The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 14
... random with respect to their mom's environment , imitation information is useless , and the adaptive strategy is to depend only upon individual learning — personal expe- rience . In between these limits , some weighted average of ...
... random with respect to their mom's environment , imitation information is useless , and the adaptive strategy is to depend only upon individual learning — personal expe- rience . In between these limits , some weighted average of ...
Стр. 15
... random . Rogers showed that the evolu- tion of imitation in such a population behaves curiously . Social learning tends to be favored ; under many conditions , a fair frequency of imitators exists at evolutionary equilibrium . However ...
... random . Rogers showed that the evolu- tion of imitation in such a population behaves curiously . Social learning tends to be favored ; under many conditions , a fair frequency of imitators exists at evolutionary equilibrium . However ...
Стр. 22
... random variable , x . If the en- vironment is in state 1 , the mean value of x is M ; if it is in state 2 , the mean value of x is -M . In other words , the true state of the environment is either M or -M . Individuals acquire an ...
... random variable , x . If the en- vironment is in state 1 , the mean value of x is M ; if it is in state 2 , the mean value of x is -M . In other words , the true state of the environment is either M or -M . Individuals acquire an ...
Стр. 31
... random from the population . With these assumptions , the frequency of behavior 1 in environment ; after individual and social learning , tj , is atj = n i = 1 n - - 9t , j ) ” — i × { A¡ ( 1 − Pj ( di ) — P12 ( di ) ) + Pj1 ( di ) ...
... random from the population . With these assumptions , the frequency of behavior 1 in environment ; after individual and social learning , tj , is atj = n i = 1 n - - 9t , j ) ” — i × { A¡ ( 1 − Pj ( di ) — P12 ( di ) ) + Pj1 ( di ) ...
Стр. 32
... random from the population , a predominance of one behavior among the models indi- cates that the behavior is more common in the population from which the models were drawn and , therefore , likely to be adaptive . An even mix of ...
... random from the population , a predominance of one behavior among the models indi- cates that the behavior is more common in the population from which the models were drawn and , therefore , likely to be adaptive . An even mix of ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |