'leges Angliæ mutari.' A 'democratic' parliament will surely not claim for English laws the virtues or vices of those of the Medes and Persians. Probably one real reason underlying the present objection to allow legitimation by subsequent marriage is a desire to punish the parties-especially the woman-for 'immorality.' As the woman cannot now be stoned, the modern Pharisee punishes her by injuring her innocent children.

Some of the arguments in favour of 'legitimation by subsequent marriage' may be summarized :

(1) It would encourage and assist a man to perform the paramount duty of doing all he can for the welfare of those for whose existence he is responsible.

(2) It would be some inducement to him to discharge a duty to the woman, who has given herself to him and become the mother of his children, by turning a union which is not lawful, but which cannot be terminated without cruelty to the woman if attached to him, into one which is recognized and lawful and may result in happy family life.

(3) It would tend to relieve the innocent progeny of an irregular union from a stigma they have done nothing to deserve, and to open opportunities in life to them from which they are at present often debarred. If the parent has not made provision by will, the law would do what the parent ought to have done, instead of setting an evil example by holding that such children have no claim on their father's property.

(4) It would bring English law into harmony with the law of Scotland and of many of the colonies and continental countries. At present the question of a person's legitimacy and his right to inherit his father's property may be the subject of sharp controversy between Scottish and English courts. The decision will depend on the question of the father's domicile, and the result of such a litigation is hard to predict.

(5) To those who hold the opinion that the law of the Church ought to have any influence on the law of the State affecting questions of this kind, the fact that 'legitimatio per sub'sequens matrimonium' has been regularly recognized by the civil and canon law ought to carry some weight. The Emperor Constantine, acting in accordance with the spirit

of the religion he had adopted, decreed that children born to persons living in concubinage should become legitimate on the subsequent marriage of their parents, but this was afterwards decided to be confined to the case of children already living when the law was passed. The object was no doubt to give an inducement to marry instead of continuing an irregular relationship. Justinian went further and established the general principle of legitimation by subsequent marriage. Even where a master had had children by a slave he could-if he had no legitimate childrenenfranchise and then marry her, and by these acts alone the children became free and legitimate.

To judge of the value of the arguments against the proposed change one cannot do better than refer to our old friend Blackstone, who may be taken as an able advocate when he has any case. He states four reasons for which we may suppose the peers to have acted at the Parliament ' of Merton, where they refused to enact that children born 'before marriage should be esteemed legitimate.' One specimen must suffice:

'The rule of the Roman Law admits of no limitations as to the time or number of bastards so to be legitimatized, but a dozen of them may twenty years after their birth, by the subsequent marriage of their parents, be admitted to all the privileges of legitimate children. This is plainly a great discouragement to the matrimonial state, to which one main inducement is usually not only the desire of having children, but also the desire of procreating lawful heirs.'

What morals! A man lives with a woman; they are faithful to each other 'many years; they have a dozen or 'more' children; they are bound to one another and to their children by every natural tie; yet Blackstone argues that the law ought to encourage the man to desert the woman with whom he has lived, and the children whom he has begotten. They are to be cast on the world as filii nullius and he is to be encouraged to marry another woman in order to procreate lawful heirs.' The dozen may starve, though their father is a millionaire, and the other woman's child will be legally entitled to take all. It may be said perhaps that this is an over-statement, for if any of the first family are under sixteen years of age the mother may get an order

from the magistrates for a contribution of five shillings a week for the support of each. By all means let us not overlook this munificent provision of English law. It means that if a millionaire has, say, four illegitimate children by four different women the law will compel him to pay fifty-two pounds a year for the lot. When the child has turned sixteen the father's liabilities either to mother or child cease. It is true that if he has seduced any of the women under promise of marriage he may have to pay damages for breach of contract; but even this remedy is now objected to, and some professed law reformers advocate the abolition of this protection for a woman who has been deceived. A civilized community ought to get rid, root and branch, of the doctrine that a child born out of wedlock is a filius nullius, and ought to recognize that a father has a paramount moral duty to do what he can to educate and to maintain throughout childhood all those whom his act has brought into the world.

A still more important subject is the reform of the law of divorce. Conditions arising partly out of the war have rendered it more urgent than ever. It has already been made the subject of careful and prolonged enquiry and a mass of evidence has been collected. The labours of Lord Gorell's Commission ought not to be thrown away, though the death of its chairman has deprived the country of one whose sound judgment, kind heart, and wide experience would have been of inestimable value when the reform of the marriage law comes before parliament. Plain speech and fearless recognition of facts will indeed be needed when this subject is brought forward. In all legislation, all political action, it has to be remembered that in the familyin the life of the true home-is to be found the basis of what is best in national life, the guarantee for security, the hope for real progress and diffused happiness. But recognition of the sanctity of family life must not be used as an excuse to justify the continuation of a state of the law which is responsible for much human misery and moral wrong. Το many minds-though the sincerity of those who take a contrary view is not denied-it appears unspeakably shocking that divine sanction should be claimed for the indissolubility of the marriage tie " er circumstances which make its continuance revolti

best ins of humanity.

Another matter to which increased importance has been given by the war is the failure of the English law to recognize the adoption of children. There are many war orphans, and the number grows daily. Simultaneously from many homes the joy of young life has passed away, and the hope for the future has gone. Further, the inequality in the numbers of women and of men has increased. There are very many women in whom the maternal instinct is strong, but who will never be able to have children of their own. The reason given by the Roman legislator for allowing adoption by women-ad solatium liberorum amissorum adoptare possunt-applies now in England with painful force as never before. Although private arrangements are now often made by which a relative or a stranger takes the custody of a child, provides for and directs its maintenance and education, and acts generally in loco parentis towards it, adoption in the sense of the transfer of parental rights and duties in respect of a child to another person and their assumption by that person is not recognized by the law of England. The law as to the position of those who place themselves in loco parentis is vague and unsatisfactory.

The time has come for the law of England to provide, as the laws of many other countries do, regular methods of adoption establishing definite parental and filial rights and duties as between the adopting parent and adopted child. Roman law, Hindu law, and other systems have elaborate provisions on the subject. No doubt the basic ideas underlying these were generally due to religions which required the performance of certain rites and the continued maintenance of family worship, but some valuable hints may be derived both from ancient and existing laws in other countries on the subject. The aim is to secure that children who have not the advantage of proper parental or maternal care, and for whom no financial provision would otherwise be made, should be able to acquire a legally recognized position with regard to those persons who wish to undertake the duty of bringing them up and of providing for them. As in Rome, the act of adoption should be sanctioned by some public authority, such as a judge or magistrate, who should be satisfied of the good faith and competence of the adoptive parents, of the probable benefit to the adopted child, and of NO. 466.

VOL. 228.

the consent of the natural parents, if any, unless by criminal conduct or very gross neglect the latter had forfeited their rights. The child itself should also be examined unless too young to have any feeling on the subject. Care would be required in defining exactly what rights of succession to property should be given to the adopted child. For example, it would not be right to treat them as heirs of the body where estates are settled in tail with remainders to collaterals. On the other hand, adopted children—at least if there are no others-should have rights of succession as regards property to which their adoptive parent was absolutely entitled. It might perhaps be desirable to have different forms of adoption recognized as giving rights of greater or less extent, and the act of adoption should be recorded and registered by some official person.

We pass to a different branch of law which needs reform, namely, the law as to murder and manslaughter. At present a number of different classes of acts are all treated alike as murder, and death is the sentence decreed by the law, whatever the judge's view may be, although the moral character of, and the social damage caused by, such acts differ as widely as the poles. In some cases of murder where, according to the law, the accused must be hanged, the sympathy of even good and thoughtful people is largely with the criminal. An offence-a crime-has been committed, but the carrying out of the prescribed sentence would be a greater crime, an outrage on the moral sense and best instincts of humanity. In spite of the great reforms in the law relating to the punishment of crime since the time of Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir James Mackintosh, we still need to be reminded that 'it is one of the greatest evils which can befall a country 'when the criminal law and the virtuous feelings of the 'community are in hostility to each other.'

The acts now treated as murder should be differentiated and classified. Murder in the first degree should be limited to the cases where the act is done deliberately, where there is really malice aforethought, where the death of the victim is really intended, is in fact the aim of the accused, and where there has been no serious provocation. The death penalty shop mited to such cases. This rule would of actsvarying degree of

exclude a