The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
Результаты поиска по книге
Результаты 1 – 5 из 66
Стр. 5
... rules of so- cial games . Our ape relations can learn only rudimentary bits of language and rudimentary technical and social skills . They have only rudimentary cultural traditions of any kind . Most of what human organic evolution has ...
... rules of so- cial games . Our ape relations can learn only rudimentary bits of language and rudimentary technical and social skills . They have only rudimentary cultural traditions of any kind . Most of what human organic evolution has ...
Стр. 6
... rules , or economic organization , such scholars pre- fer almost any economic or ecological explanation , no matter how far - fetched , over explanations that invoke cultural history . From table talk we gather that one reason is that ...
... rules , or economic organization , such scholars pre- fer almost any economic or ecological explanation , no matter how far - fetched , over explanations that invoke cultural history . From table talk we gather that one reason is that ...
Стр. 14
... rule : if individual experience is sufficiently accurate , rely on it ; otherwise , imitate . Some individuals move ... rules ( Boyd and Richerson , 1985 ) . The models can also be modified to take account of social learning within , as ...
... rule : if individual experience is sufficiently accurate , rely on it ; otherwise , imitate . Some individuals move ... rules ( Boyd and Richerson , 1985 ) . The models can also be modified to take account of social learning within , as ...
Стр. 17
... rule to follow . These quick - and - dirty rules of thumb have interesting evolutionary side effects . In part III we discuss how conformity reduces within - group cultural variation , making group - level selection a more plausible ...
... rule to follow . These quick - and - dirty rules of thumb have interesting evolutionary side effects . In part III we discuss how conformity reduces within - group cultural variation , making group - level selection a more plausible ...
Стр. 18
... rules is that under some conditions they can give rise to maladaptive behavior . Consider a moral norm that is maintained by a combi- nation of conformity and success - based bias . Some such norms , for example , the mutilation of ...
... rules is that under some conditions they can give rise to maladaptive behavior . Consider a moral norm that is maintained by a combi- nation of conformity and success - based bias . Some such norms , for example , the mutilation of ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |