the greater portion of its personnel, as occasion arose, from the seamen who manned the mercantile marine. It could fairly be argued that even if a particular measure had the result of decreasing the total volume of trade, its effects were beneficial if the increased proportion carried under the national flag led to an increase in the aggregate tonnage of English shipping. It was on the ground that ' defence is of much more importance 'than opulence' that Adam Smith held the Act of Navigation to be perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations 'of England,' although he considered that it was 'not favour' able to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that opulence 'which can arise from it.'*

This argument was somewhat weakened by the provision of a regular establishment for the Royal Navy, but the circumstances of the present war have led both to a great extension of the auxiliary services, manned chiefly by merchant seamen, and to the necessity of relying for the carriage of our war-time trade on vessels armed for defence. Το a greater extent than at any time since the introduction of iron and steam the ships and men of the merchant service have been called upon to play a part in keeping open our maritime communications which could not be played by neutral carriers, however willing, and the development of the mercantile marine as a measure of national defence has again come into prominence. At the same time, it is no longer possible to draw any clear distinction between the requirements of national defence and those of commercial prosperity. The importance of financial stability in the conduct of war is immeasurably greater than at any previous period, and while we shall readily concede to Dr. Holdsworth that national safety must take precedence of national wealth, we must not forget that wealth is itself a vital element of national strength, and that the expansion of shipping must be sought, if possible, by means which are not inimical to trade. With these considerations in mind, let us examine, very briefly, the course of the legislation by which our ancestors sought to promote the expansion of the mercantile marine.

The first attempt to encourage native shipping by confining the carriage of goods to and from English ports to vessels

* 'Wealth of Nations,' Book IV., Chap. 2.

flying the national flag was made so early as the reign of Richard II. In 1381 a law was passed forbidding any subject of the King to ship any merchandise outward or homeward except in ships of the King's liegence.* A single year was sufficient to prove that this Act was unworkable owing to the lack of available tonnage, and in 1382 it was modified by permission to employ foreign vessels in cases where English ships could not be obtained.† Under Richard II. himself, Edward VI., Henry VII., and Henry VIII. similar measures were enacted, confining either the whole import and export trade, or particular branches of it, to native shipping; but the majority of these Acts were either allowed to fall into disuse or mitigated by the granting of licences, and the only case in which any considerable measure of protection was secured to English shipowners for a long period was that of the trade in Gascony wines and Toulouse woad. Even in this case there were not wanting protests as to the costliness and inefficiency of the policy, as may be seen from the preamble to an Act of Edward VI., introducing certain modifications into the system on the ground that the restrictions placed upon the trade caused these articles to be 'sold at such excessive price 'as hath not before been seen within this realm,' and that the navy was 'thereby never the better maintained.'§

Apart from the increase of prices and the difficulty of finding sufficient native tonnage, the great obstacle to effective enforcement of these early Navigation Acts was the fear of retaliation on the part of foreign Powers, and the preamble to an Act passed in the first year of Elizabeth, suspending the whole of the previous legislation on the subject, is well worth pondering to-day, when the revival of a restrictive policy is suggested. In this preamble it is somewhat naively stated that:

'Other foreign Princes, finding themselves aggrieved with the said several Acts, as thinking that the same were made to the hurt and prejudice of their country and navy, have made like penal laws against such as should ship out of their countries in any other

5 Ric. II., Stat. I., c. 3.

† 6 Ric. II., Stat. I., c. 8. i Hen. VII., c. 8; 4 Hen.

14 Ric. II., c. 6; 3 Edw. IV., c. 1; VII., c. 10; 7 Hen. VIII., c. 2 ; 23 Hen. VIII., c. 7; 32 Hen. VIII.,

C. 14.

§ 5 & 6 Edw. VI., c. 18.

vessels than of their several cou tries and dominions, by reason whereof there hath not only grown great displeasure between the foreign Princes and the Kings of this realm, but also the merchants have been sore grieved and endamaged.'*

The ineradicable tendency of foreign Princes' to make 'like penal laws' to those passed by British parliaments was destined at a later date to play an important part in breaking up a much more elaborate restrictive system.

At a later period of Elizabeth's reign the coasting trade was reserved to English shipping, the restrictions on the Bordeaux trade were revived, and several attempts were made to encourage the building of fishing vessels by the enforcement of fast days and restrictions on the import of foreign cured fish.† So far as concerns the foreign trade, however, the system prevailing under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts was, generally speaking, that of free choice between native and foreign shipping, subject only to the payment of aliens' duty on goods imported in foreign vessels.

The real cause of the expansion in English trade and shipping which marked the Tudor period must be sought in the progress of social and economic developments at home, in the opening up of new markets by exploration and by a wisely conceived series of commercial treaties, and in the creation of a strong, efficient, and permanent Royal Navy. Under the first two Stuart kings the spirit of enterprise decayed, the efficiency of the navy declined, and piracy flourished with unexampled freedom. In such circumstances the competition of the Dutch, then at the height of their political and economic prosperity, was far too strong to be successfully resisted, and the bulk of the world's carrying trade fell into the hands of Dutch shipowners. Meanwhile the progress of colonization had developed new markets and new sources of supply in America and the West Indies, and there was every reason to fear that this trade also would fall into the hands of the Dutch.‡

Under the vigorous government of the Commonwealth

r Eliz., C. I3.

† See 5 Eliz., c. 5; 23 Eliz., c. 17, etc. The failure of the import restrictions to effect their purpose is acknowledged in the preamble to 30 Eliz., c. 10.

See Child's New Discourse of Trade,' 1698, pp. 195, 196.

and Protectorate it was not likely that the nation would tamely acquiesce in this condition of permanent inferiority, and so soon as the naval strength of the country had been reorganized the demand for some effective measure of protection became irresistible. Political animosity accentuated the irritation arising from commercial jealousy, and the Navigation Act of 1651 was inspired equally by the hope of encouraging English trade and shipping and by that of striking a blow at the prosperity of the rival republic. At the conclusion of the war which followed the Dutch found themselves compelled to acquiesce in the restrictions imposed by the Act, and on the restoration of the Stuarts a new Navigation Act was immediately passed, embodying and amplifying the provisions of Cromwell's law, and laying down the general lines followed by English policy with regard to trade and navigation during nearly the next two centuries.*

By the Navigation Act of 1660 it was provided that no goods or commodities of the growth, production, or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America should be imported into England or Ireland except in ships owned in England or the Plantations, of which the master and three-fourths of the crew were English subjects. As regards the European trade, it was provided that Russian and Turkish products, together with certain specified commodities in the case of other countries, including practically all the principal articles of trade, should only be imported in English ships or in ships belonging to the country of origin, or to that from which they could only be or usually were first shipped for transportation. When brought in such foreign ships they were to pay special duties. Further, with a view to attacking the transit as well as the carrying trade of the Netherlands, it was enacted that no goods or commodities of foreign origin should be imported from any part of the world except from the producing country direct, or from the ports at which such goods could only be, or most usually were, first shipped.

In addition to these restrictions on the foreign trade, the coasting traffic was rigidly reserved to English shipping;

12 Car. II., c. 18, confirmed by 13 Car. II., c. 14. For Cromwell's Law see' Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum' under date October 9, 1651.

but the greatest care and ingenuity of those who drafted the Act were expended on the regulation of the Plantation trade. Not only was it provided that no goods whatsoever should be imported into or exported from any of the English possessions overseas except in English or colonial vessels, but the Plantations were actually prohibited from shipping many of their principal products direct to any part of the world except to England and Ireland or to other colonial ports. Three years later a further Act was passed providing that no European goods should be shipped to the Plantations except from England and Wales and in ships built as well as owned in this country. Still later the permission to ship to Ireland direct was rescinded, and in 1696 the fabric was completed by an enactment that no goods should be imported into or exported from any of the Plantations, or carried from one Plantation to another, except in ships built and owned in England or the Plantations, and that English ships engaging in the Plantation trade should be registered for the purpose.*

The effect of this mixed colonial and commercial system was to make the entire carrying trade of the Plantations an English monopoly, and to constitute England and Wales the sole distributing centre for the greater part of their produce and the entrepôt through which they must draw all supplies of foreign origin. Moreover, it reserved to English shipowners the carriage of practically the entire volume of the English import trade, with the exception of goods of European origin shipped in vessels belonging to the producing country. A more sweeping measure of protection could hardly be devised; that it was not extended to exports from England to the Continent was probably only because most European countries themselves prohibited imports in any but national vessels.

Such were the provisions of the celebrated Navigation Acts which have been described as the foundation of our maritime greatness, and which it is now proposed in some form to revive. The advocates of such revival naturally base their argument upon the undoubted expansion in English shipping which took place during the period of their enforcement; but before considering the effect of the Acts it is necessary to look for a moment at the conditions in which they were to operate.

* 15 Car. II., c. 7; 22 & 23 Car. II., c. 26; 7 & 8 Guil. III., c. 22.