22. This French state actually holds possession of the person and nominal authority of the Mogul, maintains the most efficient army of regular native infan. try, and the most powerful artillery now existing in India, with the exception of the Company's troops, and exercise considerable influence over the neighbouring states, from the banks of the Indus to the confluence of the Jumna and the Ganges. 23. In the supposition of the most intimate and established connec tion of amity and alliance between Scindia and the British power, in the event even of Scindia's accession to the treaty of Bassein, and to the general defensive alliance with the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, it is impossible to suppose that this French state would co-operate with cordiality in support of the British interests; the aid of this state could be least expected in the case which would most urgently demand it, and which would require the most active operation of the principles of the general defensive alliance. 24. In the event of an attack from France upon the British dominions or power in India, it could not be expected that a French state, erected under the nominal and ostensible auspices of Scindia in Hindustan, would afford any substantial aid to the ally of the British power in a contest against France, even if that ally should be disposed to assist us in such a crisis. 25, On the other hand, no doubt exists that Scindia would receive the most zealous aid from the same state in any attempt which he might be disposed to make, either for the reduction of the British or for the aggrandize ment of the French power in Ia. dia. 26. In addition to these remarks, your Excellency is apprized that the vicinity of M, Perron's regular infantry operates as a constant drain upon the population of the Company's provinces, and diminishes the sources of our agriculture, manufacture, commerce, and revenue, as well as of our recruits for the army in that quarter. 27. In the present crisis, when every circumstance announces the probability of a renewal of the war with France, aud urges the necessity of resorting to every practicable measure of precaution and security, the safety of the British dominions requires the reduction of M. Perron's military resources and power, independently of any question which might exist between Scindiaand the British government. 28. In a state of profound peace and even of alliance with Scindia, the necessity of providing for our own security would justify a formal demand for the removal of a danger so imminent from the frontier of our dominions. The refusal of Scindia to comply with such a demand would afford a just ground of war against that chief; and any true or false plea of inability on the part of Scindia to controul the movements or to reduce the power of this French state, would authorise and require the British government to assume the protection of its own territories, and to remove, with its own hand, the proximate cause of insecurity and alarm. Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to understand, that the most desirable object in prosecuting hostilities against Scindia on the north-western frontier of Hindus tan, tan, appears to me to be, the entire reduction of M. Perron's regular corps. This operation necessarily includes the capture or destruction of all his artillery and military stores, and especially of all arms of European construction. 29. Connected with this object, and with every principle of security bearing relation to it, is the occupation of the whole tract of country forming the Doab, between the Jumna and Ganges to the mountains of Cumaon, and similar considerations will require the occupation of Delhi and Agra,and of a chain of posts on the western and southern banks of the Jumna, from the mountains of Cumaon to Bundelkund, sufficient to secure to the British power the free navigation of the Jumna, and the possession of both banks of that river. It is not my desire to ex tend the actual possessions of the Company beyond the line of the Jumna, including Agra and Del. hi, with a continued chain of posts to the westward of the Jumna, for the purpose already described. 30. Within the described line, my wish and intention is to estab. lish the system of the Company's government in all its branches; but whatever connections may be formed beyond that line to the westward and southward of the Jumna must be regulated on the principle of defensive alliance or tributary dependence, in such a manner as shall form between the actual possessions of the Company and the Mahrattas, a barrier of petty states exercising the internal government of their respective dominions in alliance with the Company, and under the protection of our power. 31. In drawing this line, I am aware of the position of the Jaghires of Sumroo's Begum,situated between the Jumna and the Ganges. For this special case I have accordingly provided in my instructions to Mr. Mercer. It is certainly necessary that the Jaghires of Sumroo's Begum should ultimately be brought under the immediate government of the Company. 32. It is highly important to secure the possession of the person and nominal authority of the Mogul against the designs of France. The Mogul has never been an important or dangerous instrument in the hands of the Mahrattas, but might become a powerful aid to the cause of France in India, under the direction of French agents. 33. The person and authority of that unhappy monarch have been treated by the Mahrattas, and by M. Perron, with the most barbarous indignity and violence; and it would contribute to the reputation of the British name to afford an honourable and tranquil asylum to the fallen dignityand declining age of the King of Delhi. It would also be necessary to extend our protection to his Majesty's Heir Apparent, and to any of the royal family who might otherwise fall into the hands of France. 34. The reduction of M. Perron's force would afford us the means of forming alliances with all the inferior states beyond the Jumna, for the purpose of enabling us, in the first instance, to prosecute the war with the greatest advantage, and finally, by forming a barrier composed of these states, to exclude Scindia and the Mahrattas altogether from the northern districts of Hindustan. 35. It is extremely desirable that Bundelkund should be ultimately placed under the immediate authority of the British government; such an arrangement would afford great additional security to the rich province and city of Benares, and would effectually check whatever power might remain to the Rajah of Berar, or to any other Mahratta chief in that quarter. 36.Reviewing these statements, your Excellency will observe, that the most prosperous issue of a war against Scindia and the Rajah of Berar on the north-western frontier of Hindustan, would in my judgment comprize, First, The destruction of the French state now formed on the banks of the Jumna, together with all its military resources. Secondly, The extension of the Company's frontier to the Jumna, with the possession of Agra, Delhi, and a sufficient chain of posts on the western and southern banks of the Jumna. Thirdly, The possession of the 37. The result of such an arrangement would destroy the influence of the French and of the Mahrattas in the northern districts of Hindustan, and would enable us to commence the founslation of such an intercourse with 38. In stating to your Excellency my sentiments with regard to the general plan of military operations by which the propos. ed objections appear to be attainable with the greatest degree of expedition and security, your Excellency will be pleased to understand that it is not my intention either to limit the free exercise of your discretion, or to interpose any ideas which may not meet the full approbation of your Excellency's superior judgment, experience, and professional skill, 39. I have, however, deemed it to be my duty, under this restric tion, to communicate to you in my private correspondence, such opinions of this branch of the subject as have appeared to me to merit consideration; and, with the same view, I have transmitted to your Excellency my observations on the plan which I have received from you. I shall therefore pro. ceed to state, without further reserve, in this official form, such conclusions as I have drawn from a view of the documents and suggestions which have been brought under my examination. 40. The first object of the camgaign must be to destroy the military force and resources of M. Perron, and it is extremely important that this object should be accomplished previously to the close of the rainy season. 41. It is therefore necessary that the main body of the army should be assembled at the point most favourable for the attack of M. Perron's M. Perron's force, and in the state of preparation and equipment which may be deemed by your Excellency most advantageous for the speedy execution of that service. 42. Your Excellency will have observed, from the whole tenor of every communication which you have received from me, that I not only concur entirely with you in deeming the destruction of M. Perron's force to be the primary object of the campaign, but that the most deliberate consideration of the actual state of affairs between his Majesty and France would have induced me to have under. taken this service, even independently of any contest with Dow lut Rao Scindia. 43. I shall therefore readily sanction any augmentation which your Excellency may think fit to make to the strength of the main army to be directed against M. Perron, by suspending the opera. tions of the several proposed detachments, or by concentrating the movements of those detachments, with a view to the principal object of the campaign, which is comprized "in the early and effectual demolition of the French state erected by M. Perron on the banks of the Jumna." 44. With this observation I desire that your Excellency will compose the main army, and regulate the strength and operations of the several detachments, in the manner which shall appear to your judgment to afford the most absolute security for the complete destruction of M. Perron's force previously to the rains." 45. The point of most urgent importance connected with the destruction of M. Perron's force, is, in my opinion, the security of the person of the Mogul, and of the Heir Apparent, and it is therefore my earnest wish that early measures should be taken for that purpose. The operations for the detachment proposed to cover Rochillcund, and eventually to invade Suharunpoor, might probably effect this object, and at the same time might tend to promote the success of the movements of the main army against M. Per ron. 46. I trust that the powers already furnished to your Excellency for the augmentation of the regular corps to the war establishment, and for raising such temporary and local corps as may be requisite for the maintenance of the internal tranquillity of the provinces, will enable you to provide effectually against internal commotion during the continuance of the war: but every temporary inconvenience of that nature must be hazarded, if the security of the great objects of the campaign should require you to incur such a danger. The early success of the army in the field will enable you to suppress, without difficulty, every effort of our domestic enemies, whose number cannot be considerable, and whose power is extremely contemptible. 47. I consider the operations of the detachment to be stationed in the direction of the Delhi, to be next in importance to those of the main army. 48. After the destruction of M. Perron's power shall have been effected, and the person of the Mogul shall have been protected beyond the possibility of hazard, the operation of greatest importance will be the reduction of the fortress of Agra. Your Excellency will form the most cor rect rect judgment in deciding the time and mode of undertaking this service; whether it would be possible either to blockade or to scize Agra during the time of the movement of the main army against M. Perron, or whether the siege of Agra should be postponed until the main army shall be at liberty to act against Agra, are points which I submit implicitly to your Excellency's determination. It is, however, important that Agra should be reduced previously to the close of the rainy season. 49. The occupation of Bundel. kund is the object next in importance to those already stated; and it appears to me, that the detachment to be assembled at Allahabad, and the detachment to be assembled for the purpose of Covering Benares, will effect that object in sufficient time to afford additional countenance to the operation of the main army. 50. The effectual protection of Benares is a point of consider able importance, and your Excellency appears to have taken suffi. cient precautions for that purpose. 51. It has appeared to me to be prudent to adopt a systematic and comprehensive plan of defensive measures in the whole line of the frontier, from Mirzapore to Midnapore, and I have directed the Chief Secretary to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the orders which I have issued on that subject. 52. The occupation of the passes from the southward and westward of the Jumna to the Deccan is an object which has already engaged your Excellency's attention; if you should be enabled to bring the main body of M. Per. ron's force to action, or should find it practicable to reduce that forco in any other manner, it appears improbable that Scindia's troops can occupy those passes in any considerable strength. 53. Major General Wellesley may be expected to commence operations against Scindia, in the Deccan, at the close of this month, and I entertain a firm confidence of the complete success of those operations in the entire defeat of Scindia's forces, and of those of the Rajah of Berar in that quarter. It is however an object of importance, and of prudent precaution, to secure the passes be tween Hindustan and the Deccan previously to the close of the rains. 54. The expediency of occupying the post of Gualior, previously to the defeat of M. Perron, must depend upon local circumstances, upon which your Excellency will exercise your discre. tion, after having considered the tenor of my instructions to Mr. Mercer. 55. Mr. Duncan has received my orders for the seizure of Sindia's sea-port of Baroach, and of all his other possessions in Gujerat, which objects will probably be effected whenever General Wellesley shall seize the import. ant fortress of Amednagur. The loss of these possessions will deprive Scindia of the most efficient portion of his military resources in the Deccan. 56. An expedition from Calcutta and Gangam will occupy Cattack in the course of the month of August. 57. It may be reasonably expected that these combined attacks will leave no other enemy opposed to your Excellency's force |