PREPARATIONS FOR INVASION.

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an enemy, who, if she succeeded to the English throne, would, through her connection with the Guises, be as dangerous to him as she now was to the queen of England! *

The death of 'Mary may have preserved England from the religious struggle which would have ensued upon her succession to the throne, but it delivered Elizabeth from only one, and that the weakest of her enemies; and it exposed her to a charge of injustice and cruelty, which, being itself well founded, obtained belief for any other accusation, however extravagantly false. It was not Philip alone who prepared for making war upon her with a feeling of personal hatred: throughout Romish Christendom she was represented as a monster of iniquity; that representation was assiduously set forth not only in ephemeral libels, but in histories, in dramas, in poems, and in hawkers' pamphlets †; and when the king of Spain equipped an armament for the invasion of England, volunteers entered it with a passionate persuasion that they were about to bear a part in a holy war against the wickedest and most inhuman of tyrants. The pope exhorted Philip to engage in this great enterprize for the sake of the Roman catholic and apostolic church, which could not be more effectually nor more meritoriously extended than by the conquest of England; so should he avenge his own private and public wrongs; so should he indeed prove himself most worthy of the glorious title of Most Catholic King. And he promised, as soon as his troops should have set foot in that island, to supply him with a million of crowns of gold towards the expenses of the expedition. Opportunity could never be more favourable: he had concluded a truce with the Turk; the French were em

* Turner, 643. Bayle's critique on Maimbourg's Hist. of Calvinism there quoted.

They are circulated to this day in Spain and Portugal.

The money, however, was not forthcoming. Strada, when he relates the offer, adds, "quod magis Xysti magnanimitatem ostendit, quam belli subsidium fuit: quippe, ut partem hujus summæ aliquam pontifex elargiretur ante præfinitum hoc tempus, nullis adduci potuit aut Hispani legati, aut Cæsii comitis à Parmensi duce propterea Romam missi, persuasioni

broiled in civil war, and could offer to him no opposition. England was without forts or defences: long peace had left it unprovided of commanders or soldiers; and it was full of catholics, who would joyfully flock to his standard. The conquest of Portugal had not been easier than that of England would be found; and when England was once conquered, the Low Countries would presently be reduced to obedience.

Such exhortations accorded with the ambition, the passions, and the rooted principles of the king of Spain. The undertaking was resolved on; and while preparations were making upon the most formidable scale, it was deliberated on what plan to proceed. Sir William Stanley, the most noted of those persons who for conscience-sake betrayed their trust, deserted to the enemy, and bore arms against this country, advised that Ireland should be the first point of attack. He knew that country well, having served in it fifteen years; and if Waterford, he said, were once taken and fortified, the Spaniards might from thence reduce the one island and invade the other. Piatti was of opinion that it were better to begin with Scotland, where he was led to believe the king might be induced to join with them for the sake of revenging his mother's death. Having established a footing there, he thought the Isle of Wight should next be occupied. A noble inhabitant of that island had promised the prince of Parma to show him a place, known only to himself, by which ships could approach, and in four-and-twenty hours obtain possession of it; and he laid before Philip a plan of the island, and a memoir concerning it, which had been drawn up at the prince of Parma's desire. The marquis of Santa Cruz, who was to be commander in chief, objected to neither of these plans, but he urged the necessity of perpending all things well before an expedition should be sent out, in which Spain put forth all her strength: and he advised that a port should previously be secured, either in Ireland, or, which he thought more desirable, in Holland or Zeeland. The enterprize might safely be

undertaken, if the fleet were thus rendered secure on that side. This was the opinion which the prince of Parna supported in his letters. He represented the danger of venturing such a fleet in the British seas without providing a harbour into which it might retreat; and Flushing, he said, was the only one in the Low Countries capacious enough for so great a force. Now, that he had taken Sluys, Flushing might more easily be captured; and he strongly advised that the capture of this place should be effected before the armada ventured into those seas. It was a conquest which, with God's help, he undertook to make. But, in thus advising, the prince had a farther object; he was not willing that Spain should divert its attention from the Low Countries, which he had no doubt of subjugating, if only a part of the force designed for England were employed for that purpose. Those countries once subdued, England would be open to invasion; and of this, which he saw clearly himself, he hoped to convince the king, if he could first persuade him to let the siege of Flushing be undertaken.*

But Philip would hear of no delay. The troubles in France, and the treaty with the Turks, allowed him at this time to direct his whole attention towards England: it was even less costly to punish that country by an invasion, than to defend the coasts of his own empire against her piratical enterprises; and he felt himself bound to exact vengeance for the death of the queen of Scots, in which cause all sovereign princes were concerned. Objecting, therefore, to any attempt upon Ireland, which would be opening a new theatre of war, or to any delay which would allow the enemy time to prepare for defence, he directed the prince to take what measures he thought best for exciting the Scotch to arms; but meantime to make ready with all speed for co-operating with the expedition, which would set sail as soon as he should be in readiness.† Upon another point, also, there had been a difference of opinion among Philip's advisers: some of whom thought * Strada, 528-531.

+ Ibid. 582.

that war should be proclaimed against England, both to remove suspicion from other powers, and to alarm Elizabeth, who might then be induced to levy foreign troops for her defence; which if she did, it was to be expected that those troops, according to the usual insolence of mercenaries, would so demean themselves, as to excite discontent among the English people, and consequent confusion.* The formality of declaring war was, however, disregarded as a mere form on both sides; and on the part of the Spaniards it was deemed more politic to disturb the English with apprehensions of some great but indefinite danger, and at the same time divert them from making any effectual preparation for defence, by carrying on negotiations in the Low Countries, without the slightest intention of assenting to any terms of reconciliation that could be proposed.

The prince of Parma, therefore, while he prepared for the invasion with his characteristic diligence, which left nothing undone, opened a negotiation with England, to which Elizabeth, notwithstanding the urgent remonstrances of the States, gave ear, yet with a just suspicion that the proposal was insincerely made. Leicester, who had unwisely been entrusted with the command of the English auxiliaries, had conducted himself neither to the satisfaction of the States nor of his own government: the English and Dutch had not been found to agree when they came to act together, under circumstances that brought their national qualities into close and unamiable contrast †: the Dutch, too, were divided among themselves; so that there seemed little hope that England could afford them any such assistance as might enable them to obtain the objects for which they had taken up arms, and still less of any such happy termination, if they were left to themselves. With regard to England, it was the opinion of her greatest

* Camden, 404.

+"Plurimum autem differunt harum nationum ingenia et mores; nam Angli, ut addicte serviunt, ita evecti ad dignitates priorem humilitatem insolentiá rependunt; Belgarum est parere et imperare cum modo, nec gens ulla fidelius amat eminentes, aut iisdem, si contemtus adsit, impla cabilius irascitur."- Grotius, 95.

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NEGOTIATIONS AT OSTEND.

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statesman, Cecil, that a peace was not only desirable, but most necessary; but it must be such a peace as should be clear and assured, leaving no such occasion of quarrel as had hitherto existed; the queen's subjects must be free from the Inquisition; and the people of the Low Countries not impeached for any thing which had past; but allowed to enjoy their liberties and franchises, and to have the use of their religion, now openly professed in their churches, for which they had so long stood to their defence.* The Dutch were well convinced that all negotiation was useless, and therefore refused to take any part: the English commissioners, however, met those of the king of Spain at Ostend: they first proposed a suspension of arms, thereby to stay the coming of the Spanish fleet;" and to this the Spanish commissioners seemed to incline, craftily thereby seeking to persuade them that it was not intended against England. They asked for the renewal of old treaties and intercourse; the repayment of such sums as the queen had advanced to the States, not requiring this from the king, but that he should authorise the States to collect money for this purpose: farther, they required that foreign governors and foreign troops should, for the queen's safety, be withdrawn from the Low Countries; that the people might enjoy their ancient liberties and privileges, and be governed by their countrymen, not by strangers; and that there might be a toleration for two years at least, during which time the matter of religion should be ordered and established by the States. If these terms were concluded, the queen would agree to any reasonable conditions concerning the cautionary towns, that all the world might know she had taken possession of them not to aggrandise herself, but for her own necessary assurance and defence. †

To the more important of these proposals it was replied, that the king could not withdraw his troops till the States had submitted themselves, nor while the French * Strype's Annals, vol. iii. part 2. p.5. + Grimestone, 986.