The Origin and Evolution of Cultures

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Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science.

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THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL LEARNING
13
Social Learning as an Adaptation
19
Why Does Culture Increase Human Adaptability?
35
Why Culture Is Common but Cultural Evolution Is Rare
52
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition
66
Norms and Bounded Rationality
83
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS
99
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers
103
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population
227
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment
241
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation
251
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY
283
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History
287
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible?
310
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis
337
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES
375

Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers
118
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION
133
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups
145
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups
166
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas
189
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test
204
Rationality Imitation and Tradition
379
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution
397
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap?
420
Author Index
437
Subject Index
446
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