in this article. Great Britain had declared in January, 1917, that the German colonies should not be returned to Germany after the war. The British labor party had declared that not only the German colonies of Africa but all tropical parts of the continent should be placed under the authority of an international commission. This idea grew during 1917 and was regarded as a most important element of peace conditions. Thus, this statement was merely the expression of a view that had become quite general by 1918, when it was recognized that colonial affairs were among the most provocative questions of war or peace that could come before the peace congress. Evacuation of Russia, and other Territorial The sixth article, regarding the evacuation of Russia; the seventh, regarding the Belgium settlement; and the eighth, regarding Alsace-Lorraine and Northern France, were already clear and needed no explanation. This was also true of article eight, regarding the Italian lands of Austria-Hungary, and of article eleven, regarding Roumania and the Balkan states, although the practical question of settling the boundaries would necessarily prove a difficult matter. Adjustments. In article ten, the demand that the nationalities of Austria should have the fullest and freest autonomy, was eventually Autonomy in Austria- replaced by a war measure which recognized the right Hungary. of independence of these nationalities. This measure had been advised for a long time by the Frenchman, André Chéradame, as a strategic measure and it was finally accepted when the Bolshevist agreement with Germany left a strong force of CzechoSlovak troops in Siberia, which by this policy became an effective Allied force. It should also be remembered that President Wilson had already adopted a policy of conciliation toward Austria-Hungary which was not entirely dropped when war was declared against her, although this conciliatory feeling was not held by the British or French. The President was not so sure of his ground in the twelfth article, in which he tried to deal with the Turkish problem. Here, too, he probably had a diplomatic aim rather than that of a final settlement, and it may be doubted whether he had given as much attention to this matter as was really needed for a useful and lasting treaty. The Turkish The thirteenth article, regarding an independent Poland, had been discussed many times and had been accepted both in An Independent Poland. Russia and among the Allies; hence it could receive no opposition except in Germany. However, the Pope had intimated the need for such a peace settlement and both Germany and Austria, especially the latter, had commended the Pope's terms. The last article, on the League of Nations, in principle was already quite generally accepted though there was very strong doubt as to its being practicable. A League of Nations. The fourteen articles proved to be the final development of peace 8 President Wilson's purpose at this time was to demand local self government for Bohemians, Croats, Poles, Serbs, etc., within Austria instead of making these nationalities independent of Austria. |