upon Turkey, and Great Britain cared for no further continental relations in 1878. Diplomatic Congress. The first and most direct diplomatic result, therefore, was that Russia was finally made to see that she could not secure her warm water port on the Aegean without an attack upon Europe which she was in no position to undertake. Whether later she would find herself in such a position, remained to be seen. The most important diplomatic result of the Congress was to lay the basis of the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria and thus with Italy's entrance a little later to create a further cause for uneasiness and fear among the Great Powers. Bismarck was very clear in his mind about the first result. He reasoned that Russia's next attack upon Turkey would come through Vienna or Berlin, which certainly made all the more necessary the alliance with Austria. The first definite step toward the Triple Alliance was made in the following year when Germany and Austria entered into a defensive alliance against the encroachment of all their enemies. This agreement was at first meant, not to break the German alliance with Russia, but to safeguard Germany against any attempt. of Russia to find a basis for alliance against Germany. That this is true is proved by the many attempts of Bismarck to maintain good relations with Russia and to prove by his actions that he had been honest in the Congress of Berlin. The result was that the German Alliance with Russia was continued and was enlarged to include Austria for a long period following 1878. Relations of Bismarck was very careful also at the Congress of Berlin to guard against any chance of Russia and France becoming friends. In this he was greatly assisted by France, and the Powers. for the time he succeeded in strengthening the old antagonisms of these two Powers. But, in both Russia and France, keen eyed statesmen saw the necessity for friendship between these two nations because of the danger common to both lurking in the German-Austrian Alliance. When therefore the Dual Alliance was strengthened by the adherence of Italy, both France and Russia recognized that this new German Empire had recast the entire diplomatic situation and had substituted for "The Concert of Europe" a Triple Alliance that, while intent upon keeping the peace, was candidly intent upon a peace in the interests of the three central European Powers. England's relations with the continent during this period were unfortunate. From a frankly aggressive policy in 1854-1856, under the leadership of Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli), she had receded to a laissez faire policy. 2 In reality one was not more selfish than the other. Beaconsfield was intent, in the Crimean war, on defending the English routes to India against Russia's attempt to block them. In 1878 Lord Salisbury had accepted a policy which, after thwarting Russia, proclaimed that Great Britain was not concerned with European matters. That English statesmen after voting to divide the newly created Bulgaria should then have voted to admit Austrian possession of Bosnia-Herzogovina, shows at least ignorance of what was happening in Europe, if not a definitely selfish feeling of indifference as long as her own direct interests were guarded. Failures of Alliances. It is, thus, not difficult to trace through its diplomacy the failure of the attempt of 1815 to find a method of keeping the peace of Europe. The Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance were unsuccessful because of the failure of statesmen to recognize the need of satisfying small states as well as large states, if war was to be averted; and, because of their inability to distinguish clearly between the changes of feeling within the states and their international relationship. The attempt, therefore, to repress liberalism within the states made inevitable the failures of the Alliances. But, of course, it must be remembered that the problem of liberalism in 1815 naturally associated itself with the problem of nationality; and that the two working together made doubly difficult the matter of keeping peace, while both these new ideas were trying to work out their relations to government and to state. The Euro So when the Alliances failed, there was substituted for them the plan of "The European Concert", which definitely pean Concert. charged itself with managing the problem of the Balkans and Turkey, and, perhaps unconsciously, assumed charge of maintaining the European situation in behalf of the small states of Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg which had been recognized by the old Alliances as perpetually neutral. With reference to the rest of Europe "The European Concert" proposed no plan of action and took no formal position. As a result, Prussia had changed the face of central Europe without any interference by the rest of the Powers; and this action had quieted any suspicion that the Great Powers assumed responsibility for the peace of Europe aside from the South East and the neutralized states. For a time each state went its own way. Great Britain had selfishly withdrawn to look after her own interests, ignoring the possibility of a future attempt by a Napoleon to despoil her great empire. France had become isolated from all the Powers through the work Laissez faire policy; that is, leaving things to take care of themselves. of the Revolution and the action of her statesmen, and, gradually, Russia was divided from Europe by the action of Bismarck. Then came the Triple Alliance as a substitute for the old Alliances and "The European Concert." Gradually, therefore, The Balance of Power. Europe had shifted back to the eighteenth century idea of the Balance of Power to maintain peace in Europe. It is not surprising that Europe gave this policy such credence, for it had a long historical background. Since the time of the Tudors in England the Balance of Power had been the mainstay of European peace. That it was purely selfish did not change the situation, for so far, no other permanent basis of peace had been discovered, and men even believed that there could be no other basis. But when we credit Bismarck and the Triple Alliance with the long peace of Europe, it should be remembered that the long period of peace was largely due to the animosities between the important states of Europe outside the Alliance and partly due to the fact that Germany with the rest of Europe was too busy building up her internal structure during this period of peace, to assume the aggressive in matters relating to other states. We should also remember that the Triple Entente was the only answer possible to the selfish basis of the Triple Alliance and that Bismarck and his work were the main causes for the division of Europe into the two hostile camps which they occupied at the outbreak of the war in 1914. SUGGESTED READINGS Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 506-510, 517519, 681, 695, 706. Hazen, Modern European History, pp. 374, 426, 548-550. Hazen, Europe Since 1815, pp. 320, 405, 625-626, 640, 644. Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 129, 311, 360. Schapiro, Modern and Contemporary European History, pp. 334, 437, 634, 635, 645, 684. THE RELATIONS OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe II, 537. Hazen, Europe Since 1815, Ch. XXX. THE PEACE OF SAN STEFANO Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modern Europe II, 504-505, 507. The Triple CHAPTER IV RECENT DIPLOMACY AND PEACE THE Triple Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria and Italy was in its beginning purely a defensive measure. It was intended only to supplement the European Concert. It aided this Concert by acting in a capacity in which this organization had never tried to act; namely, as administrator in purely European affairs. Moreover, the Triple Alliance was not designed to aid any except those who were its members. It protected Germany from attack by France or Russia, strengthened Italy against France and made Austria safe from Russian aggression. Its only claim to being an agent of peace lay in the certainty of the Powers that France or Russia really contemplated an attack upon one or more of the three members of the Alliance. Of course, this is as difficult to prove as that the Alliance itself was interested in peace for peace's sake. No one can doubt that all the members of the Alliance wanted peace. Germany was intent upon her own internal development. Austria was busily trying to secure this development and to solve the impossible task of reconciling a group of discontented nationalities. As for Italy, she had many internal problems of her own. On the other hand, the Triple Alliance definitely disturbed the peace of Europe in so far as it made clear to France or Russia or to Great Britain the possibility of a future attack. France had suffered at the hands of Germany in 1870 and had no real assurance that she might not have to suffer again. If she hoped ever to regain her lost provinces she must secure allies, and France was prepared in 1879 to match the alliance of Germany and Austria by one of her own. Russia did not reach a conclusion so quickly because she had not suffered from German aggression. But it now seems clear to most students of European diplomacy that Russia might have moved toward such an alliance to her own advantage immediately after the Congress of Berlin. It is, therefore, certain that the Triple Alliance made necessary The Triple its counterpart, the Triple Entente, consisting of France, Entente. Russia, and England, which was finally consummated when Great Britain and Russia came to an agreement in southern Asia in 1907. To reach this conclusion it is not necessary to assert that the members of the Triple Entente meant to use the Alliance for offensive purposes. It was apparently a purely defensive measure and one should recognize that the Triple Alliance had in reality forced all Europe into the old method of keeping peace by a balancing of the Powers against each other. The defensive character of the Triple Entente is emphasized both by the history of its organization and the character of its terms. So long as Germany was interested in keeping up the alliance with Russia and did not feel strong enough to defy her, little progress was made in establishing the Franco-Russian Alliance. In 1888 the terms of the Triple Alliance were first published by Germany to check Russian aggression and as a challenge to Russia to walk carefully. When in 1890 the Emperor dismissed Bismarck he also set aside the latter's policy of friendship with Russia. William II adopted the new policy because of his own strength and Russia's weakness; he could not see, with the statesman's eyes, that such a course must lead to the end which Bismarck had feared. Consequently, a series of friendly acts led directly to the Franco-Russian Alliance, and when the German Emperor celebrated the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, he had the opportunity of seeing the French and Russian fleets enter the canal together in token of the new friendship of the two states. So, also, the Emperor had only himself to blame for the final consummation of a long attempt to bring about better relations between France and England. His own attitude in the Boer war and the announcement of a great naval policy made possible the direct English attempt to make friends with France, this understanding being due almost wholly to the uneasiness which Great Britain felt at the language and the acts of the German Emperor. So it was also with the Anglo-Russian understanding. The fear of England that Germany was definitely laying the basis for an attack, both commercial and military, upon India, together with Russia's fear of her activities in southeastern Europe and western Asia, led to the establishment of the Triple Entente in 1907 by a treaty of understanding between Great Britain and Russia. Europe After 1907 the European world stood at bay. This was the most fundamental product of Bismarck's attempt to defend Germany by the organization of the Triple Alliance. The situation of 1907 was produced by the Triple Alliance plus the German policy of aggression, which made Great Britain and Russia. as well as France fear for their defense. From 1907 to 1914 both the Alliances were busy strengthening themselves among the weaker states, preparing for the time when hostilities should come to a focus and hoping for some way to avert the calamity. It may be worth while to follow more closely the incidents which |