ment had no views beyond the express stipulations of the treaty of Bassein. 15. If Scindia should proceed to Poona, in opposition to Colonel Collins's remonstrances, the British force in that city must be as strong as possible. 16. Some of the Peishwa's immediate dependents or Aumils may refuse to submit to his authority. In that event, measures must be adopted to compel submission. 17. A force to be detached from Guzerat, if practicable, for the purpose of occupying the districts eeded to the Company in that province. 18. If the condition of Guzerat should not permit the adoption of this arrangement, a sufficient force should be detached either from Surat or Bombay, to be replaced by a part of the force under the Honourable Major-General Wellesley, or Colonel Stevenson, 19. Part of the troops, in returning to the Carnatic or to My sore, may occupy the cessions to the southward of Poona. 20. Colonel Close is supposed to have obtained from the Peishwa the necessary orders for the cession of the districts, under the sțipulations of the treaty. 21. The government of Bom. bay, in concert with General Wellesley and Colonel Close, will ap point the proper officers of collec. tion in the ceded districts in Gu. zerat. 22. The government of Fort Saint George to pursue the same course with respect to the ceded districts to the southward of Poona. 23. Proper measures will be taken to reinforce Midnapoor, and to collect a force on the northwestern frontier of Oude, in the direction of Agra. 24. If Major-General Wellesley and Colonel Close should be convinced of the hostile intentions of Scindia or Holkar, the army must be properly employed to disperse Holkar's forces, and to drive Scindia beyond the Nurbuddah. In such an event, the earliest notification should be sent to General Lake at Futty Ghur, who will be ordered to seize Agra, Matura, Cowle, and Delhi, with other places (probably Colpec), and to take or disperse Scindia's troops in those quarters. 25. These suggestions are stat. ed; but no reason exists to countenance an apprehension that Scindia, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, or any other power, will now at. tempt to frustrate the treaty by hostilities. WITH a view to furnish you at the carliest moment with instructions of the Governor Gene ral for your guidance, upon the expected return of his Highness the Peishwa to Poona, I forwarded to you on the 7th instant, by his Excellency's command, a note containing the general tenor of the measures proposed to be pursued in the present posture of affairs in the Mahratta empire. The Go vernor General is satisfied that the early circulation of that note will have enabled you and all the subordinate authorities to which it was communicated, to act in concert under the proposed plan; and I am now commanded by his Excellency to state to you in detail the directions necessary for the further regulation of your conduct, and for the guidance of the Honourable Major-General Wellesley. 2. His Excellency concludes that the Peishwa's restoration to the Musnud of Poona will have been accompanied by the most public demonstrations of ceremony and respect on the part of the British authorities at that station, and the Governor General has issued orders which will afford to the Peishwa an ample testimony of the cordiality and zeal with which the British government has entered into this happy alliance with the Mahratta power. 3. The Governor General intends at a future period of time to review in a more particular manner, the principles on which the treaty of Bassein is founded, the objects to which it is directed, and the means by which the stability of our alliance with the Mahrattas is to be maintained. 4. I am commanded however by his Excellency to apprize you, at this early season, of the general scope of his intentions and views in concluding this important arrangement. 5. The destruction of the hostile power of Mysore, accompanied by the consolidation of our alliance with the court of Hydrabad, left no possible antagonist to the British government among the native states in India, excepting the Mahratta power. 6. The Mahratta states, unconnected with any European ally, could never become formidable to the British government, excepting in the event of an actual union of the feudal chiefs under an efficient sovereign power, or in the event of a revolution, which should unite the command of the resources of a large portion of the Mahratta territory in the hands of an active and enterprizing chief. Such events, however, to be averted, might have been encountered withcut apprehension by the British government in the present commanding posture of its foreign relations, and in the vigorous condition of its internal resources and concentrated strength. 7. But it was obviously prudent to employ every endeavour to effect such an arrangement as should preclude the union of the Mahratta states, under any circumstances which might menace interruption to the tranquillity of our possessions, or of those of our allies and dependants, especially of the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore. 8. The most effectual arrangement, with a view to this importtant object, appeared to be an intimate alliance with the acknowledged sovereign power of the Mahratta empire, founded upon principles which should render the British influence and military force the main support of that power. Such an arrangement appears to afford the best security for preserving a due balance between the several states constituting the confederacy of the Mahratta empire,as well as for preventing any dangerous union or diversion of the resources of that empire; you will therefore understand that the principal object to be accomplished by the operation of the treaty of Bassein is the prevention of any hostile union of the Mahratta states under the sovereign power of that empire against the British government or its allies. 9. The same policy requires that the operation of the treaty should be be so directed as to prevent the aggrandizeinent of any individual chief, or the combination of any number of chiefs under circumstances adverse to the authority of the Peishwa, or to the tranquillity of the territories of the Company, its dependants, and allies. 10. The treaty restores the legitimate power of the Peishwa, on the foundation of our support, and establishes our influence as the channel of mediation and protection, for the maintenance of the separate rights and interests of the confederated chiefs. alliance, you will not fail to advert to the advantages which have been enjoyed by the Nizam since the conclusion of similar engagements with the British power. You will describe the uniform disposition which the British government has manifested to maintain inviolate the dignity and honour of the Nizam, and to abstain from any infringement of his Highness's just authority within his own dominions. 13. It must be evident to the Peishwa, that while the independent authority of the Nizam over his own subjects, and the internal order of his dominions and go verument have been considerably improved, the power and importance of the court of Hydrabad among the states of India have been greatly augmented by the Nizam's connection with the British government. The continued security of the Nizam's dominions under the protection of the Company, from the encroaching spirit of the neighbouring powers, must have been remarked by the Peishwa in the course of the various transactions which have passed between the Mahratta states and the Nizam since the year 1798. 11. Your discretion and experience will sufficiently indicate to you the real nature of our situation in regard to the operation of the treaty on these points. You will observe, that it is neither consistent with the principle nor necesary to the objects of the treaty, to exercise any influence in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's immediate government of a natnre injurious to his dignity and independence, or offensive to his prejudices or pride; you will endeavour to satisfy his Highness, that his real and legitimate power is ellectually secured by this alliance, and that he may confidently expect, under the operation of his engagements 14. The Peishwa must have with the British government, to remarked, that the protection of enjoy that tranquillity and securi- the British government has preserty, accompanied by respect and ved the Nizam from the rapacity, honour, which he has never ex- ambition, and treachery of Scinperienced under the degrading in- dia, and of other Mahratta powfluence of his own subjects, ser- ers--and that every sinister provants, or feudatory chieftains, and ject of the Mahratta states against which he could never have attained the Nizam has been frustrated by under the protection of Scindia or the vigilance and strength of the of the Rajah of Berar, or under British government. If the death any pacification with the rebel of the Nizam should happen, and Holkar or with the traitor Amrut the succession of Secunder Jah Rao. should take place under the orders 12. In demonstrating to the of the Governor-General of the Pieshwa the benefits of his new of January to Major Kirkpatrick, you will direct the Peishwa's particular attention to the justice, moderation, and honourable spirit of public faith, which the British government will have displayed in the unconditionalestablishment of Sec under Jah on the Musnud of Hydrabad; and you will contrast the order and regularity of the established system of affairs at Hydrabad with the con. fusions which have distracted the state of Poona, and which must have endangered its existence if the Peishwa had not solicited and obtained the powerful and seasonable protection of the Company. 15. In reviewing the probable effect of the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, you will ob. serve, that while they are calculated to protect the authority of thePeishwa from the encroachment of the great feudatory chiefs, the most effectual security is also provided for the preservation of the respective interests and possessions of those chiefs within the just limits of their separate dominions and authorities. 16. It is a principal object of the treaty of Bassein to prevent the sovereign power of the Mahratta states, or the power of any great branch of the Mahratta empire, from passing into the hands of France. 17. To this object, in all its relations, your constant and unremitting vigilance must be directed. The Governor General trusts, that the operation of the treaty must immediately exclude the French from the councils and armies of the Peishwa, and gradually from those of every Mahratta power which shall resort to the British protection for the preservation of its separate station in the Mahratta empire. 18. It may reasonably be expected that all the Mahratta states will speedily discover the advantages of resorting to that protection which offers the best attainable security for the preservation of their respective possessions and interests with the least possible sacrifice of prejudice or pride. 19. Beyond the limits of the principles and views stated in the preceding paragraphs, the Governor General wishes that the British government should abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of the Mahratta states. 20. In stating to you the detailed instructions of the Gover nor General, for the execution of the treaty, the following objects appear to require special attention: 1. The restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the due exercise of his regular authority in the Mahratta empire: 2. The effectual exercise of the rights of mediation and guarantee acquired by the British govern. ment under the treaty of Bassein, or originating in the measures adopted by the British government for the restoration of his Highness the Peishwa to the Musnud of Poona, without exciting the jea lousy or offending the pride of the Peishwa, or of the Mahratta chieftains; under this head may be classed the exertion of your endeavours to mitigate the resentment of his Highness against Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to obtain from his Highness such concessions in favour of each of those chieftains, as may be calculated to conciliate their submission to his Highness's authority: 3. To establish the subsidiary force in exact conformity to the treaty, treaty, and to provide for the return of the remainder of the forces employed in the restoration of the Peishwa to their respective stations, or for the disposal of such parts of those forces as it may be necessary to employ for the completion and security of the arrangements concluded with his Highness the Peishwa: 4. To provide for the security of his Highness the Nizam's dominions against any attack on the part of Scindia or of Holkar: 5. To provide for the complete occupation, by the Company's of ficers, of the districts ceded by his Highness the Peishwa. 21. It may be expected that the Peishwa will be solicitous to provide for the effectual re-establishment of his authority, by proceed ing to appoint proper officers for conducting the detail of his administration; but it may be proper that you should afford to his Highness the benefit of your advice, in framing the arrangements necessary for that purpose; at the same time you will employ your utmost endeavours to satisfy his Highness's mind, of the resolution of the British government to abstain from all interference in the details of his administration, and to maintain his dignity and independence: this object however may be difficult of attainment, when combined with the absolute necessity of securing the effectual mediation of the British government, in the manner described under the 2d head, especially in favour of the several Jaghiredars who have manifested a disposition to co-operate with the British troops in the restoration of the Peishwa to the Musnud of Poona, and to whom the faith of the British government Day have been pledged for the ex ertion of its influence with the. Peishwa for the attainment of any concessions in their favour, or for the future security of their just and acknowledged rights. 22. The Peishwa must be aware that the complete eonsolidation of his power will depend in a considerable degree on the successful exertion of his endeavours to conciliate the allegiance and attachment of the Jaghiredars, who occupy so large a portion of his territory, and this consideration may induce his Highness to admit the mediation of the British government, in favour of such of the Jaghiredars as have established a claim to it by their attachment to the Peishwa's cause. 23. Considerations connected with the consolidation of his Highness's power may also favour the success of your endeavours to ob tain from the Peishwa such conces sions as may induce Amrut Rao and Jeswunt Rao Holkar to submit to his authority. 24. The Governor General does not possess the means of suggesting the nature and extent of the concessions which it may be expedient to solicit from the Peishwa in favour of Amrut Rao and Jeswunt RaoHolkar. That point must necessarily be regulated by the expectations and dispositionof both parties, and by the relative rank and reasonable pretensions of those chieftains. 25. The characteristic insinceri. ty of Baajy Rao will, however, preclude all confidence in his of fers and engagements, unless they shall be secured by the mediation and guarantee of the British government. 26. The effectual and equitable exercise of our mediation and guarantee between the Peishwa and his subordinate |