The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 7
... less attractive alter- natives tend to disappear . Some skills are easy to learn accurately while others are likely to be transformed during social learning . Some beliefs cause people to be more likely to be imitated , because the ...
... less attractive alter- natives tend to disappear . Some skills are easy to learn accurately while others are likely to be transformed during social learning . Some beliefs cause people to be more likely to be imitated , because the ...
Стр. 9
... less complete . Then we took up culture , whose evolution is completely con- trolled by the preexisting evolved mind . First , we got human nature by genetic evolution ; then , culture happened as an evolutionary by - product . This way ...
... less complete . Then we took up culture , whose evolution is completely con- trolled by the preexisting evolved mind . First , we got human nature by genetic evolution ; then , culture happened as an evolutionary by - product . This way ...
Стр. 15
... less individual learning and bias than would be optimal from the point of view of the population because of the altruistic effect of social learning on future members of the population . Kameda and Nakanishi ( 2002 ) have shown ...
... less individual learning and bias than would be optimal from the point of view of the population because of the altruistic effect of social learning on future members of the population . Kameda and Nakanishi ( 2002 ) have shown ...
Стр. 22
... less than -d , then it acquires behavior 2 . This is our attempt to capture the essence of the processes of individual learning . Finally , if -d < x ≤d , then the individual imitates the behavior of a single individual chosen at ...
... less than -d , then it acquires behavior 2 . This is our attempt to capture the essence of the processes of individual learning . Finally , if -d < x ≤d , then the individual imitates the behavior of a single individual chosen at ...
Стр. 24
... less than half ; if p2 / pi < 1 , q > \. The fraction choosing alternative 1 at equilibrium does not depend ( directly ) on the relative importance of social learning versus individual learning in determining the behavior of individuals ...
... less than half ; if p2 / pi < 1 , q > \. The fraction choosing alternative 1 at equilibrium does not depend ( directly ) on the relative importance of social learning versus individual learning in determining the behavior of individuals ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |