The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 14
... Individuals can evaluate the quality of their individual experience and use this rule : if individual experience is sufficiently accurate , rely on it ; otherwise , imitate . Some individuals move about on the landscape and may find ...
... Individuals can evaluate the quality of their individual experience and use this rule : if individual experience is sufficiently accurate , rely on it ; otherwise , imitate . Some individuals move about on the landscape and may find ...
Стр. 15
... individual learning . In Rogers's model , the only benefit to imitation is that it allows individuals to avoid the costs of learning ; imitators are scroungers who profit from the costly learning efforts of others . In the model ...
... individual learning . In Rogers's model , the only benefit to imitation is that it allows individuals to avoid the costs of learning ; imitators are scroungers who profit from the costly learning efforts of others . In the model ...
Стр. 21
... individuals experience the behavior of a number of expe- rienced individuals , and that this behavior varies , how should social learning be structured ? Here we will consider a model in which naive individuals are exposed to a finite ...
... individuals experience the behavior of a number of expe- rienced individuals , and that this behavior varies , how should social learning be structured ? Here we will consider a model in which naive individuals are exposed to a finite ...
Стр. 22
... individual is to determine which of the two habitats it is in . Individuals in the model have two sources of infor- mation available to help them solve this problem . Each individual obtains evidence from its own experience : any ...
... individual is to determine which of the two habitats it is in . Individuals in the model have two sources of infor- mation available to help them solve this problem . Each individual obtains evidence from its own experience : any ...
Стр. 23
... individual's model . Suppose that a fraction q , of individuals in cohort t acquired behavior 1 . A fraction p, of the naive individuals in cohort t will acquire behavior 1 based on their own experience , and a fraction q ( 1 - P1 — pz ) ...
... individual's model . Suppose that a fraction q , of individuals in cohort t acquired behavior 1 . A fraction p, of the naive individuals in cohort t will acquire behavior 1 based on their own experience , and a fraction q ( 1 - P1 — pz ) ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |