II.

dable to the government, and upon many occa- CHA P. fions intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who fupports every propofal for ftrengthening this monopoly, is fure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whofe numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public fervices, can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from perfonal infults, nor fometimes from real danger, arifing from the infolent outrage of furious and difappointed monopolifts.

THE undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being fuddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, fhould be obliged to abandon his trade, would no doubt fuffer very confiderably. That part of his capital which had ufually been employed in purchafing materials and in paying his workmen, might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another employment. But that part of it which was fixed in workhoufes, and in the inftruments of trade, could scarce be difpofed of without confiderable lofs. The equitable regard, therefore, to his intereft requires that changes of this kind fhould never be introduced fuddenly, but flowly, gradually, and after a very long warning. The legiflature, were it poffible that its deliberations could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity

BOOK importunity of partial interefts, but by an exIV. tensive view of the general good, ought upon this

very account, perhaps, to be particularly careful neither to establish any new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already established. Every fuch regulation introduces fome degree of real diforder into the conftitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure without occafioning another diforder.

How far it may be proper to impofe taxes upon the importation of foreign goods, in order, not to prevent their importation, but to raise a revenue for government, I fhall confider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are evidently as deftructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of trade.

CHA P. III.

Of the extraordinary Restraints upon the Importation of Goods of almost all Kinds, from thofe Countries with which the Balance is fuppofed to be difadvantageous.

PART I.

Of the Unreasonableness of thofe Restraints even upon the Principles of the Commercial Syftem.

III.

O lay extraordinary restraints upon the im- CHA P. portation of goods of almost all kinds, from those particular countries with which the balance of trade is fuppofed to be difadvantageous, is the fecond expedient by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and filver. Thus in Great Britain, Silefia lawns may be imported for home confumption, upon paying certain duties. But French cambrics and lawns are prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be warehoufed for exportation. Higher duties are impofed upon the wines of France than upon thofe of Portugal, or indeed of any other country. By what is called the impoft 1692, a duty of five and twenty per cent., of the rate or value, was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other nations were, the greater part of them, fubjected to much lighter duties, feldom exceedVOL. II.

P

ing

IV.

BOOK ing five per cent. The wine, brandy, falt and vinegar of France were indeed excepted; these commodities being fubjected to other heavy duties, either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the fame law. In 1696, a fecond duty of twenty-five per cent., the first not having been thought a sufficient discouragement, was impofed upon all French goods, except brandy; together with a new duty of five and twenty pounds upon the ton of French wine, and another of fifteen pounds, upon the ton of French vinegar. French goods have never been omitted in any of those general fubfidies, or duties of five per cent., which have been impofed upon all, or the greater part of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one third and two third fubfidies as making a complete fubfidy between them, there have been five of thefe general fubfidies; fo that before the commencement of the prefent war feventy-five per cent. may be confidered as the lowest duty, to which the greater part of the goods of the growth, produce, or manufacture of France were liable. But upon the greater part of goods, thofe duties are equivalent to a prohibition. The French in their turn have, I believe, treated our goods and manufactures juft as hardly; though I am not fo well acquainted with the particular hardships which they have impofed upon them. Thofe mutual restraints have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations, and smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into France, or of French goods

into Great Britain. The principles which I have CHA P.
been examining in the foregoing chapter took
their origin from private intereft and the spirit
of monopoly; thofe which I am going to exa-
mine in this, from national prejudice and ani-
mofity. They are, accordingly, as might well
be expected, still more unreasonable. They are
fo, even upon the principles of the commercial
system.

FIRST, though it were certain that in the cafe of a free trade between France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France, it would by no means follow that fuch a trade would be disadvantageous to England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than those of Portugal, or its linens than thofe of Germany, it would be more advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign linen which it had occafion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany. Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the fame quality were cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the cafe, even upon the fuppofition that the whole French goods imported were to be confumed in Great Britain.

BUT, fecondly, a great part of them might be re-exported to other countries, where, being fold with profit, they might bring back à return equal