have scarce any communication, or intercourse, with the other nations of the world, cannot be denied, and admitting this fact, we must also admit, that their seclusion from other nations is an irrefragrable argument, that their manners, customs, and habits of life, are now the same as in ancient times, and we may hence infer, that the same causes which pro. duced the rapid encrease of the population in former times continuing to operate, must produce the same effects now, I have therefore no doubt, but that independent Tartary is, at the present time, arrived at as high a degree of population as the country is capable of maintaining, and must 'ere long, get rid of a part of its inhabitants, by some foreign expedition. The limits of this letter will not admit of my going more largely into the consideration of the several circumstances, which have led to this conviction in my mind; but, if I have not said enough to convince you also, I still trust you will allow that I have advanced strong arguments in support of my opinion.

Although I have frequently reflected on this subject, I have always thought the danger so distant, as to make it an object of very secondary consideration in our Indian politics, until some late occurrences took place, which may bring it much sooner forward than I was prepared to expect, and which I shall now briefly state.

The late revolution at Kabul, which deprived Zemaun Shah of his throne (and life) and placed his brother Mahmood Shah upon it, has been attended with much anarchy and confusion. One of the chiefs, who had a considerable share in putting him up, is now

become his competitor, whilst a brother of Zemaun Shah's, by the same mother, has escaped with Zemaun Shah's son, and has taken refuge with the Ushbeck Tartars, and these princes having carried off jewels of considerable value, are endeavouring to raise a force for the recovery of the empire, and have sent their emissaries to the Furkomaun, the Mogul, and the Kalmuk Tartars, and other neighbouring tribes. Should these princes succeed in bringing down a Tartar force, and from the present state of that country, it is extremely probable, I imagine the Afghan dynasty will soon end, and be succeeded by a Tartar one. And if the Tartars once get possession of the Kabul dominions, it will open a channel for the su perfluous inhabitants of their own country to flow forth, and, ere long, we may have them very near and troublesome neighbours on our frontier. You may smile at this, and I am sensible I lay myself open, by submitting the idea to the ridicule of those who are unacquainted with the subject; but, nevertheless I cannot help, from the various circumstances which have come to my knowledge, believing that the danger from this quarter is neither ideal nor remote, and if arguments were required to point out the necessity of placing this frontier in a state of perfect security, and for augmenting the army in the field, this might be advanced as one of no small weight. Formerly we had six battalions of Sepoys at Cawnpoor, and six at Futty Ghur, which could be moved to the frontier at a moment's warning. Now we have not a spare corps, and could not assemble three or four battalions without great inconvenience,

and

and considerable risk of loss on the

revenues.

You know, that in this country the appearance of an enemy is the signal and excuse for every Zemindar to withhold the payment of 'his rents; not a corps that is at present employed on the revenue duty, and which I may say includes every one in the field at present, could be withdrawn without certain loss to government. We should, therefore, always have at least ten or twelve battalions, with as many regiments of cavalry, and the proper proportion of artillery, reserved entirely for defensive operations, exclusive of awhat are at present in this country, cll of which are employed in the tollection of the revenue. But to his it may be answered, we are at peace with all the world, and what is the use of loading the state with the heavy expence of so large a standing army. To which I reply, that we are only at peace in this country, so long as we retain the capacity of commanding it, and no longer. Have the Mahratta's reduced their forces, or dismissed any part of their army? I

say no! but it has been largely augmented, by their entertaining both horse and foot discharged from the Nabob's service, and the disbanded Sepoys from ours, t beside which, not a ship sails from France for India, that does not bring out adventurers to their service, and even the natives speak of French officers being soon expected in the Mahratta camp. If then the Mahratta and French force in this quarter is encreasing and improving, which I could easily prove to be the fact, both in numbers, discipline, and experienced officers, upon what principle of policy are we to reduce ours; that our power is as great a curb and check on the ambitious views of the Mahrattas in this country, as it has been, and I hope still is, on that of the French in Europe, I think will not be denied. We must, therefore, consider them as much our natural enemies as the French, so long as they continue to be jealous and envious of our prosperity in India, which certainly will be as long as they exist as a nation, or as our power and prosperity lasts.

Importance

THE open and exposed state of the Nabob Vizier's frontier, from Allahabad to Hurdwar, is one of the strongest arguments that can be adduced, in proof of the imperious necessity of a large force, in cavalry, being maintained in his dominions; but, as some plausible objections may be started against this position, though I am satisfied no solid one exists, and as it is certainly a subject of much greater national importance than is generally imaged, or which even the best informed in the Company's service are aware of, a brief examination of the question may at this time prove acceptable; and the more particularly so, as our late acquisitions in the Dekkan have left this the only accessible, the only vulnerable part of the British possessions in Hindustan ; and which, if properly protected (and that can alone be done by a powerful body of cavalry) we might then bid defiance to all the united powers of Asia.

The defence of the Nabob Vizier's possessions, and the security and tranquillity of the Company's provinces, are most intimately blended. The former being provided for protects the latter, which is scarcely assailed, except from that quarter. It is obviously, then, not more the interest of the Nabob Vizier than of the Company, to provide for the defence of his frontier; and, as he possesses neither the means nor ability himself, the whole responsibility of the measure, in fact, rests with the Bengal

government. But as the policy of protecting his possessions as well as our own will doubtless be readily admitted, it is needless to say more on that head. I shall thereproceed to consider the position assumed, and then take a short view of the important changes that have taken place in the countries, extending along the frontier, from Allahabad to Hurdwar, within the last twenty years; as from these changes have chiefly arisen the expediency of more troops being stationed in the field, and particularly a very numerous body of cavalry.

Previous, however, to this discussion, it will be proper to premise, that the Nabob Vizier's own troops, from being defrauded of their just dues, and from ill treatment in various other ways, as well as from insubordination, and a total want of discipline, are so deeply tinctured with disaffection to his government, that unless they are reformed, regularly paid, and placed under the command of British officers, instead of being of any service in the event of a war, the most serious danger is to be apprehended from their turbulent, disorderly, and licentious disposition. The disaffection and treachery manifested by his Kandahar cavalry, when employed last year be yond the Gogra in pursuit of Vizier Ally, their frequent mutinies at Lucknow, and in every part of the country where the nabob's troops are stationed, with the cruel depredations they are in the constant

practice

practice of committing on the inhabitants of the districts over which they are placed, are too notorious to every officer who has served in this country to require enumeration here. They have been fraught with the most baneful effects, and are highly disgraceful to the government under which they have been suffered to pass unpunished.

But to proceed: the principal objections to an alteration in the present system of defence and an increase of cavalry are, that during the Maharatta war, which terminated in 1782, they made no impression whatever on any part of the Nabob Vizier's territories; nor did they even attempt depredatory incursions, although it is a species of warfare for which their troops are singularly well adapted, and to which they are particularly partial; and, secondly, that from that time to the present, the troops stationed at Gawnpore and Futty Ghur have been found sufficient for the protection of this frontier, as well as for preserving the internal tranquillity.

To the first objection it may be answered, that during the Mahratta war alluded to, the Nabob Vizier's country, to the southward and westward, was covered by a number of small independent states, all jealous of the Mahrattas, and dreading an extension of their power; that therefore they could not commit any depredations upon his territories without marching their troops through some of these states; and that their forces, then, being composed of an irregular, disorderly, undisciplined rabble, such a movement would have carried with it all the ill effects of an invasion; and, in all probability, would have united the state or states they attempted to pass through in an alli

ance with the Nawaub Vizier, and the company against them as the common enemy of all. It consequently became (if not impracticable) so impolitic and hazardous in the extreme, to make an attack in that quarter, that it was not even attempted, however well disposed the Mahrattas might have been to the measure. So that these states served at that time as a secure and impenetrable barrier to the Nawaub Vizier's dominions; and had they been maintained in their independence against the Mahrattas, as it was the interest and sound policy of the British nation to have done, they would have continued so to this day.

In reply to the second objection it may be observed, that since the peace with the Mahrattas in 1782, they have been too busily employed in the conquest of those very states which have been mentioned, to find leizure to molest the Nabob Vizier's possessions, particularly under the disadvantages which must always lie in their way whilst any of these states existed, and whilst others of them were but recently brought under subjection. The conquest of countries naturally strong and very extensive was a difficult and arduous enterprise, the accomplishment of which might have been materially obstructed, or entirely overthrown, by the slightest interference, on any pretence, on the part of the Company, or of the Nawaub Vizier. Sensible of this, and that the political conduct of the latter was entirely guided by the sentiments and advice of the former, the sagacious Madhajee Scindeah, during the whole progress of this aggression, studiously avoided giving any cause of offence to either government; and his desire of conciliating the

good

good will of all Brisish subjects was so evident, that he paid the most marked attention to such gentlemen as were led by curiosity or pleasure to visit the ancient seats of splendor and opulence situated within his recent conquests. Perwannahs, safeguards, and escorts were furnished to them, and from every individual of his go. vernment the most respectful attention was exacted. The same policy has since been continued, and will necessarily be preserved in until the inhabitants are perfectly reconciled to their new masters, and assimilate with their manners and customs, which is sooner effected in this country than in any other, perhaps, in the world. But as the cogency of this policy becomes less binding, and it is declining rapidly, we shall find the polite, the respectful attention of the Mahrattas, change into a morose and jealous insolence: for although they have been compelled by policy to dissemble their real sentiments, there is no doubt that they behold with bitter vexation and burning envy the aggrandizement of the British power throughout India, and which has alone checked the career of general conquest, which they have long aimed at, and have so frequently attempted within the last fifty or sixty years.

Stimulated by success, the late Madhajee Scindeah had scarcely gained complete possession of the countries which separated the Mahratta empire from the Nabob Vizier's dominions, when he meditated an attack on the Punjaub, and pushing his conquests in that direction to the banks of the Indus: with this view, he laboured incessantly to augment and discipline his regular infantry, which was formed into battalions and brigades, com

manded by European officers, on the plan of the corps in the Company's service; and in casting

brass field-pieces, and manufactur ing musquetry for these corps. But before this project was ripe for execution, his attention was called off by affairs in the Deccan, and he proceeded to Poonah in 1793-4, attended by a division of his regular troops, &c. The war soon after ensued with the Nizam, in which his army suffered a total defeat, owing chiefly to the ability of General Perron, and the good conduct of Scindeah's regular troops under his command. But all Scindeah's ambitious designs were soon after cut short by a premature and unexpected death. His nephew, Dowlat Rao Scindeah, succeeded him, a daring, bold, unprincipled young man, of very considerable ability, and inheriting all his uncle's ambition and thirst for power; this prince had not long ascended the Musnud, when the accidental death of the Peishwa opened a wide and promising field to his ambilious views; and so seducing, as to divert his attention from returning to Hindustan, to prosecute his uncle's plans of conquest; but the dissentions which ensued at Poonah are well known: suffice it then to say, that Scindeah, after a long and arduous struggle, finding himself unable to accomplish his views, began at length seriously to turn his thoughts on returning to Hindustan.

To the peculiar circumstances, then, in which the Mahrattas have been placed of late years, first in obtaining and securing their conquests on this side of India, and next in the dissentions which have prevailed among their chiefs at Poonah, since the death of Madhajee Scindeah, and of the late Peishwa,