cavalry in the ceded districts can always join the Hydrabad detachment in a short time:

Secondly, Because the corps at Hydrabad and Poona, thus reinforced, can join as soon as Scindia shews an intention to cross the Nurbuddah :

Thirdly, Because by breaking up the army, and leaving nothing more at Poona than the usual de tachment, the jealousy of our strength will cease in a great degree, and we may then see in what manner the new treaty will work.

No. 3,

Extract of a Letter from MajorGeneral Wellesley to the Governor General; dated Poona, 21st April, 1803.

I ARRIVED here yesterday with the cavalry of my division, and the Mahratta troops under Appa Sahib, Goklah, and others of the Peishwa's officers.

I had received repeated intimations from Colonel Close that Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poona, intended to burn that city when I should approach with the British troops; and at last a request from the Peishwa, that I would detach some of his officers, with their troops, to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious, that even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poona, their force was not of the description, or of such strength as to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's design, and I there fore determined to march forward with the British cavalry and the Mahrattas, as soon as I should arrive within a long forced march from Poona. In the mean time, I received intelligence that Amrut

Rao was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th, and that he had removed the Peishwa's family to Sevagur, a measure which was ge, nerally supposed to be preparatory to the burning the town; and I marched on the 19th at night above 40 miles to this place, making the total distance which the cavalry have marched since the 19th in the morning about 60 miles.

Amrut Rao heard of our march yesterday morning, aud marched off with some precipitation leav ing the town in safety. It is generally believed here, that he in tended to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. infantry will come here to-morrow.

The

I received a very civil letter from Amrut Rao in answer to one which I wrote him. He says, that he will send a person to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very important that he should be brought in, and Į will do every thing in my power to induce him to submit to the Peishwa's government,

Matters in general have a good appearance. I think they all will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly, and take our station at this place, and, notwithstanding their threats, have ta ken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a position from which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among themselves, much less have they agreed to attack us, or in any particular plan of attack. If I should be mistaken, and

that

that, in opposition to the conclu. sions of reasoning upon the state of our affairs with each of the Mahratta chiefs, who, we are told, were to combine to attack us; and upon a comparison of our means of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the Nizam (which is all that they can do) we should still have a war with them; you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that in consequence of the course of measures which you have already pursued, you have removed the seat of war to a distance from the Company's territories, and that you have the means of carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its speedy and successful termination.

In this reasoning upon the sub, ject I conclude that we should have had to contend with this confederacy at all events, or at least that we should have had a war with the Mahratta powers in some shape, even if this treaty with the Peishwa had not been concluded.

Upon this point I have only to observe, that the establishment of Holkar's power at Poona, found, ed as it was upon repeated victo ries over Scindia's troops, would probably have occasioned demands upon the Nizam. But supposing that I should be mistaken, I declare, that from what I have seen of the state of this country, it would have been im, possible for Holkar to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam's territory, They have not left a stick standing at the distance of 150 miles from Poona; they have eat the forage and grain; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials as firewood; and the inhabitants are filed with their

cattle. Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature since I quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch; so that the result of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peishwa, which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if only for the subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar's suite, or their march to the countries to the southward of the Kistna. This last course might have procrastinated the evil, as they might in those coun❤ tries have found subsistence for another year; but then their next step would have been to seek for it in the Company's territories, the very sources from which we should have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which must have ensued.

Supposing, therefore, that there is a distant risk that you may have a contest with the Mahratta powers, you have the satisfaction of reflecting that in consequence of those measures, the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company's territories, and that you are in such a state of preparations as to ensure its speedy success; and that at all events, it is probable, that if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war without having the same means of averting them, or of limiting their duration.

No. 4.

Extract of a Letter from the

Honourable Major-General
Wellesley to the Governor Ge-
neral; dated Poona, 27th of
May 1803.

IT is evident that the Peishwa's
eonfidence

confidence in us increases daily. He calls for our assistance frequently, to support and enforce, by our influence over the Jaghiredars and other chiefs, his authority and orders, and he pays attention to our recommendation of their claims upon his government. He has consented to give Appa Sahib (the eldest son of Purseram Bhow, and the chief of the Putwardan family) the Zurrec Putka to go out with me, provided that chief will present him with a Nuzzer of one or two lacks of rupees; and by this measure he shows his confidence in us, he secures to his cause this powerful family, and secures the tranquillity of the southern districts if there should be a war; and as Appa Sahib is known to have been our friend, and the determined enemy of the Peishwa, all the chiefs of the empire will know to what quarter they are to look in future for the favours and honours of the state. We do not know yet whether Appa Sahib will or can give the Nuzzer which will be required from him; but I make no doubt that if he can afford it, I shall be able to prevail upon him to give it.

as

1

between Amrut Rao and me were given to the Peishwa some time ago, and this last letter from Amrut Rao was given to him three days ago, with a request that he would take it into consideration, and let me know what answer he wished me to give it. He was at the same time informed, that the British government was very desirous that he should be reconciled to Amrut Rao, and that that chief should have a provision in the state, as the best mode of in. suring the internal tranquillity of his Highness's territories; and as we expected that he would urge Amrut Rao's disposition to intrigue as an argument against a reconciliation with him, we desired that it might be observed to him, that now that his government was strengthened by an alliance with the Company, and that all his subjects saw that the British government was determined to support his lawful and accustomed authority, it was not probable that any of them would venture to enter into intrigues to disturb or overturn it, as they had heretofore, or that if they did, he had much to apprehend from those intrigues. We have not yet received his answer, but if we succeed in reconciling the Peishwa with Am. rut Rao, the interior of this state will be settled as far as it can be at present; and his defection will shake the nerves of the members of the congress to the northward. This will be a greater object than the disposal of the Zurree Putka; but the two measures secure every thing within in case of a contest.

Your instructions to Colonel Collins of the 5th will have arrived just in the proper time. The treaty of Bassein is, in fact, a

better

better security to Holkar and to Scindia for the possessions which they have extorted from the Peishwa, and those lying to the southward of the Nurbuddah, than either of those chiefs could have under any other arrangement which could secure the Peishwa's power. They will see that clearly, and their sense of their own interest will combine with their fears to prevent a war.

You will have seen Holkar's letter to me upon the subject of the plunder of Aurungabad. If matters are brought to a peace. able conclusion with Scindia, and Holkar goes off to Hindustan, towards which quarter he is now moving, in my opinion it will be most proper to take no further notice of the contribution levied upon Aurungabad; at least not to go to war to force Holker to pay it back again. In fact, this chief is only a free-booter, and the Nizam's government allow that the Soubahdar of Aurungabad had combined with him. They acknowledge that they were aware of the intercourse between Holkar and the Sonbahdar some time before the contribution was levied, but they were afraid to at

tempt to dismiss their own treache rous servant. Upon the whole, therefore, the levy of the contribution upon Aurungabad may be considered as the act of two rebels to the states of the Peishwa and the Nizam.

In case Holkar should be considered in the light of a power in India, his conduct at Aurungabad atords ample grounds for hosnities against him; but upon the whole, considering that the Mahrattas have long been in the habit of plandering the Nizam's territories, that his Highness's government omit to take any mea sures for their defence, and that in this particular instance they were aware of the combination between their own servant and a Mauratta chief, and they were afraid to take the most obvious steps to frustrate their designs; . "1 think that if all parties acquiesce peaceably in the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, it will not be worth while to commence a chace after folkar to recover the plunder of Aurangabad.

(True Extracts.)

N. B. EDMONSTONE,
Sec. to Gor.

December 1802, 10th of February, 19th of April, and 20th of June, 1803, the progress of transactions in the Mahratta empire, and of stating to your Honourable Committee the measures which his Excellency deemed it necessary to pursue for the security and improvement of the British interests

as

as connected with that empire, and his general sentiments with respect to the actual state of affairs at those several periods of time.

2. The Governor General in Council now deems it proper to continue the narrative of events from the date of the Governor General's latest communications to your Honourable Committee, a duplicate of which accompanies this dispatch overland.

3. At a conference between Dowlut Rao Sciudia and the Resident at the court of that chieftain, holden on the 28th of May, the Resident communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindia the represen. tations which he was instructed to make in conformity to the notes of instructions, of which a copy form. ed an inclosure in the Governor General's address to your Honorable Committee of the 20th June. 4. The Resident began the con, ference by imparting to DowlutRao Scindia the whole of the treaty of Bassein, of which he also delivered a copy to that chieftain, agreeably to the directions of the Governor General. After some discussion with regard to particular parts of that treaty, the Resident called on Dowlut Rao Scindia to declare, whether it appeared to him to contain any stipulations injurious to his just rights: in reply to which, that chieftain candidly acknowledged, that it contained no such stipulations. The Resident then adverted to the reported confederacy between Dow But Rao Scindia, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to the actual approach of the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of meeting Dowlut Rao Scindia; and, in conformity to the Governor General's instructions, required that chieftain to state the nature

of the late negotiations between those Mahratta chiefs, and to disavow any intention of confe derating with the Rajah of Berar and with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, for the purpose of obstructing the completion of the arrangement established by the treaty of Bassein. 5. The Resident enforced these demands by every argument which the nature of the case suggested, and by the declaration which he was instructed to make, of the determined resolution of the British government to resist any attempt on the part of any state or power to obstruct the complete execution of the treaty of Bassein; and the Resident apprized Dowlut Rao Scindia, that in the event of his refusing to afford the just and reasonable explanations and assur. ances which the Resident had demanded, and of his continuing to prosecute military operations in opposition to the Resident's remonstrances, the British govern. ment would be compelled to adopt measures of precaution on every boundary of that chieftain's dominions. The Resident added, agreeably to the Governor Gene ral's instructions, that certain intelligence of the accession of Dowlut Rao Scindia to any con federacy against the British pow. er, would produce immediate hos tility on all parts of his frontier.

6. These representations, however, failed to produce the desired effect: Dowlut Rao Scindia re peatedly declared to the Resident, that he could not afford the satis faction demanded until a meeting should have taken place between that chieftain and the Rajah of Berar, whose arrival was expected in the course of a few days; and Dowlut Rao Scindia closed the discussion, by stating to the Resident,