well-irrigated and cotton-growing land, they have not succeeded in winning the sympathies of the people, who have maintained what is, after all, only an enforced loyalty. Their hostility has not been tempered by prosperity; rather it has been intensified by it, even among the wandering Turkomans, who never before had the assured incomes they now derive by securing employment in Russian textile industries, but earned instead a precarious livelihood by attacking the Ameer's Kafilas. Russia, in the days of Tsardom, had to lay a firm hand on the province, which, although seething with discontent, was rapidly becoming one of its richest Asian assets. When the revolution broke out, half of Russia's cotton supply was being drawn from Turkestan. For several successive seasons as much as 13,697,000 poods were sent to Orenburg from Tashkend. Prior to the war the bulk of the Russian cotton supply was imported from Germany, but from 1914 until the outbreak of the revolution the Russian Government very wisely bestowed great attention on their Mid-Eastern provinces, and especially upon Turkestan, whose cotton output advanced by leaps and bounds. Germany was thus confronted by the unpleasant prospect that one of the inevitable results of the war would be the ruin of its cotton trade with Russia, owing to the rapid development of Russia's own cotton production. In addition to developing the cotton industries, Russia has also in Turkestan done much for agriculture. Wheat and barley have been grown in rapidly increasing quantities, and the cultivable areas are capable of great extension in the future. Gold and salt are found in the Ural Sea area.

Enough has been said in this connexion to indicate that Russian Turkestan is a rich and tempting enough prize to attract the Germans. Berlin, as has been indicated, is well aware of the sentiments of the Turkomans regarding Russia, and may be expected to take full advantage of this knowledge. The average Turkoman consistently regards the Russians as intruders, and this feeling has hardened into a political principle. He is accustomed, as I can freely assert from personal knowledge, to regard the activities of the Russians as being intended to benefit themselves chiefly. Outsiders may criticize this attitude. It is sufficient for the student of politics to recognize it. There can be no doubt about its reality. One of the causes of this prevailing discontent is the bitterness of

the Turkomans who still remember the gross severities suffered during the early stages of Russian intrusion. Another cause is the attitude of the Khan of Bokhara who has never been able to realize that the management of Turkestan concerns any other than his own infallible self. The Khan is sure to make a bid for full control of the provinces should opportunity offer. He is a powerful potentate, and if backed up by a strong force and liberally supplied with funds, would undoubtedly exercise his influence in assisting to throw off the Russian yoke. He would not find it difficult to fan the embers of discontent in Russian Turkestan. Should it happen that the Khan may prefer not to co-operate in a German penetration of the province, a breath to fan the dormant embers into flame could be blown from Germany.

German influence may penetrate more rapidly than is fully realized in this country. Bribery, at a time like the present, will assuredly accomplish much in Russia and in Central Asia. German gold can buy a not inconsiderable degree of Russian support; it can also purchase the allegiance of influential native agitators in Turkestan. In Bokhara, German gold may similarly' work magic'; it would undoubtedly accomplish more than German bayonets and with much more dispatch. Indeed, German gold may cause trouble as far south as the Khyber, for it could be freely distributed with effect in stirring up the Uzbek party.

Of one thing there can be no doubt, and that is the gravity of the situation from the Ameer's point of view. Let us therefore survey briefly the outlook as it appears to His Majesty the Ameer and to his people. On the north-east of Afghanistan lies the Khanate of Bokhara; to the north and north-west is Russian Turkestan and westward lies Persia; to the southwest is the province of Seistan. By each of these states or provinces the Ameer's kingdom is more or less threatened; in certain of them there are smouldering antipathies and rivalries resembling those which have created the Balkan problem in Europe.

There is Persia, in the first place. The Persians want Herat ; the fertile and beautiful Herat district is the Macedonia or the Dobrudja of Central Asia. The ethnic affinities with Persia of a large proportion of the Heraties constitute a sentimental bond, and the Shia sect of Moslems predominates there as it VOL. 228. NO. 465.

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does in Persia. The Afghans are mainly adherents of the Moslem sect of Sunnis. Like the Persians, the Heraties are not good fighters. They are descendants of plain-dwellers of sedentary habits, inclined to indolence, and they are lacking in the hardy qualities of the Afghan mountaineers, with their intense love of liberty and inherited valour fostered by immemorial traditions. The Herat area has ever been a hotbed of intrigue, and would be found particularly susceptible of Germanic influence adroitly engineered. In the past it has been operated upon by Russian propaganda accompanied by systematic bribery. Even the Afghan officials and soldiers were being contaminated in the enervating and poisonous atmosphere of Herat. When, some years ago, the Ameer became aware of this, he issued an order that the Herat garrison should be changed every two months, and he took care that it should consist mainly of Kabul and Ghazni troops, that is, representatives of his most trusted subjects. The Herat question is one which is ever prone to cause friction between Persia and Afghanistan.

Seistan province, to the south-west, also constitutes another problem, and one liable at any moment to become acute. This extensive and low-lying area, sandwiched between Persia and Afghanistan, and divided between these Powers, as is the Basque country between France and Spain, is likewise a political hotbed. The population includes Armenians, Russian Jews, and Persian traders who, in the Afghan section, are far from being faithful adherents to the government of the Ameer. Liberally supplied with Russian funds, a section of the mixed population, and especially the commercial section, has for years pursued consistently and energetically the policy of promoting Russian trade in southern Afghanistan at the expense of Indo-British trade. So well have these Russian agents succeeded in their efforts that in many a town in southern Afghanistan scarcely a British or Indian article is to be seen.

On the north, Russian Turkestan has ever been a source of anxiety. The threat from this quarter is a very real one. Until recently it was the outpost in the mid-east of Russian power. To the Afghan it represented the claw of the Russian bear,' which seemed ever to be itching to clutch at a vital point in Afghanistan. The 'claw' already holds a district, which was wrested from Afghanistan in 1885, when Russian

encroachments almost brought about war between Russia and Great Britain. The negotiations conducted between the representatives of those great Powers had, however, a peaceful issue, but unfortunately at the expense of Afghanistan, for the determination of the frontier resulted in a decided gain to Russia. The Afghan town of Penjdeh was lost to the Ameer, and its loss is never likely to be forgotten. Wholly Afghan in sympathy as in race, Penjdeh and its area remains antiRussian to this day. Its position gave to Russia an immense trading advantage. Situated in the extremely fertile Hari Rud valley, it was an excellent prize in itself. It has also a decided strategic importance, being situated on the western edge of the Karabel plateau, the whole of which became Russian, although it is the natural frontier of Afghanistan.

Merv lies to the north and is connected with Penjdeh by railway. It was from the Merv area that the Tekke-Turkomans of old were wont to make their predatory attacks on Persia and Afghanistan; Merv is indeed the strategic key which unlocks the gate' to Maruchak and that' gate' is Penjdeh. The Russians have done their utmost to dominate the commercial life of northern Afghanistan and Persia from the Merv area, and, in accordance with this policy, goods are carried at greatly reduced rates over the Trans-Caspian railway. Thus the great trading centre of Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, is the commercial base for Russian Turkestan, and the starting-point for military expeditions into Central Asia. The Power which dominates the Caspian Sea and holds Merv has, either for military or trading purposes in Central Asia, an immense advantage, the value of which cannot be over-estimated. Should the Germans reach Baku in force, the commercial penetration of Russian Turkestan will at once become an imminent probability and that of Persia and Afghanistan an assured prospect. The same can be said of a military penetration. In this connexion one cannot overlook the great scheme recently referred to in German newspapers, to construct a canal from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and another from the Sea of Azov to the Caspian, by utilizing the river Don and its tributary, the Manitch, which connects a series of long narrow salt lakes. These canals are future possibilities. At present it is important to note that the trade

of the Caspian Sea is believed to be in possession of Germans or German agents, and the transportation of a German force from Baku to Krasnovodsk is less an imaginary contingency than is generally supposed in western Europe.

The next area from which a threat is ever possible, as the Ameer of Afghanistan fully realizes, is Bokhara. I have already indicated how the Germans could turn to account the anti-Russian sentiments of this province by bringing about in Russian Turkestan chaotic conditions which would be favourable to their policy of aggrandizement. As Herat and Maruchdak are threatened from Merv, so is Balkh from Bokhara city, with Kelif on the frontier as a 'spring-board' for starting from. An invading force which had India as its objective would not require in the first place to cross Afghanistan from Bokhara but could work round the eastern border into Chitral, so as to disturb that province with the liberal distribution of gold and munitions of war. By first setting Chitral in flame, the German invasion of India by way of Herat would be greatly facilitated.

The Ameer's anxieties regarding the integrity and defence of his kingdom should be and, as a matter of fact, are shared by all those in the British Empire who realize the importance of maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer state. A strong and friendly Afghanistan is a prime necessity for the future of India. About the reality of its friendship no doubt can now remain. The Ameer has been tested and not found wanting. The fact that his kingdom is likely to be threatened from the north will increase his power and unite his people and, withal, make them realize that their welfare depends on the consolidation of their friendship with British India. It may be remarked, in this connexion, that the Afghan has learned by experience to respect and appreciate British friendship. Great Britain has respected Afghan national ideals, and the friendship has not brought with it any loss of Afghan independence. Afghans know well, on the other hand, that the friendship of autocratic Russia in the past involved in the case of Bokhara the predomination in politics and commerce of a powerful neighbour. It is also fully realized that the independence of Afghanistan depends on the friendly interest of Great Britain. In short, Great Britain, is as much trusted as, in the immediate past, Russia was thoroughly distrusted, and Germany is