his avowed intention of relinquishing Scindia's service, in the hope of more advantageous offers from Scindia or from the British go vernment. 5. A considerable number of Sepoys who were discharged from the British army at the late reduction, are said to have entered into M. Perron's service; and it is supposed, that if any new corps were raised in the vicinity of their station, many would return to the service; and that Scindia's European officers might be induced to resign the service of Scindia by offers of a present subsistence, and of a future establishment in the service of some of the allies or tributaries of the British govern. ment. 6. It must be ascertained whether it would be safe or practicable to endeavour to detach M. Perron, or any of the European officers in Scindia's service, or any of Scindia's troops, from their employment with Scindia; and whether any, and what emissary, should be sent to M. Perron or to the officers. but insufficiently supplied with ar tillery; a new bastion is said to have been constructed where it was formerly breached by M. Du boigne, but this work is said not to have added essentially to the defences of the place. 9. After the reduction of M. Perron's force, the principal object would appear to be, to prevent Scindia from entering Hin~ dustan with a large body of cavalry. 10. If operations against M. Perron's force should be necessary, a separate detachment of sufficient force might he formed at Etawah, to proceed directly upon Gualior, which covers the principal route from Ougein into Scindia's pos sessions in Hindustan. 11. The position at Gualior would probably render it impossible for Scindia to enter Hindustan with a considerable body of cavalry, 12. The Ranah of Gohud is said to be reduced to poverty, and to be destitute of resources or power. This chief, however, is said to retain considerable influence with the Ghauts. 13. It is said that the Ranah of Gohud is anxious to obtain the support of the British government; with our support he would probably be enabled to raise a considerable force, which might assist in opposing Scindia's march into Hindustan. The possession of the fortress of Gualior by British troops would enable us to support the Ranah's authority in the coun 7. If opposition is ultimately to be expected from M. Perron's force, a detachment of an adequate strength, formed at Saune or Bidgygush, might either attack M. Perron at Cael, or, by an easy change of position, might intercept his communication with Agra, where it is probable the principal supplies and military stores would be lodged, unless such a measure should have been pre-try, and would encourage the vented by the seasonable interposition of a British force between Agra and Cael, where M. Perron's principal depots are understood to be established at pre sent. 8. The fort of Agra is extensive, Ghauts to assist their native chief against the depredations of Scindia. The Ghauts Rajahs holding the strong forts of Bhistpoor-Chombeer and Deig, to the southward of Agra and Matra, are believed to be desirous of exchanging their dependence dependence on Scindia for the protection of the British government; an assurance of the secure possession of their hereditary tenures, and of their internal power would probably attach those petty states to us. 14. The Rajpoot chiefs of Jynagur and Jeypour have been long dissatisfied under the yoke of Scindia. Those chiefs would probably enter into subsidiary engagements with the British government for an adequate support against the usurpation of the Mahrattas. The accession of the Rajpoot chiefs, with the Ranah of Gohud, to the interests of the British government, would present an almost insurmountable barrier to Scindia's presumption of influence in Hindustan. 15. As these chiefs could furnish considerable bodies of cavalry a small force of British infantry and artillery would be sufficient to counteract any force of that description Scindia could detach from the Deccan 16. Bundelkund and Bhogachund are considered as fiefs holden from the Peishwa. Occupied by the British government either as a security for subsidy from the Peishwa, or in consequence of a subsidy granted for the support of the internal government of Bundelkund or Boghachund by British troops, these countries would oppose an effectual barrier to any attempts of the Rajah of Berar to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's provinces from those quarters. 17. It is believed that Scindia has stationed a body of predatory horse at Kalpee and Ongassy, on the southern bank of the Jumna. This point requires immediate at tention. 18. With a view to preparation for a war, directed to all the points stated in this note, it would ap pear to be proper,― MILLITARY PREPARATIONS. 1st. That the main body of our troops should be assembled at a point between M. Perron's station and Agra, and Shah Aulum invited to put himself under its protection as soon as the communication with Delhi may be opened. 2d. That Agra should be seized, if possible, by a separate de- 3d. That another detachment 4th. That Bundelkund should POLITICAL. 1st. A negotiation with M. Perron. 2nd. With his European offi cers. 3d. With his troops. 4th. With the Ranah of Gohud and Jaut chiefs of Bhistpoor and Corbeer. 5th. With the Rajpoot chief of Jynagur and Jeypour. 6th. With the chiefs of Bundelkund. N. B.-The commander in chief will make any preparations which he may deem necessary in draught or carriage cattle immediately, and will order any corps from any of the lower stations. 19. Benares must be well pro tected until Bundelkund shall be occupied. Query, Does the Commander in Chief think that the experimental horse artillery, with any any addition from the body guard, would be useful? 20. The Commander in Chief will be so good as to transmit any observations which may Notes, with a detailed plan of a campaign against Scindia. (Signed) Fort William, occur to him upon these the 20th June, 1803. WELLESLEY. INCLOSURE (C.) Governor General's Letter to the Commander in Chief; To his Excellency the Commander nature of the subject under dis. Sir, THE necessity of providing for the event of hostilities with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar has already induced me to transmit to your Excellency, in the form of private notes, such suggestions as have appeared to me to be requisite for the purpose of enabling your Ex. cellency, to frame a plan of military operations, connected with the political considerations which have ultimately compelled me to engage in war against those chieftains, and with the objects which I deem most important to secure, by the success of our arms, in the final settlement of peace. 2. These private communications from me have been answered by your Excellency in the same form, and I have hitherto deemed it to be expedient to return my observations upon your Excellency's propositions through the channel of private correspondence; it is now expedient to adopt the regular course of official correspondence with your Excellency in the secret department, and I shall accordingly henceforth address you in the form observed in this letter, or through the Secretary in the seeret department, according to the 3. In this dispatch I propose to state to your Excellency my views and intentions with regard to the following important points: 1st. The objects which appear to be most desirable to be attained in the prosecution of hostilities against Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, on the north-western frontier of Hindustan. 2d. The general plan of military operations by which those objects appear to be attainable with the greatest degree of expedition and security. 3d. The course of political arrangements and negotiations which I propose to pursue, under your Excellency's superintendence, for the purpose of facilitating the operations of your army, and of insuring the stability of peace under the most favourable conditions to the British interests. 4. With a view to render the statement of my sentiments on these questions more clear and distinct, I have annexed to this dispatch copies of the documents enumerated in the margin. 5. To every person conversant with the true nature of the British interests and power in India, the north-western frontier of Hindus. tan must have long appeared to present present the most vulnerable point of our extensive empire. 6. The condition of the power of the Seiks, as well as that of the Mahrattas, of the Rajpoots, and other petty states, offers considerable advantage to an invading enemy from the more remote northwestern countries of Asia, or from the banks of the Indus; and it is unnecessary to remark to your Excellency's judgment,experience, and knowledge, that the violence and rapacity of the Afghan tribes, or of the Asiatic nations inhabiting the northern and western countries of Asia, might have pursued objects of invasion in that quarter which might have occa. sioned considerable embarrassment to the British power in India. 7. A sense of this danger concurred with other motives to induce me to conclude those arrange. ments with the Nabob Vizier, which terminated in the treaty of Lucknow, and which secured a considerable augmentation of the military, political, and financial resources and power of the British mation on the north-western frontier of Oude. 3. The result of that happy settlement has certainly afforded a great accession of security against the dangers which menaced the stability of our empire on that side of India. 9. But the local position of Scindia's territories, the condition and nature of Scindia's military force in Hindustan, and the cor rupt and profligate councils of that weak, arrogant, and faithless chief,still constitute a serious danger to the British interests. The territories of Scindia between the Jumna and the Ganges interrupt the line of our defence in that quarter, and some of his principal posts are introduced into the centre of our dominions, while the possession of Agra, Delhi, and the western and southern banks of the Jumna enables him to command nearly the whole line of the western fron. tier. 10. In the event of any considerable accession to Scindia's power, or in the event of his forming any connection with France, or with any enemy to the British interests, the actual position of his territories and forces in Hindustan would furnish great advantages to him in any attack upon the Company's dominions. 11. Formidable as the power of Scindia might have become in the event of any accession to his strength, a danger more urgent and more direct in all its consequences, has grown out of the decline of Scindia's local authority in Hindustan, and has recently assumed a more alarming aspect in proportion to the accumulated embarrassments of Scindia's circumstances in the Deccan. and to the general decay of his resources and power. 12. The regular infantry in the service of Scindia, under the command of European officers, is supported by funds derivable almost exclusively from the territorial possessions of that chief situated between the Jumna, the Ganges, and the mountains of Cumaion. 13. A considerable portion, if not the whole of this territory, has been assigned to M. Perron, à French officer, who has suc ceeded M. Deboigne in the chief command of Scindia's regular in fantry. 14. M. Perron has formed this territory into an independent state, of which Scindia's regular infantry infantry may be justly termed the national army. That force is now stated to amount to 15. The inhabitants of the districts comprehended in M. Perron's Jaghire, consider that officer as their immediate sovereign ; while the troops, supported from the revenues of the country, re. gard M. Perron as the immediate executive authority from which the army is to receive orders, subsistence, and pay. Possessing such means, M. Perron dictates with the authority of a sovereign state of superior rank, and with the vigour of efficient military power, to the 'petty states occupying the country to the southward of the Jumna, and, by the terror of his name and arms, holds in abject submission the Rajpoot, states of Jynagur and Jeypour, together with the Ghauts and the state of Gohud, extending his influence even to Bundelkund, and to the country occupied by the Seiks. 16. Scindia retains no efficient controul over M. Perron, or over his regular troops; various instances must be familiar to your Excellency's knowledge, in which M. Perron has either openly disobeyed or systematically evaded the orders of Scindia, especially in the late crisis of that chief's affairs. 17. M. Perron has for some time past manifested a systematic disposition to remove all British officers, from the command of Scindia's regular infantry, and to introduce French officers under his own immediate patronage. 18. M. Perron is supposed to have amassed a considerable fortune, and your Excellency is in timately acquainted with his anxi ous desire to retire to Europe, and to dispose of his actual com. mand, and of his territorial possessions, to some person of the French nation, 19. To these considerations, it is important to add, that M. Perron is in possession of the person of the unfortunate emperor Shah Aulum, and consequently is master of the nominal authority of that unhappy prince; M. Perron, therefore, may transfer this valuable possession, together with his property of any other descrip、 tion, to any French adventurer or officer who may be enabled to complete such a purchase. 20. Thus the coincidence of various extraordinary and uncontroulable accidents, the weakness of Scindia's personal character, the rapacity and profligacy of his ministers, who have engaged him in pursuits of aggrandizement, avarice and ambition, at a distance from Hindustan, in the Deccan, at Poona, and in the southern provinces of the Mahratta empire; the treachery of many of his chiefs, whose interests consist in diverting his attention from the affairs of Hindustan to those of the Deccan, and the recent shock which his power has received from Holkar, have contributed to found an independent French state on the most vulnerable part of the Company's frontier. 21. Under the influence of a succession of French adventurers, this state must be exposed to every intrigue of the French in India, and even to the ambition and hostile spirit of the French nation; nor could an instrument of de struction, more skilfully adapted to wound the heart of the British empire in India, he presented to the vindictive hands of the Chief Consul of France. 22. This |