The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 8
... cost . To get the benefits of social learning , humans have to be credulous , for the most part accepting the ways ... costs . The advantage of culture is that individuals don't have to invent everything for themselves . We get wondrous ...
... cost . To get the benefits of social learning , humans have to be credulous , for the most part accepting the ways ... costs . The advantage of culture is that individuals don't have to invent everything for themselves . We get wondrous ...
Стр. 9
... cost but perhaps greater risk of error . The research reported in these chapters suggests that this kind of reasoning leads to conclusions quite differ- ent from those of other evolutionary theories of human behavior . Under the right ...
... cost but perhaps greater risk of error . The research reported in these chapters suggests that this kind of reasoning leads to conclusions quite differ- ent from those of other evolutionary theories of human behavior . Under the right ...
Стр. 15
... costs of learning ; imitators are scroungers who profit from the costly learning efforts of others . In the model presented in chapter 1 , the possibility of imitation increases the efficiency of learning by allowing learners to be ...
... costs of learning ; imitators are scroungers who profit from the costly learning efforts of others . In the model presented in chapter 1 , the possibility of imitation increases the efficiency of learning by allowing learners to be ...
Стр. 17
... costs of learning for one's self in the style of the model of chapter 1 is a trick to finesse information costs . Conforming to the majority is an inexpensive rule to apply , compared , say , to doing experiments on the alternative ...
... costs of learning for one's self in the style of the model of chapter 1 is a trick to finesse information costs . Conforming to the majority is an inexpensive rule to apply , compared , say , to doing experiments on the alternative ...
Стр. 18
... cost . We do not tout this family of models and our interpretations of them as any more than a first attempt at explaining why social learning evolves , especially how our own extraordinary system of complex culture has evolved . We do ...
... cost . We do not tout this family of models and our interpretations of them as any more than a first attempt at explaining why social learning evolves , especially how our own extraordinary system of complex culture has evolved . We do ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |