The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 6
... figure — essential parts of their crafts . We often use everyday words like idea , knowledge , belief , value , skill , and attitude to describe this information , but we do not mean that such socially acquired information is always ...
... figure — essential parts of their crafts . We often use everyday words like idea , knowledge , belief , value , skill , and attitude to describe this information , but we do not mean that such socially acquired information is always ...
Стр. 22
... figure 1.1 , it is analogous to a confidence interval . The larger the value of d that characterizes the population , the more decisive the evidence must be before it will affect the individual's decision . Second , the value of d ...
... figure 1.1 , it is analogous to a confidence interval . The larger the value of d that characterizes the population , the more decisive the evidence must be before it will affect the individual's decision . Second , the value of d ...
Стр. 23
... Figure 1.1 . Illustrates the definition of p1 and p2 and their relationship to the parameter d . F ( x ) is the cumulative normal distribution , and f ( x ) is the normal density function . relative importance of social learning and ...
... Figure 1.1 . Illustrates the definition of p1 and p2 and their relationship to the parameter d . F ( x ) is the cumulative normal distribution , and f ( x ) is the normal density function . relative importance of social learning and ...
Стр. 27
... figures 1.2 and 1.3 , suggest that under a wide combination of migration rates and quality of individual ex- perience , it is optimal to employ a mixture of social ... figure d * 3.0 2.0 m = .01 1.0- m = SOCIAL LEARNING AS AN ADAPTATION 27.
... figures 1.2 and 1.3 , suggest that under a wide combination of migration rates and quality of individual ex- perience , it is optimal to employ a mixture of social ... figure d * 3.0 2.0 m = .01 1.0- m = SOCIAL LEARNING AS AN ADAPTATION 27.
Стр. 28
... Figure 1.2 . Plots the evolutionary equilibrium value of d , d , as a function of the quality of information available for individual learning , S , and for three levels of environmental heterogeneity , measured by m . 1.2 , the ESS ...
... Figure 1.2 . Plots the evolutionary equilibrium value of d , d , as a function of the quality of information available for individual learning , S , and for three levels of environmental heterogeneity , measured by m . 1.2 , the ESS ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |