requirement-power not only at home but outside in all spheres of the world. Otherwise finance capital sees no outlet. And the World-Power must secure these economic spheres by various means-fleet demonstrations, forms of occupation, better still, a protectorate; best of all, complete subjection. Yes, that is the solution. The Home State must be not only a World State but one like the British, that guarantees an economy area extending over the whole earth. This tendency is political Imperialism, and the ultimate cause of the world

war.

Such, in brief, are the main points in Dr. Renner's analysis. From beginning to end it puts the responsibility on Germany as plainly as possible without saying so in so many words. The economic development he describes is pre-eminently that of Germany and in a secondary degree that of Austria. It does not fit any of the entente nations and does not apply at all to Great Britain, which is not a closed unit, as he admits, and is already a World-Power. All the phenomena he describes in detail-here omitted-with the dates marking successive stages, are true of Germany and of Germany only. The whole argument might be headed, Why Germany went to War.' The cause is not capitalism in general but German capitalism in particular, coupled with political imperialism. The Germans wanted to extend their economy area at the expense of their neighbours and could only do it by war. There were, he admits, other causes, weighty and interesting, but secondary, not determining. His exposition corresponds closely with Dr. Naumann's argument for Mittel-Europa, but it is much fuller, more precise, and wider in scope. He writes, however, not as an advocate but as a dispassionate observer seeking to elucidate the facts, and he expresses no moral judgment. The thing is there and he explains it as a scientific Marxian. Writing of the bourgeois idea of Nationalism, a little later on, he says that an empire is only ' autarch' or completely independent when it produces all the raw materials it needs. Hence Germany's future is on 'the water.'' Alongside of and in place of the British Empire 'we boldly set the German. We cannot do otherwise unless we would suffocate some day in capital and popular wealth.' That, he adds, is the ruling national idea of our time. It fully explains what the Germans mean when they say that the

war was forced on them. It was forced, not by the emy countries, but by the discrepancy between their position and their aspirations. There never was a war yet which might not be said to be forced on the people who began it by a similar process of reasoning. But the logic which drives a people to war for extending their sources of wealth in order to avoid suffocation by the wealth they already possess, is not exactly convincing. The motive of pure aggrandizement and dominion corresponding to their wealth fits the case better.

What is Dr. Renner's own attitude to the policy he thus interprets? As a Socialist he cannot expressly approve of the bourgeois national idea, but he certainly does not condemn it. His treatment of the question is of great interest because it throws light on the position of the German Socialists who support the war, and form the great majority of the party; if there were a Stockholm conference they would run it or try to run it, and they count on doing so. One learns from him the line of argument to be expected of them. He steers round awkward points with the dexterity of a practised advocate and smothers plain issues under a cloud of forensic arguments; but it is clear that he has far more sympathy with the 'ruling 'national idea' than with the old Socialist ideals represented by the minority, which he dismisses as Utopian. The German proletariate,' he says, has passionately taken up the idea of national unity and independence, and watches with sympathy the struggles of the small awakening nations in the Balkans and further East; but nation and State do not coincide in the Central Empires, where the wars of 1866 and 1870 left the Germans split up and other nations included in the State. This was accepted because it was

'more clearly recognized that States must be before everything united areas with firm military frontiers and organized economic life... Small and poor States guarantee neither the required capitalist nor any sort of Socialist development. If the map were arranged by strictly national lines you would have impossible frontiers, but before all you would have many small, poor States incapable of development. With all sympathy for the suffering small peoples one recognized that the principle of small nationalities carried out would be reactionary not revolutionary.'

The true ideal is self-government within a larger unit

without regard to historical or other boundaries-a limited measure of self-determination, but that guaranteed through the higher community-leading up to a league of States. This realizes internationalism, but for the present, frankly 'under the deliberate sole rule (beabsichtighten Alleinherrschaft) ' of one nation over many dependent peoples.' In other words, the way to the true international, which is at present a mere idea,' is to bring all the smaller States of Europe under the sole rule of the Central Powers (otherwise Germany) -a very pretty argument which may be commended to the Independent Labour Party and Sinn Fein. It justifies imperial aggrandizement as a step towards the Socialist ideal.

Dr. Renner's sympathy with the German war policy is further made clear when he comes to deal with the juridical theory of war. He bases his argument on the struggle for existence and the theories of German jurists that Law itself (Jus, Recht) is conflict. The struggle for existence pervades modern life, which is all conflict between individuals and classes. Conflict is the special signature and peculiar philosophy of our time. Hence the readiness of the masses for war, each individual feeling himself a fighter and striver in peace. In this sense the war is nothing but the struggle for existence of peoples and States. Other conflicts recede temporarily in the struggle of peoples; but there is no essential difference in kind. People's war is transformed class-war. But private and class-war take place on the field of a settled legal order which restricts their aims and means. The antagonisms remain, and the conflict continues, but it is civilized by the substitution of legal for personal action. Between States there is also a legal order-that of international law; but it is of a very precarious nature. The States are sovereign against each other, like individuals without a government ; there is no ordered tribunal between them and no legal decision. There is, therefore, no legal obligation to observe a treaty. He here refers to Spinoza's argument that no sovereign power ought to keep a promise injurious to itself because that would be breaking the promise made to its own people to maintain their interests, which takes precedence of other promises; and draws the corollary that observance of a treaty, when it was injurious, would be not only no legal duty but a moral crime. So it would be a crime for a State not to make war,

if it were the stronger. He further quotes an argument from Professor Lasson, enunciated at the significant date of 1871:

'A State is not there to be the innocent victim of foreign ill-will. One must at least allow it to defend its own skin, get space enough for existence, and secure the atmosphere in which alone it can breathe, though a thousand treaties were against it. The aspiring State which represents the principle of historical progress has the superior historical right; and all treaties must yield to the demand of historical development' (Prinzip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts.) '

We all know the name of the aspiring State which represents the principle of historical progress, and to which every knee must therefore bow. The same reasoning does not apply to any other, and it means in effect that Germany has a right to do anything she pleases. The citation from Lasson, who is one of the most violent of all the German professors (and they are more extreme than the soldiers), is highly significant in the mouth of a Socialist. Dr. Renner does not applaud Lasson's argument but he does not criticize it, and he incorporates it in his own analysis. He goes on to say that since there is no judge to decide which State represents the principle of historical development nothing is left but the right of the stronger and the survival of the fittest. He calls this a conflict for creating law, which he distinguishes from conflict for enforcing law. As for the latter, war must certainly be held justified, when its object is to enforce standing rights. These may be guaranteed by treaties between particular States or by conventions between several States. Violation of the latter is not breach of a treaty but breach of public order. Such is violation of the neutrality of a State guaranteed by international agreement; it is a revolt against the whole community of States. But by analogy with civil and criminal law there must be civil or criminal execution if treaty or convention rights have a juristic character; and since there is no court and no judicial execution for States they are driven to force. More than all economic influences, he says, the lack of an ordered legal process causes war, for between States force is the only means of pursuing rights. Then the question arises whether arbitrary force (Eigenmacht) is not itself unlawful. He answers in the negative with the assistance of German jurists and the German civil and criminal

code. The latter recognizes Notwehr or that self-defence which is required to repel a direct unlawful attack on oneself or another. Conduct produced by Notwehr is not unlawful, and he admits that Belgium can apply this definition to her own case. A State unlawfully attacked is justified in making war; but, of course, he goes on, we must not forget that it is almost impossible to determine on which side the attack lies. There is no competent and objective judge; so every people is compelled and entitled to judge for itself. But it appears that German law allows a good deal more than simple self-defence. Acts exceeding the necessity are not punishable when committed through bewilderment or terror. And there is also ' justifiable self-help,' which is the right to attack an unattacking person and use violence in various ways when official help cannot be secured in time, and there is a risk that the fulfilment of a claim may be frustrated or substantially hindered. This is war conduct when exhibited by a State. Even if self-help is used in error the law only requires compensation to be given. Further, there are wars which, though not exactly in pursuit of rights, must be recognized from the standpoint of the modern sense of right. Over and above Notwehr the civil law recognizes Notstand, or a state of need. It allows conduct intended to save life and limb of the person or dependents from immediate danger in a state of need not otherwise to be avoided. According to the German jurist, Ihering, law ceases in Notstand both in private and in national life. Anyone in Notstand acts by blind natural 'force in the a-moral animal sphere of necessity.' Not kennt kein gebot. Is there such a thing as Notstand war? If so 'the question whether it is justified or not has no meaning. 'There is only the question of fact whether real need is 'present. Real need occurs when the conditions of external 'growth and internal development of the life of a people are per'manently prejudiced, when these laws of life press beyond the 'inherited frontiers and constitutional boundaries and burst 'them.'

Here we have the German claim to override all law without disguise and the dictum Not kennt kein gebot adopted by a German Socialist. To leave no doubt on the subject he again refers to Lasson's dictum quoted above, and adds: 'Such real 'need occurs where dependent economy areas in consequence