The Origin and Evolution of CulturesLos Angeles Robert Boyd Professor of Anthropology University of California, Davis Peter J. Richerson Professor of Environmental Science and Policy University of California Oxford University Press, USA, 22 дек. 2004 г. - Всего страниц: 464 Oxford presents, in one convenient and coherently organized volume, 20 influential but until now relatively inaccessible articles that form the backbone of Boyd and Richerson's path-breaking work on evolution and culture. Their interdisciplinary research is based on two notions. First, that culture is crucial for understanding human behavior; unlike other organisms, socially transmitted beliefs, attitudes, and values heavily influence our behavior. Secondly, culture is part of biology: the capacity to acquire and transmit culture is a derived component of human psychology, and the contents of culture are deeply intertwined with our biology. Culture then is a pool of information, stored in the brains of the population that gets transmitted from one brain to another by social learning processes. Therefore, culture can account for both our outstanding ecological success as well as the maladaptations that characterize much of human behavior. The interest in this collection will span anthropology, psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. |
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Стр. 24
... stable strategies ( ESS ) approach . That is , we assume that an individual's learning rule is affected by a genetic locus at which two alleles , a com- mon allele , H , and a very rare allele , h , are segregating . Most individuals in ...
... stable strategies ( ESS ) approach . That is , we assume that an individual's learning rule is affected by a genetic locus at which two alleles , a com- mon allele , H , and a very rare allele , h , are segregating . Most individuals in ...
Стр. 26
... stable equilibrium is reached . Due to the assumed symmetry of the model , we know that any equilibrium at which both behaviors are present must satisfy 91 = 1-92 ( 9 ) where a is the fraction of individuals acquiring behavior 1 in ...
... stable equilibrium is reached . Due to the assumed symmetry of the model , we know that any equilibrium at which both behaviors are present must satisfy 91 = 1-92 ( 9 ) where a is the fraction of individuals acquiring behavior 1 in ...
Стр. 30
... stable solutions to this problem . Begin by considering an individual exposed to i models using behavior 1 and n - i models using behavior 2. Once again assume that the individual observes the variable x that indicates the state of the ...
... stable solutions to this problem . Begin by considering an individual exposed to i models using behavior 1 and n - i models using behavior 2. Once again assume that the individual observes the variable x that indicates the state of the ...
Стр. 31
... stable symmetric equilibrium such that the favored behavior is common in each habitat , that is , a1 = 1-92 > . We will refer to this as the symmetric equilibrium . Depending on the values of A t and di t there may also be other stable ...
... stable symmetric equilibrium such that the favored behavior is common in each habitat , that is , a1 = 1-92 > . We will refer to this as the symmetric equilibrium . Depending on the values of A t and di t there may also be other stable ...
Стр. 37
... stable long - run outcomes . Since the fitness of the learners is constant , it follows that the evolutionarily stable mix of learners and imitators has the same fitness as a population composed only of learners . Two Extensions of ...
... stable long - run outcomes . Since the fitness of the learners is constant , it follows that the evolutionarily stable mix of learners and imitators has the same fitness as a population composed only of learners . Two Extensions of ...
Содержание
13 | |
19 | |
35 | |
52 | |
Climate Culture and the Evolution of Cognition | 66 |
Norms and Bounded Rationality | 83 |
ETHNIC GROUPS AND MARKERS | 99 |
The Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 103 |
GroupBeneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population | 227 |
The Evolution of Altruistic Punishment | 241 |
Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation | 251 |
ARCHAEOLOGY AND CULTURE HISTORY | 283 |
How Microevolutionary Processes Give Rise to History | 287 |
Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible? | 310 |
Was Agriculture Impossible during the Pleistocene but Mandatory during the Holocene? A Climate Change Hypothesis | 337 |
LINKS TO OTHER DISCIPLINES | 375 |
Shared Norms and the Evolution of Ethnic Markers | 118 |
HUMAN COOPERATION RECIPROCITY AND GROUP SELECTION | 133 |
The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups | 145 |
Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation or Anything Else in Sizable Groups | 166 |
Why People Punish Defectors Weak Conformist Transmission Can Stabilize Costly Enforcement of Norms in Cooperative Dilemmas | 189 |
Can GroupFunctional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group Selection? An Empirical Test | 204 |
Rationality Imitation and Tradition | 379 |
Simple Models of Complex Phenomena The Case of Cultural Evolution | 397 |
Memes Universal Acid or a Better Mousetrap? | 420 |
Author Index | 437 |
Subject Index | 446 |
Часто встречающиеся слова и выражения
acquire adaptive agriculture animals argue assume average fitness average payoff beliefs benefits biology Boyd and Richerson brain Cambridge Cavalli-Sforza climate cognitive common complex conformist transmission contingent cooperation cost costly cultural change cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural transmission cultural variation Darwinian defection defectors depends diffusion dividuals effect environment environmental equilibrium evolution of cooperation evolutionary biology evolutionary process evolve example expected fitness explain extinction favored Feldman frequency function Galef genes genetic group-beneficial habitat Henrich Holocene human behavior hunter-gatherers imitation important individual learning inheritance initial innovations institutions kin selection lead learners marker traits migration natural selection norms observational learning organization P. J. Richerson parameter phylogenies plausible Pleistocene prisoner's dilemma probability problem psychology punishment R₁ random reciprocating strategies relatively result Science similar simple models social interaction social learning societies species spread subsistence suggest transmitted University Press Upper Paleolithic variable W. D. Hamilton Younger Dryas
Ссылки на эту книгу
Language, Consciousness, Culture: Essays on Mental Structure Ray Jackendoff Ограниченный просмотр - 2007 |
People and Nature: An Introduction to Human Ecological Relations Emilio F. Moran Недоступно для просмотра - 2006 |