government of France shall be directed to the establishment of its authority within the peninsula of Hindustan, it is manifestly the policy of the British government to accomplish such a system of alli ances with the powers of India, as may preclude the occurrence of those internal convulsions which would afford to France the most favourable opportunity of effecting her ambitious purpose. Independently of this consideration, the prosecution of such a system of alliances is prudent and advisable in the degree in which the tranquillity and prosperity of any dominion is endangered by the disturbed and distracted condition of neighbouring states.

125. The restoration of the Peishwa, therefore, to the just exercise of his authority, under the protection of the British government, and the conclusion of defensive and subsidiary engagements with his Highness, afforded the only means of precluding the dangers to be apprehended either from the consolidation of a formidable power, or from the continuance of the distractions in the Mahratta empire.

126. In a letter which the Governor General addressed to the Honourable the Court of Directors, under date the 3d of August 1799, containing a review of the interests, the power, and disposition of the several states of India, under the change produced in the relative condition of those states by the conquest of Mysore, the Governor General expressed his opinion, that the consolidation of the power of the Mahratta empire was highly improbable; and that it would require a most vi olent exercise of injustice and oppression on our part to dispose

the suspicious and cautious coun-cils of the court of Poona to favour the progress of a French force in India.

127. That opinion was amply justified by the situation of affairs in the Mahratta empire at that period of time. Since that time, however, the internal condition of the Mahratta empire has suffer. ed a material change.

not

128. The ascendency which Scindia had then established in the state of Poona was such as to menace the actual dissolution of the constitutional form of the Mahratta empire, or to produce a civil war among its component branches: and the contending interests of the seve→ ral feudatory chieftains appeared to afford a sufficient security against any dangerous consolidation of the Mahratta power.

129. Since that time a new power has arisen in the Mahratta state, under the direction of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which acquired sufficient strength to endanger the stability of all the principal feu◄ datory states, and was actually directed to the subversion of the constitutional form of the empire.

130. If the progress of the contest which ensued between that chieftain, the Peishwa, and Dowlut Rao Scindia, had not been checked by the seasonable interposition of the British power for the restoration of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, it is reasonable to conclude, that in the moment of extreme danger, the Peishwa, or either of those chieftains, would have been disposed to accept the aid of a French force for the support of his cause, and that the contest would either have terminated in the consolida

tion of a formidable power in the Mahratta state, accompanied by the complete establishment of the authority of France in the peninsula of India, or would have required the interposition of our arms after the aid of the French had actually strengthened one of the belligerent powers, and had consequently increased the difficulty, expence, and hazard of the war.

131. The security, therefore, which the British government might be supposed to derive from a balance of power and interests among the Mahratta states, and from the jealousy which the Mahratta nation has uniformly entertained of the influence and ascendancy of an European power, ceased to exist; and that security has been still further diminished by the augmented solidity and actual independence which the French force in the service of Dowlui Rao Scindia has gradually acquired since the termination of the war with Tippoo Sultaun.

132. After the expulsion of the Peishwa from his capital, not only the Peishwa, but Dowlut Rao Scindia and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, afforded the most unequivocal proof that the characteristic jealousy of the Mahratta states would not have deterred those chieftains from having recourse to the aid of France, if an opportunity should have occurred in any crisis of affairs in which their danger or their interest should have suggest ed the expediency of such a mea

sure.

133. The Peishwa directly solicited, and obtained, the aid of the British power for the restoration of his authority: Dowlut Rao Scindia indirectly invited our Co-operation ostensibly for the

same purpose; and Jeswunt Rao Holkar in his own name, and in that of Amrut Rao, signified his consent to the terms of alliance which had been proposed to the Peishwa on the condition of our support.

134. If the danger or the interest of those chieftains was so urgent as to induce them to seek the aid and alliance of an European state, of which the established power, extensive dominion, and unrivalled ascendancy in India, had been the peculiar object of the jealousy and apprehension of the Mahratta states, it may rea sonably be supposed that in such a crisis of affairs any of those chieftains would have been still more disposed to accept the aid of a military force from the French, who being destitute of any regular establishment in India, could not, in the same degree with the British government, be an object of jealousy and apprehension to the native powers, and especially to the Mahrattas.

135. If, therefore, the British government had refused to the Peishwa the aid which he solicited, it is reasonable to conclude that his Highness would have availed himself of any opportunity which might have occurred for obtaining the assistance and co-operation of a French military force, and the peace existing at that time with France might have afforded a favourable opportunity to the French power in India of aiding the Peishwa, or any of the contending parties in the Mahratta empire. Admitting, however, that the characteristic jealousy of the Mabratta nation might deter any of the Mahratta chieftains from accepting the aid of a considera ble body of European troops fure

nished by the government of France, it cannot be doubted, that in a situation of emergency, any of those chieftains would be disposed to receive into their service a number of French adventurers, to be employed in improving the discipline of their armies, and in augmenting the strength and efficacy of their military establishments. The evils which have arisen from the employment of French officers in the service of the native powers have been abundantly manifested in the gradual establishment of the formidable French force in the dominions of his Highness the Nizam, which was happily dissolved under the operation of the treaty concluded with his Highness in the year 1798, and in the growth and extension of the force lately under the direction of M.

Perron in Hindustan.

136. In the actual situation of affairs, no argument unfavourable to the policy of our engagements with the Peishwa could justly be deduced from the jealousy with which the other Mahratta states might be expected to contemplate the establishment of the British influence in the state of Poona. The dangers which eventually menaced the security of the British dominions in India, under the circumstances above de scribed, far exceeded any which - could be apprehended from the effects of that jealousy, and could only have been averted by the interposition of the British power for the restoration of order and tranquillity in the Mahratta state.

137. From the preceding remarks, it appears, that the acknowledged policy of contracting defensive and subsidiary engage ments with the state of Poona was never so urgent as at the moment

when those engagements were actually concluded; and the course of recent transactions in the Mah. ratta empire, (as detailed in the several dispatches from the Governor General to your Honourable Committee) combined with the relative power of the British government, and of the confede rated chieftains, with the commanding position of our armies, and with the exposed condition of the territories of Scindia and the Rajah of Berar at that period of time, constituted a crisis of affairs apparently favourable to the pacific accomplishment of that arrangement, or to the complete success of our arms in the event of opposition on the part of Scindia or of the Rajah of Berar,

[The subsequent paragraphs of this dispatch, down to ara graph 183, relate entirely to military operations, and are therefore omitted, for the reason already stated.]

183. In our dispatch of the 1st of August the Governor-General in Council apprized your Honourable Committee of the expected death of his Highness the Nizam.

184. That event took place on the 6th of August; his Highness's eldest son, Mirza Secunder Jah, was immediately proclaimed successor to the Soubahdary of the Deccan on the 7th of August. Mirza Secunder Jah formally took his seat on the Musnud, to which he was conducted by the Resident at Hydrabad and by Rajah Ragotim Rao, the deputy of his late Highness's Prime Minister Azeem ul Omrah, and received the congratulatory presents of all the principal officers of his government at Hydrabad.

185. On that occasion the Resident at Hydrabad was received

by

had been checked by the position of the British troops, those chieftains would have taken advantage of the event of the Nizam's decease to excite commotions in the state of Hydrabad, and to disturb the regular order of succession, by affording the aid of their troops in support of the known pretensions of Fureedoon Jah, the younger brother of Secunder Jah, to the Musnud of Hydrabad.

191. The expected event of his Highness the Nizam's decease, and the opportunity which that event might afford to the confederated chieftains in the actual position of their armies, to prosecute their injurious designs, furnished an additional reason for requiring those chieftains to withdraw their armies from the menacing position which they occupied on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions.

192. The Governor General in Council deems it proper to transmit to your Honourable Commit tee, an extract from a dispatch from the Resident at Poona, detailing propositions on the part of his Highness the Peishwa, for the

transfer to the Honourable Coinpany of a part of his Highness's possessions in the province of Bundelkund, yielding an estimated annual revenue of 36 lacks of rupees, in lieu of the territory ceded by his Highness in the southern quarter of his dominions, and of a part of the cessions in the vicinity of Surat, and other proposed modifications of the treaty of Bassein.

193. The Governor General in

Council, considering those proposed modifications of the treaty of Bassein to be a considerable improvement of the terms of that

treaty, with reference to the inte rests of the British government, has assented to the Peishwa's proposi➡ tions. A copy of the Governor General in Council's instructions to the Resident at Poona on that oc casion is closed for your Ho❤ nourable Committee's information,

194. Your Honourable Com. mittee will observe with satisfac tion, that these propositions from the Peishwa afford an unequivocal proof of the sincerity of his Highness's disposition to adhere to the principles and spirit of the alliance happily concluded between his Highness and the British govern

ment.

195. In conformity to the plan of operations and political arrangement, contained in the Governor General's instructions to his Excellency the Commander in Chief of the 27th June, (of which a copy accompanies our dispatch of the 1st of August) a considerable detachment of British troops was assembled near Allahabad, for the purpose of co-operat ing with the force under the command of Himmut Behauder (one of his Highness the Peishwa's principal officers in Bundelkund), in the occupation of that province, agreeably to the proposals which that officer some time since transmitted to the British government, as noted in the 59th paragraph of this dispatch; and the Governor General has received information that the detachment has crossed the river Jumna, and cutered the province of Bundelkund.

196. The Governor General in Council has every reason to expect the pacific introduction of the Company's authority into the province of Bundelkund; and the late cession of a part of the Peishwa's possessions in Bandel

kund,