The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 17
... amount of fine - scale environmental variability in space and time . Ancient mammals were dull because they lived in a dull , little - varying world , whereas modern mammals are sharp because they live in a world alive with rapid change ...
... amount of fine - scale environmental variability in space and time . Ancient mammals were dull because they lived in a dull , little - varying world , whereas modern mammals are sharp because they live in a world alive with rapid change ...
Стр. 24
... amount of social learning . If there is little individual learning , p, and pj will be very small , and social learning will ensure that the population remains very similar from one generation to the next . Thus , as individual learning ...
... amount of social learning . If there is little individual learning , p, and pj will be very small , and social learning will ensure that the population remains very similar from one generation to the next . Thus , as individual learning ...
Стр. 25
... amount of individual relative to social learning , but the rate of approach to that frequency does . In a variable environment , the expected fitness of individuals in the population likely will depend on the rate at which the ...
... amount of individual relative to social learning , but the rate of approach to that frequency does . In a variable environment , the expected fitness of individuals in the population likely will depend on the rate at which the ...
Стр. 27
... amount of social learning in a variable environment for 0 < m < 1 . The expected fitness of individuals using a learning rule characterized by the learning parameter d ' is given by E { w ( d ' ) } = W + D [ 91 ( d ) ( 1 − p1 ( d ...
... amount of social learning in a variable environment for 0 < m < 1 . The expected fitness of individuals using a learning rule characterized by the learning parameter d ' is given by E { w ( d ' ) } = W + D [ 91 ( d ) ( 1 − p1 ( d ...
Стр. 28
... amount of social learning is increased . Second , as the environment becomes less predictable ( i.e. , m increases ) , the optimal amount of social learning decreases . In figure 1.3 , we plot the probability that individuals rely on ...
... amount of social learning is increased . Second , as the environment becomes less predictable ( i.e. , m increases ) , the optimal amount of social learning decreases . In figure 1.3 , we plot the probability that individuals rely on ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |