roneous proceedings of the Peishwa's government, may menace the security of the alliance, and the stability of his Highness's legitimate authority. 12. The policy of the treaty, and my inclinations, would induce me to limit our interference in the internal affairs of the Peishwa's government within the most moderate bounds. I am determined, however, to pursue that course which shall lead most directly and speedily to the full restoration and establishment of his Highness's authority on a permanent basis, and to the efficient operation of the benefits of the alliance. If the imbecility of his Highness's council, the defect of his personal character, or the intrigues of his servants, should tend to frustrate or to retard the accomplishment of those salutary obiects, the provisional interference of the British power must be seasonably and firmly applied, to rescue his Highness from the immediate effects of evils which cannot be suffered to operate for a moment, without the hazard of every interest which the treaty of Bassein was destined to restore and confirm. 13. You will therefore proceed without delay to conclude all such arrangements with his Highness's Jaghiredars, and servants of all descriptions, as may appear to you to be necessary to enable you to meet the exigencies of the present crisis; and you will not abstain from the most direct and even ostensible interposition of the British authority, which may, in your judgment, be requisite to secure the exertions, to animate the zeal, or to reward the services of the Peishwa's subjects and servants in the common cause of his Highness and of his allies. Whatever im mediate expence may be necessa ry for this purpose, will be defray. ed at present by the British government, and will hereafter become a charge against the Peishwa, as being inseparably connected with his Highness's restoration and establishment. 14. All such engagements as you may conclude with his Highness the Peishwa, and with any of the Mahratta chiefs and Jaghiredars, or other powers, will be confirmed by me under the limitations and restrictions herein prescribed, 15. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the govern, ments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at the courts of Poona, Hydrabad, at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindia, and in the territories of the Guickwar, with directions to those several authorities to assist you, and to co-operate with you in all points connected with the efficient powers with which you are hereby invested. 16. In exercising the powers hereby entrusted to your sole dis. cretion, I direct you to hold the most unreserved and confidential intercourse with the Residents at Poona, at Hydrabad, and at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindia, and also with the Resident in the territory of the Guickwar, and, you will regularly correspond with Lord Clive and with Mr. Dun political nature under these instructions. 18. If circumstances should render it necessary for his Excellency Lieutenant-General Stuart, to unite the whole force of the army in the field, and to assume in person the general command in the Deccan, in that case I hereby vest the authority con. veyed to you by this dispatch in his Excellency Lieutenant-General Stuart, under the fullest confidence that he will exercise it with the same advantage to the public service which I have uniformly derived from the exertion of his Excellency's distinguished talents, experience, and virtues. 19. In the case supposed, I empower his Excellency to delegate the whole, or any part of the said authority to you; and I desire that in exercising the said authority,or any part thereof, in his own person, his Excellency will be pleased to communicate fully with you, and to receive your advice and opinion. 20. In the execution of these instructions, I authorize and direct you to employ any additional military staff; and to require the services of any civil officers, whose assistance you may deem necessary to the dispatch of the arduous affairs connected with the subject of this order. I have the honour to be, Fort William, 26th June 1803. INCLOSURE (E.) Governor General's Letter to the Commander in Chief; To the Honourable Major-Gene- with the advantages which you THE Conduct of Scindia, and of the Rajah of Berar, requires a special notification to you of my views and intentions with regard to the operations of your army, and to such political proceedings as may be connected with a state of war between the British govern ment and those chiefs. First. On receipt of this dispatch, you will desire Colonel Collins to demand an explicit declaration of the views of Scindia, and of the Rajah of Berar, within such a number of days as shall appear to you to be reasonable, consistently with a due attention to the period of the seasons, and to the facility of moving your army, and of prosecuting hostilities 2. If that explanation should not be satisfactory on such grounds as, in your discretion, you may state to Colonel Collins, you will desire Colonel Collins to repair to your camp under a proper escort. 3. In this event, or in any other state of circumstances which may appear to you to require hostilities, consistently with the tenor of my instructions, you will employ the forces under your command in the most active operations against Scindia or the Ra; jah of Berar, or against both, according to your discretion. 4. It is probable that the state of the rivers will afford great ad. vantages to your army, and will embarrass the enemy in a considerable degree, if hostilities should commence my. commence during the rainy monsoon. In this event, I direct you to use your utmost efforts to destroy the military power of either or of both chiefs, and especially of Scindia, and to avail yourself of every advantage which circum. stances may offer, to the utmost extent of the strength of your are It is particularly desirable that you should destroy Scindia's artillery, and all arms of Euro. pean construction, and all mili. tary stores which he may possess. 5. In the event of hostilities, you will therefore proceed to the utmost extremity which may appear to you to promise success, without admitting pacific negotiation until the power of the opposing chief shall have been completely destroyed. In such case, the actual seizure of the person of Scindia, or of Ragojee Bhomslah, would be highly desirable, and the state of the rivers may perhaps favour such an advan tage. most desirable arrangement would be:-First, that Scindia, should cede to the Company all his pos sessions, rights, and pretensions, within the countries to the northward of a line drawn from the north frontier of Gohud, to the frontier of Jynagar, together with all his possessions, &c. to the nothward of Jynagar.-This cession would include Agra, Delhi, and the remainder of the Doab, of the Jumna, and Ganges. The Mogul's person would necessarily fall under our protection. This article must be a special stipulation of treaty.-Our frontier towards the ceded provinces of Oude would then be formed by the small state of Gohud, and by the Rajpoot states of Jynagur and Jeypour.The Ranah of Gohud to become tributary to the Company; Gualior to be occupied by the Company.-Defensive alliances to be formed with Jynagurand Jey pour. By this arrangement the Mah. rattas would be excluded from the north of Hindustan, and from communication with the Seiks.— 2dly, Scindia to cede Baroach, and all his maritime possessions. possessions, rights, &c. in Gaze. rat.-4thly, Scindia to cede all his possessions, &c. southward of the Nurbuddah. 6. In any crisis which may exist under the terror of your approach, or at any time after hostilities shall have actually commenced, I empower you to con3dly, Scindia to cede all his clude peace with Scindia, or with the Rajah of Berar, jointly or separately, on such terms as may appear to you most advisable. I shall, however, state to you the objects most desirable, in the event of any treaty with either or with both those chiefs, founded on their aggression and on our success or power. 7. The entire reduction of Scindia's power would certainly afford considerable security to our interests; in the event, however, of a peace with Scindia, which should leave his power in existence among the states of India, the 8. Arrangements might be made for a partition of these cessions with the Peishwa and the Nizam. In the event of hostilities with Scindia and Holkar, and of the complete defeat of those chiefs, the most distinct arrangement would be to take for the Compa. ny all the territories, rights, or pretensions, of Scindia and of Hofkar, to the northward and westward of the Nurbuddah, and to make that river the boundary of of the northern frontier of the Peishwa, giving to the Peishwa all the territories, &c. of those chiefs to the southward of the Nurbuddah, with the exception of all sea ports, which must be reserved to the Company.-Bundelkund is properly subject to the Peishwa. It would be desirable to obtain that province for the Company, with a view to secure the navigation of the Jumna, and to the further security of the province of Benares. From the Rajah of Berar I should wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack, so as to unite the northern Sircars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal. This cession, including Balasore, &c. to be made either absolutely, or upon payment of a moderate rent, or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominious of the Rajah of Berar. The district of Gunzmundelo has been an object to the Nizam. This object is to be pursued, according to circumstances, in the event of war with the Rajah of Berar. Without securing one or other of these advantages, you will not make peace with the Rajah of Berar, after he shall have compelled you to resort to hostilities against him, unless, in your discretion, you should deem peace with the Rajah of Berar advisable on different terms. 9. You are at liberty, generally, to modify the terms of peace herein suggested, at your discretion, or to change them altogether if it should become advisable to detach any chicf from the confederacy. 10. If Holkar should join the confederacy, you will act towards him on the principles of the pre ceding instructions. It is not desirable to erect Holkar's accidental power into an established state of India. His reduction would certainly be the most advisable policy; but the conduct and modification of our relations with Holkar must be left entirely to your discretion. You will not, however, prosecute hostilities against Holkar merely for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the plunder of Aurungabad, or for any other predatory incursion; such question may be reserved for amicable negotiation. 11. In the event of hostilities, you will take proper measures for withdrawing the European officers from the service of Scindia, Holkar, and of every other chief opposed to you. 12. You are at liberty to incur any expence requisite for this service, and to employ such emissaries as may appear most service. able. You are also at liberty to' enter into such engagements as may appear advantageous with any of Scindia's ministers, chiefs, or servants, or with those of the Rajah of Berar or of Holkar, and to afford any useful encourage ment to the party of the Bheys, or to any others in the dominions* of any of the confederate chiefs. 13. In the event of hostilities, I propose to dispatch proper emissaries to Gohud, and to the Rajpoot chiefs. You will also employ every endeavour to excite those powers against Scindia. I propose to engage to guarantee their independence, and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require. The independence of the Rajpoot chiefs would constitute a power which would form the best secu rity to our north-western frontier in Hindustan, in the supposition of Scindia's reduction. 14. You will apprize his Excellency General Lake, through the most expeditious channel (if any more expeditious communication should offer than through Calcutta) of your plan of political and military operations under these instructions. 45. Scindia's retreat across the Nurbuddah (after his insolent and hostile declaration to Colonel Collins of the 28th of May) will alone be a sufficient proof of his pacific intentions; unless, therefore, Scindia shall have afforded full satisfaction and security in your judgment, you will pursue him across the Nurbuddah, if you should deem that movement ad. visable for the purpose of reducing his means of mischief. 16. The same principle applies to any movement of the Rajah of Berar or of Holkar. The re treat of Ragojee Bhomslah or of Holkar to any place situated within their respective territories, or elsewhere, will not exch sively amount to a sufficient degree of satisfaction and security, after the recent proofs which the confederacy has disclosed of determined hostility and arrogant ambition. 17. You will consider what steps may be taken to excite Cashee Rao Holkar against Jeswunt Rao; and if, in prosecuting hostilities, you should be able to obtain possession of the person of Kundee Rao Holkar, you will avail yourself of that advantage. 18. The precise time of action from Oude and in Cottack cannot now be stated: but I will seize Agra, Delhi, take the person of the Mogul under British protec tion, and occupy the Doab, toge ther with Cottack, at the earliest practicable moment after I shall have learnt that you deem hostilities inevitable, or as soon as such measures of precaution may appear to me to be requisite. 19. In the movements of your army, and in all-your proceedings under these instructions, you will advert to the precarious state of the Nizam's health, and to the necessity of preserving our inte rests at Hydrabad in the event of his Highness's decease. The Resident at Hydrabad will apprize you of the orders which he has received from me respecting the succession to the Musnud of the Deccan. 20. Although a division of the French troops is already arrived at Pondicherry, and the remain. der may be soon expected, I de. sire that you will not be induced, by that event, to precipitate an accommodation with any of the Mahratta powers. The effectual security of our interests in the Mahratta empire is the strongest barrier which can be opposed to the progress of the French interests in India; the early reduction of Scindia (if that chief should com. pel us to resort to hostilities) certain, and would prove a fatal blow to the views of France. An imperfect arrangement with the Mahratta powers, or a delay of active measures, might open to France the means of engaging, with advantage, in the atlairs of the Mahratta empire. I have the honour to be, (Signed) 27th June 1803. |