the Fourteen Points. ideas among the Allies. They presented such sound principles of peace and were applied so fairly that with a few exceptions they were wholeheartedly accepted. The Central Powers, on the other hand, commended the peace principles underlying the Influence of fourteen points, yet by their tone, as well as by discussion, announced that they found no possibility of peace in them. The German Chancellor's frank statement that Germany could not admit the discussion of the eastern frontier in the future peace congress left no doubt, if there had been any, of the character of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Clear also was the statement that Belgium and northern France were to be used as pawns in the coming peace, while Poland and her problems were to be settled by Germany, Austria, and Poland, not by a peace congress. The Austrian answer was very similar to the German note and although President Wilson seemed to feel a difference in the replies, the difference was one of tone and not of statement. The Austrian reply was rather more polite and diplomatic, as was natural, but it showed no real difference in attitude. Thus, after more than three years of war, its issues had been made clear to all thoughtful men. What in America had been dimly felt now became more clear. There was no tendency to blame Germany less for precipitating the war; it was understood that what she had done would be done again unless the old system was destroyed. The roots of the war were seen to have gone back into the past for a hundred years and each root was charged with life to such a degree that to be rid of the causes meant the tearing out of these roots, one and all. This was the aim of President Wilson's program. It became clear that much of the newer fabric that had been woven into the old Europe had followed the old pattern which was altogether faulty. Thus, all the splendid work of the Industrial Revolution, with its intended blessings for mankind, had failed to realize its fullest fruitage and had been used to perpetuate the old weaknesses of the state. But it also became clear that the progress of a hundred years still lay at the mercy of individual men whose ambitions could be wholly apart from those of the people. Nothing, perhaps, brought this out so clearly as the terrible policy of frightfulness adopted by the German imperial leaders. It was a policy that mocked at civilization, to accomplish its ends. In every feature it was the barbarism of the past, the cold, logical determination to secure desired ends by deliberately ignoring the suffering of the people, or rather, perhaps, by purposely discovering new methods of increasing that suffering in order to hasten the desired ends. It was when this fact forced its way into our con sciousness in spite of our incredulity and disbelief, that the issue of democracy became clear, and that we were able to realize that Germany in her methods of frightfulness, through the direction of irresponsible rulers, had renewed and emphasized for us the most terribly barbaric pages of history. It thus becomes clear that to understand the issues of this war and this peace one must trace them backward, discover their settings and then apply to them the teachings, material and spiritual, which humanity has evolved in the attempt to direct its course upward. SUGGESTIVE READINGS EARLY ATTEMPTS AT PEACE AND THE CONSUMMATION OF PEACE PLANS Nicholson, J. S. "President Wilson's Patience." New York Times Current History III, 472-475. (Dec. 1915.) Lansing, Robert, "Our Foreign Policy in the War." Ibid., IV, 739-740. (July 1916.) Cromer, Lord, "Wilson's Mediation not Acceptable." Wells, H. G., "World Peace." Ibid., II, 33-45. (April 1915.) International Conciliation Bulletin No. 110. "Looking Toward Peace," Ibid., No. 111 and No. 119. TOPICS FOR SPECIAL STUDY The Attempts of Pope Benedict to Promote Peace Current History Magazine Sept. 1917, pp. 392-393; Hart, America at War, 344. Wilson's Fourteen Points Dial 65: 463-4, Nov. 30, 1918; Literary Digest 59: 22, Nov. 16, 1918; Living Age, 298: 614-16, September 7, 1918; Outlook, 120: 208-209, 1918; Mr. Wilson and His Promises, New Republic, May 1919, p. 104; President Wilson's Achievement, Survey, March 1919; President Wilson and Peace Settlement, Continental Review, January 1919; President Wilson as a World Leader, Forum, December 1918; President Wilson in Europe and America, Continental Review, April 1919, p. 404; Conditions of Peace, Nation, May 24, 1919; Wilson's Fourteen Points, Literary Digest, March 24, 1918; also in War, Labor and Peace, 28-31. America and World Peace The Peace Movement of America, Julius Moritzen, published by G. P. Putnam & Sons 1912; American Friends Peace Conference, published by the Conference, Philadelphia, 1901; American Peace Society, published by American Peace Society at Washington, 1911-12-13-14; Review of Reviews 10: 244-57 1918; Dial 65: 459-63 November 30, 1918; Forum 60: 727 October 1918: Living Age 216: 112-13 January 12, 1918; Nation 106: 54 January 17, 1918; Outlook 118: 136-7, January 23, 1918; Survey, 71; 59-61, October 19, 1918; Literary Digest 56: 7-9 January 1918; Nation 105: 708-9 December 27, 1917; Nation 107: 557-8 November 9, 1918; Living Age 298: 348-50 August 10, 1918; Bellman 25: 425-60, 1918; Fortn. 109: 301-8 February 1918; Living Age 296; 707-12 March 23, 1918; Contemporary 114: 407-140, 1918. CHAPTER III THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE THERE were two series of events that forced the Germans to think of peace in terms other than those of Empire. One series was military. Although knowing full well that it must drive the United States into the war, the Germans had begun submarine warfare in the belief that it would succeed. They thought that if the attention of the United States could be directed toward Mexico long enough and strongly enough, her entrance would be too late to affect the decision, and they, therefore, encouraged the intrigues in this country and Mexico. To the German mind, this was a war measure purely and simply. The year 1917 proved clearly, even to the Germans, that the submarine warfare had failed of its purpose. It had been successful enough to maintain strong popular hopes of final success, but although the German people still believed in it, the leaders knew it had failed. There was left for them one further attempt. The submarine war had forced the United States into the ranks of the Allies and Germany knew, that if the war were to be won, it must be won before the American forces could be put into the field in effective numbers. It was this knowledge that forced the de- Germany's cision for the last great drive. It was Germany's last Last Drive. chance of success and upon it depended fortune or failure. It is not necessary to trace its course here. How nearly it succeeded, how desperate was the case of the Allies, is clear when one remembers how the comparatively few men whom the Americans could put into the field seemed to turn the tide for the Allied victory. Marshal Foch, the great Allied commander, has already told the world just how necessary were the American forces for that success. At any rate, the defeats at Chateau-Thierry and Vimy Ridge destroyed Germany as an offensive military power. How much she could still do as a defensive power the Allies did not yet know. Internal Dissatisfaction in Germany. The other series of events which led to Germany's acceptance of peace are not so easily portrayed. Those events are important because of their effects upon the German people. President Wilson, very soon after our entrance into the war, had drawn a distinction between the people of Germany and their rulers. This did not mean that he thought the German people were not behind the government in the war. It was the application of psychology to practical affairs. The German people were war tired. That success was needed to maintain their spirit is seen in the published speeches of the chancellor before the Reichstag as well as in the public reports of the military authorities. The president had the advantage of knowing that there was an appreciable group of socialists under the leadership of Liebknecht who were not in sympathy with the war and who held the government responsible for it. Dissatisfaction in Austria. In Austria, too, the time had come to make a strong distinction. The success of Austria-Hungary and Germany meant the riveting of the chains about the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slav and all the dissatisfied groups within the empire. For a long time attention had been called to the possibility of some success through propaganda designed to give heart to these oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary. The Bolshevist revolution made the opportunity and the Allied recognition of the two groups opened the way for the overthrow of Austria as a military power. Trust in Austria's troops, never very strong in Germany, now disappeared. Austria-Hungary was slowly driven to defeat without a military offensive. The full effect of the Russian revolution upon Germany has yet to be guessed at. That it strengthened the Socialist party and made it an aggressive factor in government is entirely clear. Already in May 1917, Scheidemann, the leader of the party, had demanded to know Germany's war aims from the chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. Already the independent wing of the socialists had dared to declare in the Reichstag that it might become necessary to proclaim a republic. "We regard a republic as a coming inevitable development in Germany. History is now marching with seven league boots. The German people indeed have shown incredible. patience. The Reichstag must have the right to a voice in the conclusion of alliances, peace treaties and declarations of war. The imperial chancellor must be dismissed when the Reichstag demands it." There was a demand for constitutional reform, for the abolition of the Prussian House of Lords, and for the destruction of Socialists of military power which the socialists declared was responsible for the war. When the chancellor announced that reform must be postponed until after the war, both Socialists and National Liberals joined in a protest, and by a very large majority voted to appoint a committee to consider the subject. The Influence in Germany. In July came the union of Socialists and churchmen on a program of peace, that so far had found no other expression in Germany. This 1 Quoted in N. Y. Times Current History XI, p. 302. union left the government with a minority. The order of the emperor, commanding the chancellor to draw up a program of political reform to be put at once before the Prussian deputies, did not change the situation. In the end the chancellor was forced to resign, probably because he was at heart convinced of the necessity of these reforms, while the military leaders were directly opposed to them. Whatever the reason for his fall, the fact remained that public sentiment made it impossible for the government to continue its policy of suppressing all who spoke for political reform. A temporary solution was found in the adoption of an expressed war aim which made it possible for the socialists under the leadership of Philip Scheidemann to join hands with the government for the defense of German territory as it had stood in 1914. This attempted alliance did not, however, stop the progress of socialist opposition. Many of the regular socialists joined the Independents and by secret organizations continued the work of undermining the government and the military authorities. The attempted general strike on May day, 1917, the meeting and revolt of the sailors at Kiel, were manifestations of the spirit of rebellion which grew steadily until the great military disasters gave it the whip hand to force peace and overthrow the government.2 Surrender of Another event which enabled Germany to realize the course of events and which destroyed the hopes of the militarists was the defeat and surrender of Bulgaria on September 30, Bulgaria. 1918. On September 16, the Allied armies began their last offensive in the Balkans. Within two weeks, the Bulgarian forces were hopelessly defeated and demanded aid of Germany and Austria-Hungary which neither could give. As a result the Bulgarian government asked an armistice of the commander of the Allied forces, General d'Esperey. The terms were drawn up and signed on September 30, 1918. Bulgaria agreed to evacuate all territory outside her own boundaries, to demobilize her armies, and to surrender all transport facilities to the Allies. She gave the Allies free passage through her territories, and occupation of the strategic centers. Territorial questions were omitted from the armistice and it was agreed that Bulgaria was to make a complete military surrender. King Ferdinand abdicated on October 4, 1918, in favor of his son, Boris, who carried out the terms of the armistice. The surrender of Bulgaria destroyed all hopes of Turkey remaining in the field and opened Austria to attack upon her southern border. On the very day on which the Bulgarian armistice was signed, Prince The preliminary account of this socialist movement in Germany is told by Joseph Danziger, a war correspondent, who remained in Germany when the United States declared war. See N. Y. Times Current History for June, 1919. |