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opinion of it; and also whether General Wellesley or the Supreme Government have a right, or could in reason expect that the Government of Bombay would, or in duty ought to have tacitly allowed their approbation of it to be against probability inferred, and their consequent responsibility entailed against their own conviction? for beyond this we went not, offering, on the contrary, to join with the most perfect submission and readiness in the execution of the measures proposed, provided they were not concluded to proceed, and to be founded on our opinion of their being in all respects the fittest for the occasion. In urging our President's own objection, and those of the board at large within these limits, this government is at a loss to conceive how he can be charged (as in the 4th paragraph of the letter from his Excellency the Governor General in council) with opposing the orders of the Supreme Government, which can in no one instance of the administration of this Presidency be, they trust, with the smallest justice imputed.

62. Neither are we aware how, as stated in the Supreme Government's 5th paragraph, the single alteration that took place in one part only of General Wellesley's original arrangements under date the 2d of August, can have frustrated, in any degree, his Excellency the Governor General's plan for the conduct of the campaign in the Deccan. All the modification which thus ensued consisted, as introduced into the instruc tions to Colonel Murray, in reserving to the Resident at Baroda a small portion of influence, (such as both Major Malcolm and Ge

neral Wellesley, Marquis Wellesley's two nearest friends in India, entirely approved, and acknowledged the expediency of in respect to that proportion of our subsidized military that should, exclusive of those in the field, remain in and near about the capital of the court at which he resided); nor was this slight qualification, or what led to it, attended either with delay, or other sensible prejudice to General Wellesley's aforesaid plan of the 2d of August; the letter and spirit of which, inclusive of the preservation of the Honourable General's own political controul and military command, in superiority to those of this Presidency, have continued, from our receipt of Lord Wellesley's orders of the 26th and 27th of June last, to be, to the present period, our leading rule in respect to Guzerat; constituting, in this view, the basis of all occasional orders to Major Walker, to Surat, and to Colonel Murray, as well as of the latter's permanent instructions; under which, and the intermediate proceedings of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington in the reduction of Baroach'and Powanghur, it is submitted whether in reference to the state of Guzerat, threatened as it was by domestic insurgents on its borders, combined, as supposed by Colonel Murray, with a large force belonging to Holkar, the Colonel could, during the extraordinary sickness and fever which affected his whole detachment, have, without overstepping all the rules of ordinary prudence, advanced beyond the frontier of Guzerat, and marched with his then inadequate force to Oujein, or done more for the two months that elapsed between

the

the middle of September and the middle of November, than defend the province of Guzerat; comprehending also in strictness, all that he dust venture on without the express directions of General Wellesley, to cross over the frontier into Malwa, which there is no reason to suppose were ever issued to him; and by the time he had, through the recovery of bis men from the sickness incident to the rainy season, and the reinforcements he drew from Surat, and the junction of an available contingent from the Guikwar government, become able towards the end of November and begin ning of December, to have proceeded against Oujein: General Wellesley had (to his own regret, as he has since acknowledged) precluded the effect of these preparations by an armistice with the enemy.

63. The next following paragraphs of the letter from the Supreme Government, under date the 23d of November, require but few remarks from this govern

ment.

64. Its sixth paragraph is mere ly declaratory of what has never been either disputed or demurred to; and the orders in its 7th were issued on the 14th instant, the day of their receipt, having in respect to these only to regret that, under the severe responsibility which Marquis Wellesley appears disposed to exact from us, either to our acting, or forbearing to act, the clauses of his orders here referred to should be so ambiguously word ed as to leave us in some degree of doubt whether we may not yet be blamed for refraining, as we mean to do, from exercising any authority whatever over Colonel Blurray, which, as it will not pre

vent our yielding him every assist ance in our power, we intend to persevere in, as the safest course, in like manner as the Honourable General Wellesley and the Su preme Government have been already advised.

65. It is satisfactory to this government to reflect that the or ders in the 8th paragraph of this letter from Bengal had been so fully anticipated, as to leave General Nicolls, the coinmanding officer of the forces under this Presidency, unaware of any thing remaining to be done" to prepare the whole body of the forces under the command of Colonel Murray for active operations in the field," and we could therefore only evince our anxiety to meet what was viewed as in consistence with the object of this instruction by availing ourselves of the degree of discipline to which a corps or fencible recruits (officered by the civil servants, lawyers, and merchants, and raised for the local service of the Presidency), had just attained, to convert them into a tegiment of the line, and to send them off to Guzerat to

reinforce Colonel Murray, al though with the certainty of leav ing Bombay with only a few hundred men of all descriptions for its defence.

66. On the call made upon this Government in the 9th paragraph of the letter from his Excellency in Council, it will be permitted to the Governor in Council not only to disclaim all sense of the relaxation alluded to, but to affirm (referring as he does for the proofs to the abundant evidence on the records) that his personal attention, labour, and continued exertions, in regard to the multiplied supplies of all descriptions

scriptions required by the Ho nourable General Wellesley for the present Mahratta war, have, to say the least, very much exceeded what were required of him in the Mysorean war thus referred

to.

67. Passing over the political truisms and general observations contained in the 10th and 11th paragraphs of the letter from Marquis Wellesley in Council, this Government is only interested in obtaining a fair appreciation (which they assuredly rely on from the discernment and impartiality of the proper tribunal) of the merits of this case between them and his Lordship; adding, at the same time, the assurance of their best endeavours to continue to fulfil, under every circumstance, the duties of their station, and for this purpose to form, as far as in their power, a correct judgment of the spirit and objects of all the orders that the Supreme Government may be pleased to direct to them. Nor was it ever the intention of this Government that" any local and temporary consideration" should be allowed to counteract "the paramount exigency of prosecut ing the war with vigour," but merely to suggest, on their opinion being required, how these two objects might in their judgment be most fitly combined, so as to support and promote each other; nor is it fair to convert their sentiments, thus gained from them, into a snare and source of reproach. 68. The remark of the Supreme Government, in their 13th paragraph, that on the active operations of the army in Guzerat, the speedy conclusion of peace now depends," unites their regret with that expressed by the Hopourable General Wellesley, that

its operations should have been arrested at the moment when they might have best answered the public wishes; at the same time that, after what has been presumed on the point of misconception " of orders," they have only to express their own unfeigned confidence, that such an imputation cannot by any impartial tribunal be ascribed to this government.

69. On the orders, in the 14th, 15th, and 16th paragraphs of the letter before us, it may be suffici ent to observe, that they have met and will, continue to receive implicit obedience from the administration of the Presidency of Bombay.

70. The explanations entered into relative to the proceedings for conciliating the Bheels, will, it is presumed, Lot only exonerate this government from the imputa-, tion of their having deviated in? any part of their proceedings from the Honourable General Wellesley's original instructions on that particular head, but evince that what has drawn upon us the strictures in the Governor-General's 17th paragraph, flowed directly and wholly from their anxious desire to obey and follow up not merely General Wellesley's written plans, but even the verbal and indirect instructions with which he was at any time pleased to fa

your us.

71. Soliciting indulgence for the unavoidable length of this narrative, which has nevertheless been compressed as much as possible, we conclude by craving and expressing our confident reliance on an impartial judgment

(A true Copy) (Signed) JAMES GRANT, Bombay Castle, Sec. to Gov. 26th Dec. 1803.

PROCEEDINGS IN-PARLIAMENT

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF INDIA,

DURING

THE SECOND SESSION OF THE SECOND PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOMS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

March 14th, 1804.

WAR IN CEYLON.

MR. CREEVEY."I now rise, Sir, in pursuance of the notification I gave some time since, to move for certain papers and documents for the purpose of information, and as grounds for further inquiry respecting the war which the king's government in Ceylon has lately been carrying on in that island. I should not have presumed, Sir, to take upon myself the office of calling the attention of the House to this subject, had it not appeared to me of a very limited nature, and one lying within a very narrow compass; or had I perceived a disposition in any other gentleman to do the same thing. As the subject, however, now, Sir, has been some time before the public, as it appears to me to be one of the greatest importance, as no gentleman has appeared to take it up, and as his Majesty's ministers have not thought fit to give this House any information respecting it, I have thought it my duty to introduce it to the consideration of parlia

ment. As the House and the public are not in possession of any official account of the cause of origin of this war, and of many of its effects and consequences, I will shortly state to the House such leading particulars, as, from the information I am in possession of, I believe to be true. I am certain they are mostly true, and where I am incorrect, the papers I shall move for will set me right. From the year 1795, when we first took the island of Ceylon from the Dutch, to the end of 1802, our government in Ceylon seems to have pursued its proper objects, to have confined itself to the possession of the coast and open countries of the island, to the introduction of wholesome laws and civilization among the natives, who live under our government, and every thing I believe, during the period I have mentioned, bore the strongest and most flattering prospect of improvement. We had never, apparently, during this period entertained the dangerous policy of interfering with the unprofitable interior of Ceylon, the woods and mountains, and wild inhabitants of the king of Candy's dominions. Some time, however, in 1802, it

seems

that dreadful malady the jungle fever, that for ever infests the interior of Ceylon, and for ever destroys the inhabitants of Europe. This fever, Sir, upon this cccasion, destroyed hundreds upon hundreds of our troops in Candia. Of the 51st regiment alone, above 300 perished; of the 19th regiment 170, besides the 200 of the same regiment who were afterwards murdered. One should have thought, Sir, as we had thus displayed our power by the seizure of the King of Candy's capital, and putting the king to flight; as we had paid so dearly for it, in the death of our soldiers, and as the country presented no object worthy of our posssesion, that our government would have instantly withdrawn the surviving troops: but it seems, Sir, our governor was now determined to play a great part in the politics of the Candian govern

seems some subjects of the British government had purchased in Candia a quantity of the arecca nut, and which, in its way to our settlements, was seized by officers of the Candian government. I have heard that such contracts by Candian subjects are against the laws of that country; but be that as it may, our government claimed the property, and it was agreed to be restored or the value to be paid for it: the value I believe was 3001. certainly not more, and the first difference between the English and the Candian governments was, whether this sum of 300l. should be paid instantly, or at the expiration of a few months; the real cause, therefore, of the war which was about to take place, was the difference between the prompt and protracted payment of 3001.-It was in this transaction that our national honour was supposed to be involved, for this our government-for this purpose he left a ment left its useful occupation, and put all the troops in Ceylon in motion, to chastise the King of Candy, to invade his dominions, and seize his capital. It is, perhaps, necessary for me here to state, that the King of Candy's dominions are composed principally, of woods and mountains affording no possible object for any rational enterprize, situated in a climate the most fatal to Europeans, and that his capital is in the heart of his dominions.-Some time in January 1803, this war began, and in a very short time, and scarcely with the loss of ten men killed in battle, we pene trated as far as Candy, which we took, and found the king was fled. So far we were all successful; but then, Sir, came what our government of Ceylon knew must come,

garrison in Candy, to secure suc-
cess to our intrigues, and from
the most ridiculous and contemp-
tible interference of ours in the
affairs of Candy, came all the
dreadful and disastrous conse-
quences we have since heard of.
We first dethroned the reigning
monarch, and put upon his
throne a new king, of our own
choice, a person so unskilfully
selected for that purpose, so uni❤
versally odious to the Candians,
that we finally withdrew him, and
he has since been murdered on
account of our partiality to him,
and his own presumption.
then, Sir, resolved upon changing
the Candian monarchy into an
aristocracy, and we guaranteed a
form of government of this spe
cies, and put the first adigar, or
first minister at the head of it.

We

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