ment. The more patriotic and loyal portion of our press have been too much content with a defensive attitude on this point, when the scoffer and the slanderer of his own country's honor should have been shamed into silence by the crushing rebuke of a just indignation. We have been content with deferentially disputing and calmly disproving his charges--sometimes with little more than simply parrying or palliating them. Now we wholly deny that there is anything in this case of Annexation, so far as regards the rights of Mexico, or any relations of ours to her, to cast a shadow upon the honor of our country. There is no prima facie case even, against us. There is no color of truth in her charges, insolently though she may parade her ridiculous protests through the courts of the two worlds. On the contrary, all that there has been of violence and wrong, of cruelty and treachery, of abuse of force over supposed weakness and dependence, has been on her side, throughout all this history of the origin, growth, and emancipation of the State of Texas. Whereas, on the other hand, our conduct has been characterized by a degree of generous forbearance, of regard for even the appearances of good faith and national justice, carried to a point only this side of quixotism, and certainly far beyond any precedent as yet afforded us in the history of any civilized nation on the face of the globe.

We propose briefly to go over this ground. We recognize our obligation at this time to do so, in response to the action which (at the date of the present article) Mexico appears to be taking in regard to the Annexation of Texas. That obligation is the more imperative from the fact of the vast disparity between us in power and resources for the forcible maintenance of our respective rights. The obligation would be still stronger, were Mexico a still feebler power. We would not consent to be placed in the wrong, in a national dispute with the mightiest sovereignty in either hemisphere-still less with one of the weakest and meanest. Hence the duty of a distinct exposition of the true merits of this case between Mexico and ourselves, at the present 'moment, even though at the cost of the recapitulation of views and arguments already familiar to the public, and already amply covered by the discussion

of the question at some of its former stages, in previous articles of this Review.

The Mexican argument against us is this-that Texas is a revolted province, with which she is rightfully engaged in a war for resubjugation, and that by its annexation to our Union, we do her a threefold wrong; namely,

That we violate the Boundary Treaty between us, of April 5th, 1831, by which we established the Sabine as the boundary between the two countries.

That we violate the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of the same date, by a step which is a virtual act of war, since it involves the assumption of an existing war between her and Texas.

And that we commit an act of aggression and spoliation, and assumption of an existing war, in violation of international law, even without the special obligations imposed by our treaties.

This is her argument, and her assumption of the state of the facts involved in the argument.-Very well; let us look first to the two treaty questions, thus brought into the front of the case.

And first as to the Boundary Treaty. This was simply a treaty determining the boundary between the two countries, with reference to all then existing rights and claims. It was nothing more nor less than the transfer to Mexico, now become independent of Spain, of that mutual recognition of boundaries which had been agreed upon with Spain, by the Florida treaty, of 1819. By the treaty of 1819, the Sabine was declared the boundary as between the United States and Spain; by that of 1831, with Mexico, the same boundary was recognized between us and Mexico. A treaty of this kind is certainly a mutual abandonment of all existing territorial claims founded on any rights existing at that date; and so far as regards the argument sometimes advanced in the pro-Annexation discussions, that any unexhausted or unforfeited rights remained to us by virtue of the original Louisiana treaty (under which we had claimed to the Del Norte), this boundary treaty of 1819 and 1831 was certainly conclusive against us. But it is equally clear that it has no bearing whatever upon new rights accruing in the course of subsequent events, by which a portion of the Mexican territory should become disintegrated from its main bulk,

and converted into a separate state, rightfully independent and sovereign, and entitled to form any alliance or union with us or any other power, as it may deem proper. As by the establishment of the independence of Mexico, our former boundary treaty with Spain became justly applicable to the new sovereignty, rightfully entitled to, and in fact possessing the same country; so now by the subsequent establishment of the independence of Texas, the just applicability of the boundary treaty with Mexico, becomes transferred to the new state, to which alone it then has reference. This branch of the Mexican argument absurdly assumes that a boundary treaty is a perpetual guaranty of the continued cohesion of each other's territory, so as in truth to deny to either the right ever to recognize any separation of any portion of the territory of the other-whatever subsequent combination of circumstances may arise to cause and justify it. So, in the case of proprietors of adjacent landed estates, A and B, a boundary line may at one period be agreed upon, with a mutual quit-claim and abandonment of all anterior rights or pretensions; yet if a third party, C, should subsequently become vested with both legal and equitable title, and actual possession, of a certain portion of the land of B, lying adjacent to that of A, it is very certain that A is guilty of no wrong against B -no violation of the original quit-claim agreement by afterwards becoming the purchaser of the tract belonging to and held by C. That agreement retains no further efficacy than for the protection of C against A, whom it still restrains from transcending the boundary line agreed upon, without the consent of C, now become the owner of the adjacent tract. But why waste time and space to illustrate a truth so plain in itself—that a boundary treaty is no treaty of guaranty for the future integrity of the respective territories; and that, while it is a mutual abandonment of all past or present claims beyond the established boundary, it has no conceivable reference to any new rights which may accrue to either party through subsequent events, or by the introduction of third parties into the relation between the original two. If a boundary treaty is to be construed into the effect now claimed for it by the

Mexican argument, by what right could the very treaty in question have been concluded between the U. S. and Mexico, precluded as we were by the subsisting agreement of boundaries with Spain by the treaty of 1819? The Mexican argument, on this head, explodes itself, by assuming a principle whose first application and effect must be to annul the very treaty to which it itself appeals. It is evident that, so far as regards the country in dispute, Texas now stands between us and Mexico on precisely the same footing as she herself, Mexico, stood between us and Spain. Spain's formal recognition of the independence of Mexico was not made till after the treaty of 1831.

So much for the Boundary Treaty, which evidently has no more bearing on the real merits of the question, than Mr. Cushing's late treaty between the United States and the Ta Tsing Empire.

This brings us to the other treaty of the same date, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation. By this we pledged ourselves to maintain perpetual peace with Mexico-which of course forbids our ever engaging in any other war with her than one defensive against her aggression, or made justifiable by her violation and abrogation of the treaty. The Mexican argument now is, that inasmuch as she is "at war" with Texas, we by annexing Texas adopt that war, and place ourselves ipso facto in a state of war with her-of course aggressively, and in violation of the treaty. Let us examine this point closely and clearly.

Assume the Annexation to be completed, and the sovereignty of Texas to be merged into the broader and higher sovereignty of the Union of which it then becomes a small fraction; retaining indeed its sovereignty in regard to internal affairs (subject only to the obligations of the federal Constitution), but having wholly parted with it in regard to all foreign relations. What then has become of the war between Texas and Mexico? Why, Texas, as a body politic capable of any foreign relations, whether of peace or war, has ceased to exist. Her war is as much at an end, as in a litigation between individuals, the death of the one terminates it, as between those parties,—or as in the Humeric combat between Paris and Menelaus, when the former is sud

denly borne off by his patron-goddess in a cloud, nothing is left but the empty air to receive the blows of the remaining party to the engagement. By the annexation, Mexico is brought up face to face with a new party, the United States. It is not we who assume the War of Texas, but Texas which, merging itself into our political being, comes ipso facto into our existing relation of Peace. It is with us that Mexico now has to deal. We are now the only other party in the case-and it takes two to make a war as well as a bargain. We are in a state of peace with Mexico, peace guarantied by treaty. The question then arising is simply, whether such a step on our part is, or is not, a sufficient cause for Mexico to declare war against us? Perhaps it may beperhaps not. This will depend on various considerations, both of fact and of right. All we are here contending for is, that Annexation is not an adoption of the war of Texas, but at the worst, only the performance of an act which may possibly give Mexico a right to declare war against us.

Of the considerations which are to determine that point, we must be the judge on our side, and Mexico on hers; the general reason and conscience of mankind, between us two.

If the preponderance of those considerations be against us, then would the act of annexation be a departure, more or less decided, from the spirit of the treaty in question. If not, not.

So far as regards the letter of the treaty, it is not at any rate a violation of it. Texas, we repeat, comes within the embrace of our existing peace; precisely as, if the case were reversed, and we were at war and Texas at peace, by coming into the Union she would come within the scope of our existing war.

Before the country thus annihilated so far as regards its sovereignty, merged itself by annexation into the political being of another, the nation which was then engaged in war with it may have had certain grounds of quarrel, which it maintained by force because justice was refused it, by the imperfect moral sense or imperfect intelligence of its opponent. But it by no means follows that that refusal of justice would be continued by the new and enlarged party, to whose control the matter in dispute would thus become transferred. Texas by herself, while an independent sovereignty, might

insist on certain grounds in her relations with Mexico, which the Union, of which Texas would become by Annexation only a small fraction, might regard with a very different eye. We by no means intend to admit that in the instance of Texas there was any injustice done to Mexico, which might perhaps be corrected by the more enlarged views and action of the Union. We give the statement of the case in this form for argument's sake, only to make the plainer the truth, that Annexation under such circumstances is no act of war, no adoption of a pending war-(even admitting anything resembling an actual war to have been pending between the two). Even supposing Mexico to have been the object of any wrongful treatment on the part of Texas justifying war, the only effect would be that Mexico would then have to address her complaints and her reclamations to the new party brought into the case. Perhaps they would be received in a very different spirit than before. Possibly the equity of all Mexico's demands might be recognized, and full right done her in the premises. Perhaps it might be by indemnification-perhaps by restoration of all the territory in dispute-perhaps by a renewed boundary treaty, with the Sabine again fixed as the limit. Who knows? The probability of such a result as the latter might not indeed be great-but how can Mexico know even that, until she has tried-until she has exhausted the mode provided by our existing treaty of amity for the adjustment of disputes-until she has asked and been refused satisfaction or arbitration? And in regard to the former result, what right has she to assume that ample satisfaction would not be done her, by an appeal to the liberality and justice of onr government and people-satisfaction going perhaps to the full extent of making her rejoiced and grateful for the bargain? It is very certain that no small amount of encouragement has been held out to her to expect such a disposition on our part, not only through manifold organs of public sentiment but through distinct and direct overtures of our government itself. It would be time enough for Mexico to think of war-to fancy herself aggrieved at all by usafter having in vain appealed to these chances of redress; especially when she may read in her existing treaty with us such a provision as the following:

"If (what cannot indeed be expected) any of the articles contained in the present treaty shall be violated or infracted in any manner whatever, it is stipulated that neither of the contracting parties will order or authorize any acts of reprisal, or declare war against the other on complaint of injuries or damages, until the said party, considering itself offended, shall first have presented to the other a statement of such injuries or damages, verified by competent proofs, and demanded justice and satisfaction, and the same shall have been refused or unnecessarily delayed."

This line of reasoning, not the less just and sound because it may be nice and strict, disposes satisfactorily of the Mexican argument on the ground of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation-so far, at least, as we have carried the reasoning. Remains then to examine these considerations of fact and right, on which must depend whether Annexation is, or is not, a departure from the spirit of that treaty.

And these hinge mainly on the question of the legitimacy and completeness of the independence of Texas. If Texas is not really and truly independent, but bears towards Mexico the relation pretended by the latter, of a merely insurgent province, justly liable to reconquest, and probably about to be reconquered, then Annexation would be an act of aggression upon Mexican territory, such as to justify war. But if, on the other hand, Texas is really and truly independent of Mexico, so as to bear no longer, if ever she bore, such a provincial relation, as a constituent and subject portion of the Mexican territory, then Annexation is no infringement of any right of Mexico, and it is no just or reasonable cause of war. How then stands this question of fact—the fact of Independence?

It may stand on either of two grounds -or it may stand on them both united. Either, the independence of Texas

may be a simple consummated fact-un fail accompli-respecting which it would be immaterial whether a just moral right lay at its origin or not. It would be enough that the thing were donefinished-settled-beyond any power of Mexico to undo it--Texas being as powerful to repel invasion as Mexico to attempt reconquest.

Or, it may be a moral right, unsupported, or only doubtfully supported, by an adequate physical force for its maintenance against the wrongful menaced aggression.

In either of these two cases, the other nations of the world have a perfect right to assume the Independence in question, and to act on that assumption. The former case needs no argument, beyond its own statement. Nor is the latter any less clear. Take the case of Switzerland, rightfully independent of Austria. Suppose it to be wrongfully menaced by the gigantic power of the latter, it would have a perfect right to incorporate itself into the realm of France, and France would be therein acting perfectly in her right; so as to make a declaration of war by Austria against France an act of unmitigated wrong and aggression, unjustifiable to man, and unblessed by God.

To apply these principles to the case before us, we might stop at the first-named ground of independence, namely, the unquestionable independence de facto. Or we might pass it over, and prove for Texas the other ground alone, namely, the independence de jure. Or, better still, we may show the happy combination of the two, in justification of our national position on this question. And that is what there is no difficulty in doing.

We do not propose here to go minutely into the historical facts of the case. Without narrating, it will suffice to indicate them. Texas never bore any other relation to Mexico than a federative one. She declared her independence of Spain in 1813,* as a