court; and I concluded with conjuring the Maharaja to disclose to me his real intentions, as well with respect to the offers I had made on the part of your Lordship, as to the measures he was resolved to pursue, in consequence of the new engagements formed between his Highness the Peishwa and the British government.

4. Dowlut Rao Scindia was on the point of replying to my discourse, when he was prevented by his ministers, several of whom began speaking at the same time. I can assure your Excellency, that had those gentlemen offered any thing that deserved the name of argument, in opposition to my observations, I should most readily repeat the same to your Lordship, since, certainly, I bear them no sort of ill will; but their remarks were trivial, and, for the most part, as little satisfactory as the words of the message which had been delivered to me by Moonshee Kavel Nyn. However, I was pleased to observe that they had relinquished their former assumption respecting the right of the · Maharaja to be consulted in his capacity of guarantee to the treaty of Salbhey, previously to the conclusion of any new engagements between the British government and his Highness the Peishwa. They moreover acknowledged, that your Excellency's late measures had been productive of great advantages to the Maharaja; but they obstinately contended that the Peishwa, who was indebted to Dowlut Rao Scindia for his eleva tion to the Musnud, ought long since to have apprized the Maharaja of the terms of the treaty which he had entered into with the English.

5. In reply to this remark, I

said, that his Highness Baajy Rao had deputed a confidential person to this court for the express purpose of explaining all particulars to the Maharaja; that this person had certainly been very tardy in performing the journey; but that delay was by no means ascribable to his Highness, who was equally desirous to make this communication as the Maharaja was to receive it. I then took occasion to assure Dowlut Rao Scindia, that his Highness the Peishwa had invariably consulted the real interests of this government, and that in several recent instances he had evinced his friendship towards the Maharaja, by rejecting certain overtures of his enemies, calculated to lessen his dignity and authority in the Mah

ratta state.

6. After expressing myself to the above effect, I reminded the ministers that they had introduced a subject quite foreign to my purpose, since all that I wished to know from them was, whether the Maharaja felt inclined to accept of your Lordship's friendly proposals, and to be apprized also of his (Scindia's) intentions in relation to the late engagement between the Peishya and the British government. With regard to the propositions, I said, as they were offered to the acceptance of the Maharaja by your Excellency, with a view to his (Scindia's) own advantage, that the Maharaja might accede to, or reject them, according to his pleasure. But as Moonshee Kavel Nyn had left me in doubt respecting the amicable intentions of the Maharaja towards the British government, I must insist on a candid explanation on this important subject; and that any further evasion of it

on

on their parts would confirm the justness of those doubts which that Moonshee's intimation had impressed on my mind.

7. This open declaration occasioned the ministers to look towards the Maharaja, which af forded me a favourable opportunity of remarking to this prince, that I clearly perceived it was from his candour alone I had to expect the desired explanation.

8. Dowlut Rao Scindia made not the smallest hesitation in giv ing me the following answer.

That he had lately been informed, that indisposition had caused the detention of Ballojee Koonger on the road. That this Vakeel was, however, now reco vered, and on his way to this court. That he (the Maharaja had sent a party of horse to escort Ballojee Koonger, whose arrival here was shortly expected, and that until he (Scindia) had been informed of the particulars which this agent was instructed to communicate to him on the part of the Peishwa, he (Scindia) could not give a decided answer to the propositions of your Excellency. The Maharaja then declared that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately concluded between the Peishwa and the British government, but on the contrary, that it was his wish to improve the friendship at present subsisting between the Peishwa, the British government, and his own Sir

car,

9. I thanked the Maharaja for his very candid and explicit reply, and at the same time requested his permission to repeat what he had said on this occasion, in order that

I might be enabled to state the same to your Lordship. Accordingly I did so, and at the conclusion the Maharaja said, "These words are my words, and you are authorized by me to write them to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General."

10. Dowlut Rao Scindia then asked me, whether I had received a copy of the engagements concluded at Bassein by Colonel Close; and on my replying in the affirmative, he expressed a wish to be apprized of the particulars thereof. I said, that if the Maharaja would enter into a discussion of the different articles of the treaty with me, for the purpose of becoming a member of the general defensive alliance, I should have great pleasure in making the communication he required. Here Unna Bhasker interposed, by observing, that the Maharaja had already declared that he could come to no determination on this point until he had conversed with Ballojee Koonger. I replied, "If that be the case, any communication of the articles on my part would be premature."

11. Your Excellency will perceive, that until the arrival of Ballojee Koonger at this court, I can make no progress towards the attainment of the objects of my mission; however, this delay appears to be of little consequence, since I am firmly convinced that Scindia's ministers will prevent their master from engaging in the defensive alliance until such time as his Highness the Peishwa be restored to that authority which he ought to possess, as head of the Mahratta empire, and until the restoration be effected by the. means of those engagements which

1

he

British government.

(Signed) J. COLLINS, Res. D. R. S.

I have, &c.

Camp near Serowleh,

25th March, 1803.

P. S. I have omitted to mention to your Excellency, that when I was about to take leave of the Maharaja, he expressed

ness of my conduct towards this Durbar in terms highly flattering. At the same time, he invited me to accompany him in his future hunting excursions.

(Signed) J. COLLINS,

Res. D. R. S.

(A true Copy.)
N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Gov,

To Major-General Wellesley, &c. &c. &c.

Sir,

You have already been apprized of your appointment to the command of a detachment destined to advance into the Mahratta territory, and of the description and extent of the force composing that detachment. You have also been furnished with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General and the Right Honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, relative to the purposes of its movements, and have been supplied with copies of all the public communications that I have received regarding the present state of affairs in the Mahratta empire, the strength and disposition of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's forces, and the probable objects of his designs. The above instructions from government will fully explain to you the plan of proceedings, by which the Governor General has proposed to re-establish the authority of the Peishwa, and fulfil the conditions of the defensive alliance concluded with his Highness. The information

derived from these papers, together with your own extensive knowledge of the state of the subject, has therefore obviated the necessity of furnishing you with detailed instructions from myself on the particular measures to be adopted in pursuit of those abjects; more especially, as the nature of the service upon which you are proceeding, depending on the sentiments of a people whose views and opinions are but imperfectly known at this distance, and on events of a contingent nature, precludes the practicability of ascertaining the exact operations which it may be thought proper to undertake.

Although I have considered it to be expedient to avoid prescribing the particular plan of the operations of your detachment, yet I judge it necessary to state certain principal objects, which, in my judgment, ought to regulate the course of your proceedings.

1. To encourage the southern Jaghiredars to declare in favour of the Peishwa's cause; to employ every means to reconcile their mutual animosities, and to in

duce

duce them to unite their forces with the advancing detachment, for the purpose of re-establishing his Highness's government.

2. To proceed to Meritch, and form a junction with the Peishwa, or, should that measure be deemed inadvisable on the part of his Highness, with such of his chieftains and troops as may be able to meet you there.

3. To open a communication, and form a junction with the subsidiary force under Colonel Stevenson, and the contingent of his Highness the Nizam.

4. To proceed eventually to Poona, and establish an order of things in that capital favourable to the return of the Peishwa, and the attainment of the ends of the late treaty.

The means of accomplishing those objects must be regulated by your own judgment, in conformity to circumstances. It will require every exertion of your ability to unite the southern Jaghiredars in an effectual support of the Peishwa's cause, distracted as they are at present by internal dissentions and hostilities. The interests and fears, however, of those chieftains, will render them solicitous to avert the calamities threatened by the farther success of a power that derives its support from contributions and plunder, and they must be sensible that the retreat or overthrow of that power, and the restoration of a regular government, are the only means by which the dangers to which they exposed can be prevented, and the possession of their tranquillity secured. But in encouraging the co-operation of those chieftains, you will carefully abstain from any specific engagements of a nature incom

are now

patible with the rule established by his Excellency the Governor General, for the conduct to be observed towards them. You will receive herewith duplicates of the letters stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Close, in his dispatch of the

to have been transmitted by the Peishwa, to the chieftains in the neighbourhood of Meritch and the Kistna, who are considered to be attached to his cause, enjoining them to join and co-operate with the British troops. on their advance. You will forward those letters to their respective addresses, at such times, and accompanying them with such instructions to the chieftains on the subject of their co-operating with you, as you may find to be most expedient.

The general state of affairs renders the rapidity of your advance of essential advantage, as your early arrival upon the Kistna, and your junction with the Peishwa's troops and the subsidiary force, will materially contribute to frustrate any designs which may be meditated against his Highness's interests or the arrangements of the late treaty, and to give union and efficacy to your operations. I consider it therefore of importance that you should employ every practicable degree of expedition in collecting the forces of the southern Jaghiredars, and proceeding in conjunction with them to join the Peishwa and the Nizam's force. I attach the greatest consequence to the latter junction, and I request that you will keep the means of .ccomplishing it at all times in view.

The detachments under you and Colonel Stevenson, while separated from each other, are exposed

to misfortunes from which their

The subsidiary force in particular, destitute of Europeans, and occupying an advanced position, may be liable to the necessity of acting under very unfavourable circumstances.

Every view of our situation appears to me to require that your junction with Colonel Stevenson's force should be effected at the carliest practicable period of time, as that measure will secure, more than any other, the safety of the British troops, and the general success of the plans of govern

ment.

I have not noticed in the foregoing orders the conduct to be observed on your part in case of the opposition of any chieftain, and in particular of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from whom we are led to expect most opposition to your proceedings.

The instructions of the Governor General and Lord Clive contain no orders, and afford no positive rule to guide my determination on this important head. I inter, however, from the spirit of those instructions, that if the majority of the southern Jaghiredars, and the sentiments of the body of the people, are found to declare in favour of the restoration of Baajy Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavours to reestablish his authority; and should the detachment, during the prosecution of that endeavour, encounter the hostility of any individual Jaghiredar, that they are to employ, in concert with the well-affected Jaghiredars, every practicable means to overcome his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory opposing resistance to the restoration

ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the chieftains are favourable to that measure, I am of opinion that the instructions which I have received justify me in authorizing you to compel his submission.

This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the Mahratta chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor General's policy is, to avoid a war; and as his Excellency has directed me to bear this principie in mind as the rule of our conduct on every emergency that may arise, you wil carefully forbear from the adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occur. rence of hostilites with any of the parties of the Mahratta empire.

The numerous considerations which recommend the early and expeditious advance of the detachment, render it inadvisable, in my judgment, to undertake the siege of Darwar.

The reduction of that fortress might be attended with delays extremely detrimental to the success of our cause,and I do not apprehend that Bappojee Scindia, intimidated as he will be by the vicinity of the army under my command, and afraid to exasperate his future treatment from the Peishwa, will attempt to molest your communications.

I therefore consider it to be expedient that this fortress, notwithstanding the important advantage which would be derived to your operations from its possession at the present crisis of affairs, should be permitted to remain under its present Kelledar. It may, however, be proper that you should avail yourself of the impression